



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
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A

TREATISE

Concerning the

PRINCIPLES

OF

Human Knowlege.

PART I.

Wherein the chief Cauſes of Error and Difficulty in the *Sciences*, with the Grounds of *Scepticiſm*, *Atheiſm*, and *Irreligion*, are inquir'd into.

By *George Berkeley*, M. A. Fellow of *Trinity-College*, *Dublin*.

DUBLIN:

Printed by AARON RHAMES, for JEREMY PEPYAT, Bookſeller in *Skinner-Row*, 1710.

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TO THE

Right Honourable

THOMAS

EARL OF

PEMBROKE, &c.

Knight of the *Moſt Noble Order*
of the GARTER,
AND
One of the *Lords* of Her
MAJESTY's Moſt Honourable
PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

YOu'll, perhaps, wonder that an obſcure Perſon, who has not the Honour to be known to Your Lordſhip, ſhou'd preſume to Addreſs You in this manner. But

that a Man, who has Written ſomething with a deſign to promote *uſeful Knowlege* and *Religion* in the World, ſhou'd make Choice of Your Lordſhip for his Patron, will not be thought ſtrange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the preſent State of the Church and Learning, and conſequently ignorant how great an Ornament and Support You are to both. Yet, nothing cou'd have induced me to make You this preſent of my poor Endeavours, were I not Encourag'd by that Candour and Native Goodneſs, which is ſo bright a Part in Your Lordſhip's Character. I might add, my Lord, that the Extraordinary Favour and Bounty You have been pleas'd

to

to ſhew towards our Society, gave me Hopes, You'd not be unwilling to countenance the Studies of one of its Members. Theſe Conſiderations determin'd me to lay this Treatiſe at Your Lordſhip's Feet. And the rather, becauſe I was Ambitious to have it known, that I am with the trueſt and moſt profound Reſpect, on account of that Learning and Vertue which the World ſo juſtly Admires in Your Lordſhip,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt Humble

And moſt Devoted

Servant.

George Berkeley.

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THE PREFACE.

WHat I here make Publick has, after a long and ſcrupulous Inquiry, ſeem'd to me evidently true, and not unuſeful to be known, particularly to thoſe who are tainted with Scepticiſm, or want a Demonſtration of the Exiſtence and Immateriality of GOD, or the Natural Immortality of the Soul. Whether it be ſo or no, I am content the Reader ſhou'd impartially Examine. Since I do not think my ſelf any farther concern'd for the Succeſs of what I have Written, than as it is agreeable to Truth. But to the end This may not ſuffer, I make it my Requeſt that the Reader ſuſpend his Judgment, till he has once, at leaſt, read the whole through with that degree of Attention and Thought which the ſubject Matter ſhall ſeem to deſerve. For as there are ſome Paſſages that, taken by themſelves,

ſelves, are very liable (nor cou'd it be remedied) to groſs Miſinterpretation, and to be charged with moſt abſurd Conſequences, which, nevertheleſs, upon an intire peruſal will appear not to follow from them: So likewiſe, thô the whole ſhou'd be read over, yet, if this be done Tranſiently, 'tis very probable my Senſe may be miſtaken; but to a Thinking Reader, I flatter my ſelf, it will be throughout Clear and Obvious. As for the Characters of Novelty and Singularity, which ſome of the following Notions may ſeem to bear, 'tis, I hope, needleſs to make any Apology on that account. He muſt ſurely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the Sciences, who ſhall reject a Truth, that is capable of Demonſtration, for no other Reaſon but becauſe it's newly known and contrary to the Prejudices of Mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premiſe, in order to prevent, if poſſible, the haſty Cenſures of a ſort of Men, who are too apt to condemn an Opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

ERRATA.

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ERRATA.

Pag.	Lin.		Pag.	Lin.	
60	14	for *one*, read *own*.	125	7	after *by*, r. *the*.
61	11	for *ſhou'd*, r. *might*.	131	3	for *many*, r. *may*.
ibid	14	after *Intelligence*, r. *without the help of External Bodies*	156	10	for *ſhew*, r. *ſhewing*.
160	19	after *relation*, r. *in*.			
83	9	for *came*, r. *come*.	165	7	for *any* r. *ſome*.
121	7	after *there*, r. *are*.	187	19	for *have* r. *hath*.
124	1	f. *acception*, r. *acceptation*.			

