

*Question is brought to this issue, Whether the object of Sight be the cause that it is Seen. But for these words, proposing of the object by the Understanding to the Will, I understand them not.*

*Again, he often useth such words as these, The Will willeth; the Will suspendeth its act, (id est, the Will willeth not; ) the Understanding proposeth; the Understanding understandeth. Herein also lyeth the whole Question: If they be true, I; if false, He is in the error.*

*Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, Whether he that willingly permitterh a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not Will the doing of it.*

*Again, the whole Question of Free-will is included in this, Whether the Will determine it self.*

*Again, it is included in this, Whether there be an universal Grace, which particular men can take, without a particular Grace to take it.*

*Lastly, there be two Questions; one, Whether a man be free in such things as are within his power, to do what he Will; another, Whether he be free to Will. Which is as much as to say, (because will is Appetite) it is one Question, Whether he be free to eat that has an Appetite; and another, Whether he be free to have an Appetite. In the former, Whether a man be free to do what he Will, I agree with the Bishop: In the latter, Whether he be free to Will, I dissent from him. And therefore all the places of Scripture, that he alleadgeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he Will, are impertinent to the Question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two Questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he Will, is to deale uningeniously and fraudulently with his Readers. And thus much for the State of the Question.*

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