☞ Page 12, line 5, after *General Ideas whatſoever*, theſe Words are to be Inſerted, *viz.* To be plain, I own my ſelf able to abſtract in one Senſe, as when I conſider ſome particular Parts or Qualities ſeparated from others, with which thô they are united in ſome Object, yet it is poſſible they may really Exiſt without them. But I deny that I can abſtract from one another, or conceive ſeparately, thoſe Qualities which it is impoſſible ſhou'd Exiſt ſo ſeparated; or that I can frame a General Notion by abſtracting from Particulars in the manner aforeſaid. Which two laſt are the proper Acceptations of *Abſtraction*.

OF

Introduction.

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth, it may with reason be expected, that those who have spent most Time and Pains in it shou'd enjoy a greater calm and serenity of Mind, a greater clearness and evidence of Knowlege, and be less disturb'd with Doubts and Difficulties than other Men. Yet so it is, we see the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Sense, and are govern'd by the Dictates of Nature, for the most part easy and undisturb'd. To them nothing that's familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of Evidence in their Senses, and are out of all danger of becoming *Sceptics*. But no sooner do we depart from Sense and Instinct to follow the Light of a Superior Prin-

ciple, to reaſon, meditate and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thouſand Scruples ſpring up in our Minds, concerning thoſe Things which before we ſeem'd fully to comprehend. Prejudices and Errors of Senſe do from all Parts diſcover themſelves to our view; and endeavouring to correct theſe by Reaſon we are inſenſibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and Inconſiſtences, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in Speculation; till at length, having wander'd thro' many intricate Mazes, we find our ſelves juſt where we were, or, which is worſe, ſit down in a forelorn Scepticiſm.

§ 2. The cauſe of this is thought to be the Obſcurity of things, or the natural Weakneſs and Imperfection of our Underſtandings. It is ſaid the Faculties we have are few, and thoſe deſign'd by Nature for the Support and Pleaſure of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Eſſence and Conſtitution of Things. Beſides, the Mind of Man

Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity, it's not to be wonder'd at, if it run into Abſurdities and Contradictions, out of which it is impoſſible it ſhou'd ever extricate it ſelf, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite.

§ 3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to our ſelves in placing the Fault originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong uſe we make of them. It is a hard thing to ſuppoſe, that right Deductions from true Principles ſhou'd ever end in Conſequences which cannot be maintain'd or made conſiſtent. We ſhou'd believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a ſtrong deſire for that Knowlege, which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted, indulgent Methods of Providence, which, whatever Appetites it may have implanted in the Creatures, doth uſually furniſh 'em with ſuch means as, if

rightly made uſe of, will not fail to ſatisfie them. Upon the whole, I am inclin'd to think that the far greater Part, if not all, of thoſe Difficulties which have hitherto amus'd Philoſophers, and block'd up the way to Knowlege, are intirely owing to our ſelves. That we have firſt rais'd a Duſt, and then complain, we cannot ſee.

§ 4. My Purpoſe therefore is, to try if I can diſcover what thoſe Principles are, which have introduced all that Doubtfulneſs and Uncertainty, thoſe Abſurdities and Contradictions into the ſeveral Sects of Philoſophy; inſomuch that the Wiſeſt Men have thought our Ignorance incurable, conceiving it to ariſe from the natural dulneſs and limitation of our Faculties. And ſurely it is a Work well deſerving our Pains, to make a ſtrict inquiry concerning the firſt Principles of *Human Knowlege*, to Sift and examine them on all ſides, eſpecially ſince there may be ſome Grounds to ſuſpect that thoſe Lets and Difficulties, which ſtay and embarraſs the Mind in it's

it's ſearch after Truth, do not ſpring from any Darkneſs and Intricacy in the Objects, or natural Defect in the Underſtanding, ſo much as from falſe Principles which have been inſiſted on, and might have been avoided.

§ 5. How difficult and diſcouraging ſoever this Attempt may ſeem, when I conſider what a number of very great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the like Deſigns: Yet I am not without ſome Hopes, upon the Conſideration that the largeſt Views are not always the Cleareſt, and that he who is Short-ſighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a cloſe and narrow Survey diſcern that which had eſcaped far better Eyes.

§ 6. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the eaſier conceiving what follows, I thought it proper to premiſe ſomewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abuſe of Language. But the unraveling this Matter leads me in ſome meaſure to anticipate

anticipate my Design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering Speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have occasion'd innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almost all parts of Knowlege. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a power of framing *Abstract Ideas* or Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect Stranger to the Writings and Disputes of Philosophers, must needs acknowlege that no small part of them are spent about abstract Ideas. These are, in a more especial manner, thought to be the Object of those Sciences which go by the name of *Logic* and *Metaphysics*, and of all that which passes under the Notion of the most abstracted and sublime Learning, in all which one shall scarce find any Question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their Existence in the Mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

§ 7. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by

it

it ſelf, and ſeparated from all others, but are mix'd, as it were, and blended together, ſeveral in the ſame Object. But we are told, the Mind being able to conſider each Quality ſingly, or abſtracted from thoſe other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it ſelf abſtract Ideas. For example, there is perceiv'd by Sight an Object extended, coloured, and moved: This mix'd or compound Idea the mind reſolving into it's Simple, conſtituent Parts, and viewing each by it ſelf, excluſive of the reſt, does frame the abſtract Ideas of Extenſion, Colour & Motion. Not that it is poſſible for Colour or Motion to exiſt without Extenſion, but only that the Mind can frame to it ſelf by *Abſtraction* the Idea of Colour excluſive of Extenſion, and of Motion excluſive of both Colour and Extenſion.

§ 8. Again, the Mind having obſerv'd that in the particular Extenſions perceiv'd by Senſe, there is ſomething common and alike in all, and ſome other things peculiar, as this or that Figure

gure or Magnitude, which diſtinguiſh them one from another; it conſiders apart or ſingles out by it ſelf that which is common, making thereof a moſt abſtract Idea of Extenſion, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea intirely preſcinded from all theſe. So likewiſe the Mind by leaving out of the particular Colours perceiv'd by Senſe, that which diſtinguiſhes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abſtract which is neither Red, nor Blue, nor White, *&c.* And in like manner by conſidering Motion abſtractedly not only from the Body moved, but likewiſe from the Figure it deſcribes, and all particular Directions and Velocities, the abſtract Idea of Motion is framed; which equally correſponds to all particular Motions whatſoever that may be perceiv'd by Senſe.

§ 9. And as the Mind frames to it ſelf abſtract Ideas of Qualities or Modes, ſo does it, by the ſame preciſion or mental

mental Separation, attain abſtract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include ſeveral coexiſtent Qualities. For example, the Mind having obſerv'd that *Peter*, *James* and *John*, &c. reſemble each other, in certain common Agreements of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of *Peter*, *James*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and ſo makes an abſtract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abſtracting intirely from and cutting off all thoſe Circumſtances and Differences, which might determine it to any particular Exiſtence. And after this manner it is ſaid we come by the abſtract Idea of *Man* or, if you pleaſe, Humanity or Humane Nature. wherein 'tis true, there's included Colour, becauſe there is no Man but has ſome Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor Black, nor any particular Colour; becauſe there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewiſe there is included Stature, but then 'tis neither Tall

Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but ſomething abſtracted from all theſe; and ſo of the reſt. Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in ſome Parts, but not all, of the complex Idea of *Man*, the Mind leaving out thoſe Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining thoſe only which are common to all the living Creatures, frames the Idea of *Animal*, which abſtracts not only from all particular Men, but alſo all Birds, Beaſts, Fiſhes and Inſects. The conſtituent Parts of the abſtract Idea of Animal are Body, Life, Senſe and Spontaneous Motion. By *Body* is meant, Body without any particular Shape or Figure, there being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, *&c.* nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedneſs being the diſtinguiſhing Properties of particular Animals, and for that reaſon left out of the *Abſtract Idea*. Upon the ſame account the ſpontaneous Motion muſt be neither Walking, nor Flying, nor Creeping, it is never-

nevertheleſs a Motion, but what that Motion is, it is not eaſy to conceive.

§ 10. Whether others have this wonderful Faculty of *Abſtracting their Ideas*, they beſt can tell: for my ſelf I dare be confident I have it not. I have indeed a Faculty of imagining, or repreſenting to my ſelf the Ideas of thoſe particular things I have perceiv'd and of variouſly compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joyn'd to the Body of a Horſe. I can conſider the Hand, the Eye, the Noſe each by it ſelf abſtracted or ſeparated from the reſt of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it muſt have ſome particular Shape and Colour. Likewiſe the Idea of Man that I frame to my ſelf, muſt be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Streight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-ſized Man. I cannot by any effort of Thought conceive the abſtract Idea above deſcribed. And it is equally impoſſible for me to form

the abſtract Idea of Motion diſtinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear; and the like may be ſaid of all other abſtract general Ideas whatſoever. And there's Grounds to think moſt Men will acknowledge themſelves to be in my Caſe. The generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to *abſtract Notions.* It's ſaid they are difficult and not to be attain'd without Pains and Study; we may therefore reaſonably conclude that, if ſuch there be, they are confin'd only to the Learned.

§ 11. I proceed to examine what can be alleg'd in defence of the Doctrine of Abſtraction, and try if I can diſcover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Opinion, ſo remote from common Senſe as that ſeems to be. There has been a late excellent and deſervedly Eſteem'd Philoſopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Countenance by ſeeming to think the having abſtract general Ideas is what puts the wideſt

widest difference in point of Understanding betwixt Man and Beast. "The having of general Ideas (*saith he*) is that "which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes "do by no means attain unto. For it "is evident, we observe no Foot-steps "in them of making use of general "Signs for universal Ideas; from which "we have reason to imagine that they "have not the Faculty of *abstracting* "or making general Ideas, since they "have no use of Words or any other "general Signs. *And a little after.* "Therefore, I think, we may suppose "that 'tis in this that the Species of "Brutes are discriminated from Men, "and 'tis that proper difference wherein "they are wholly separated, and which "at last widens to so wide a Distance. "For if they have any Ideas at all, and "are not bare Machines (as some "wou'd have 'em) we cannot deny 'em "to have some Reason. It seems as e-"vident to me that they do some of "'em in certain Instances Reason as that they

" they have Senſe, but it is only in par-
" ticular Ideas, juſt as they receive them
" from their Senſes. . They are the beſt
" of 'em tied up within thoſe narrow
" Bounds, and have not (as I think)
" the Faculty to enlarge 'em by any
" kind of *Abſtraction. Eſſay on Hum. Underſt.* B. 2. C. 11. § 10 and 11. I readily agree with this Learned Author, that the Faculties of Brutes can by no means attain to *Abſtraction.* But then if this be made the diſtinguiſhing property of that ſort of Animals, I fear a great many of thoſe that paſs for Men muſt be reckon'd into their number. The reaſon that is here aſſign'd why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have Abſtract general Ideas, is that we obſerve in 'em no uſe of Words or any other general Signs; which is built on this Suppoſition, *viz.* that the making uſe of Words, implys the having general Ideas. From which it follows, that Men who uſe Language are able to Abſtract or Generalize their Ideas. That this is the Senſe and Arguing of the Author will further appear by his anſwering

swering the Question he in another place puts. " Since all things that ex-
" ist are only Particulars, how come
" we by general Terms? *His Answer is,*
" Words become general by being
" made the Signs of general Ideas. *Essay*
" *on Hum. Underst. B. 3. C. 3. § 6.* To this I cannot assent being of opinion that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abstract general Idea but, of several particular Ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the Mind. For Example, When it is said *the change of Motion is proportional to the impressed force*, or that *whatever has Extension is divisible*; these Propositions are to be understood of Motion and Extension in general, and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body mov'd, or any determinate Direction, Velocitie, *&c.* or that I must conceive an abstract general Idea of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, *&c.* 'Tis only implied that whatever Motion I consider,

ſider, whether it be Swift or Slow, Perpendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in whatever Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular Extenſion, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or that Magnitude or Figure, *&c.*

§ 12. By obſerving how Ideas become general, we may the better judge how Words are made ſo. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny abſolutely there are general Ideas, but only that there are any *abſtract general Ideas* : For in the Paſſages we have Quoted wherein there is mention of general Ideas, it is always ſuppoſed that they are formed by *Abſtraction*, after the manner ſet forth in *Sect.* VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning to our Words, and ſpeak only of what we can conceive, I believe we ſhall acknowledge, that an Idea, which conſider'd in it ſelf is particular, becomes general, by being made to repreſent or ſtand for all other particular Ideas of the

the ſame ſort. To make this plain by an Example, ſuppoſe a Geometrician is demonſtrating the Method, of cutting a Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for inſtance, a Black Line of an Inch in Length, this which in it ſelf is a particular Line is nevertheleſs with regard to it's ſignification General, ſince as it is there uſed, it repreſents all particular Lines whatſoever; ſo that what is demonſtrated of it, is demonſtrated of all Lines or, in other Words, of a Line in General. And as that particular Line becomes General, by being made a Sign, ſo the name *Line* which taken abſolutely is particular, by being a Sign is made General. And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an abſtract or general Line, but of all particular right Lines that may poſſibly exiſt, ſo the latter muſt be thought to derive its Generality from the ſame Cauſe, namely, the various, particular Lines which it indifferently denotes.

§ 13. To give the Reader a yet clearer View of the Nature of abſtract Ideas, and the Uſes they are thought neceſſary to, I ſhall add one more Paſſage out of the *Eſſay on Human Underſtanding*, which is as follows. " *Abſtract Ideas* are not ſo obvious or " eaſy to Children or the yet unexerciſ- " ed Mind as particular ones. If they " ſeem ſo to grown Men 'tis only be- " cauſe by conſtant and familiar Uſe " they are made ſo. For when we nice- " ly reflect upon them, we ſhall find " that general Ideas are Fictions and " Contrivances of the Mind, that carry " Difficulty with them, and do not ſo " eaſily offer themſelves, as we are apt " to imagine. For Example, Does it not " require ſome Pains and Skill to form " the general Idea of a Triangle (which " is yet none of the moſt abſtract com- " prehenſive and difficult) for it muſt " be neither Oblique nor Rectangle, nei- " ther Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Sca- " lenon, but *all and none* of theſe at " once. In effect it is ſomething imper- " fect

" fect that cannot exist, an Idea where-
" in some Parts of several different and
" *inconsistent* Ideas are put together:
" 'Tis true the Mind in this imperfect
" State has need of such Ideas, and makes
" all the haste to them it can, for the con-
" veniency of Communication and En-
" largement of Knowledge, to both
" which it is naturally very much in-
" clin'd. But yet one has reason to su-
" spect such Ideas are Marks of our Im-
" perfection. At least this is enough to
" shew that the most abstract and ge-
" neral Ideas are not those that the Mind
" is first and most easily acquainted
" with, nor such as its earliest Know-
" lege is conversant about. B. 4. C. 7.

§ 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind such an Idea of a Triangle as is here describ'd, it's in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor wou'd I go about it. All I desire is, that the Reader wou'd fully and and certainly inform himself whether he has such an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one

to look a little into his own Thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an Idea that ſhall correſpond with the deſcription that is here given of the General Idea of a Triangle, which is, *neither Oblique nor Rectangle, Equilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon, but all and none of theſe at once?*

§ 14. Much is here ſaid of the Difficulty that abſtract Ideas carry with them, and the Pains and Skill requiſite to the forming them. And it is on all Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind, to Emancipate our Thoughts from paticular Objects, and raiſe them to thoſe Sublime Speculations that are converſant about abſtract Ideas. From all which the natural Conſequence ſhou'd ſeem to be, that ſo Difficult a thing as the forming abſtract Ideas was not neceſſary for *Communication*, which is ſo eaſy and familiar to all ſorts of Men. But we are told if they ſeem obvious and eaſy to Grown Men, *'Tis only becauſe by conſtant and familiar uſe they are made ſo.* Now I wou'd fain

fain know at what time it is, Men are imploy'd in ſurmounting that Difficulty, and furniſhing themſelves with thoſe neceſſary helps for Diſcourſe. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it ſeems they are not conſcious of any ſuch Pains-taking; it remains therefore to be the buſineſs of their Childhood. And ſurely, the great and multiply'd Labour of framing abſtract Notions will be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of Children can't Prate together, of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the reſt of their little Trinkets, till they have firſt Tack'd together numberleſs Inconſiſtencies, and ſo framed in their Minds *abſtract general Ideas*, and annexed them to every common Name they make uſe of?

§ 15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the *Enlargement of Knowlege* than for *Communication*. It is I know a Point much inſiſted on, that all Knowlege and Demonſtration are about univerſal Notions, to which I fully

ly

ly agree: But then it does not appear to me that those Notions are form'd by *Abstraction* in the manner premised, *Universality*, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive Nature or Conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the Particulars signified or represented by it: By vertue whereof it is that things, Names or Notions, being in their own Nature, *Particular* are render'd *Universal*. Thus when I demonstrate any Proposition concerning Triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal Idea of a Triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I cou'd frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon, *&c.* But only that the particular Triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, does equally stand for and represent all Rectilinear Triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense *Universal*. All which seems very Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it.

§ 16. But

§ 16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Propoſition to be true of all particular Triangles, except we have firſt ſeen it demonſtrated of the abſtract Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For becauſe a Property may be demonſtrated to agree to ſome one particular Triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other Triangle, which in all reſpects is not the ſame with it. For Example, Having demonſtrated that the three Angles of an Iſoſceles, Rectangular Triangle are equal to two right Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Affection agrees to all other Triangles, which have neither a right Angle, nor two equal Sides. It ſeems therefore that, to be certain this Propoſition is univerſally true, we muſt either make a particular Demonſtration for every particular Triangle, which is impoſſible, or once for all demonſtrate it of the *abſtract Idea of a Triangle*, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally repreſented.

ed. To which I anſwer, that tho' the Idea I have in view whilſt I make the Demonſtration be, for inſtance, that of an Iſoſceles, Rectangular Triangle whoſe Sides are of a determinate Length, I may nevertheleſs be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bigneſs ſoever. And that, becauſe neither the right Angle, nor the equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides are at all concern'd in the Demonſtration. 'Tis true, the Diagram I have in view includes all theſe Particulars, but then there's not the leaſt mention made of 'em in the Proof of the Propoſition. It is not ſaid the three Angles are equal to two right Ones, becauſe one of them is a right Angle, or becauſe the Sides comprehending it are of the ſame Length. Which ſufficiently ſhews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonſtration have held good. And for this reaſon it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonſtrated of a particular Right-angled, Equicrural Triangle

Triangle; and not becauſe I demonſtrated the Propoſition of the abſtract Idea of a Triangle.

§ 17. It were an endleſs, as well as an uſeleſs Thing, to trace the *Schoolmen*, thoſe great Maſters of abſtraction, thrô all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Diſpute, which their Doctrine of abſtract Natures and Notions ſeems to have led 'em into. What Bickerings and Controverſies, and what a learned Duſt have been raiſed about thoſe Matters, and what mighty Advantage has been from thence deriv'd to Mankind are things at this Day too clearly known to need being inſiſted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that Doctrine were confin'd to thoſe only who make the moſt avow'd Profeſſion of it. When Men conſider the great Pains, Induſtry and Parts, that have for ſo many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithſtanding all this the far greater Part of them remain full of Darkneſs and Uncertainty, and Diſputes, that

are like never to have an end, and even thoſe that are thought to be ſupported by the moſt clear and cogent Demonſtrations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the Underſtandings of Men, and that taking altogether, a very ſmall Portion of them does ſupply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwiſe than by being an innocent Diverſion and Amuſement. I ſay, the Conſideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Deſpondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may perhaps ceaſe, upon a view of the falſe Principles that have obtain'd in the World, amongſt all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended Sway over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than that we have been endeavouring to overthrow.

§ 18. I come now to conſider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that ſeems to me to be Language. And ſurely nothing of leſs extent than Reaſon it ſelf cou'd have been the Source of an Opinion ſo univerſally receiv'd. The

The truth of this appears as from other Reaſons, ſo alſo from the plain Confeſſion of the ableſt Patrons of abſtract Ideas, who acknowlege that they are made in order to naming, from which it is a clear Conſequence that if there had been no ſuch thing as Speech or Univerſal Signs, there never had been any thought of Abſtraction. *See* B. 3. C. 6. § 39. *and elſewhere of the Eſſay on Human Underſtanding.* But let us examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origine of that Miſtake. Firſt then, 'Tis thought that every Name has, or ought to have, one only preciſe and ſettled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain *abſtract*, *determinate Ideas* that conſtitute the true and only immediate Signification of each general Name. And that it is by the mediation of theſe abſtract Ideas, that a general Name comes to ſignifie any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no ſuch thing as one preciſe and definite Signification annexed to any general Name, they all ſignifying indifferently a great number

of particular Ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every Name that has a Definition is is thereby restrain'd to one certain Signification. *e. g.* a *Triangle* is defin'd to be a *plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines*; by which that Name is limited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the Definition it is not said whether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, *&c.* nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal ot Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclin'd to each other, in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled Idea which limits the Signification of the word *Triangle*. 'Tis one thing for to keep a Name constantly to the same Definition, and another to make it stand every where for the same Idea, the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

§ 19. But

§ 19. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Doctrine of abſtract Ideas, it muſt be obſerv'd that it's a receiv'd Opinion, that Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every ſignificant Name ſtands for an Idea. This being ſo, and it being withall certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether Inſignificant, do not always mark out particular conceivable Ideas, it is ſtraightway concluded that they ſtand for abſtract Notions. That there are many Names in uſe amongſt Speculative Men, which do not always ſuggeſt to others determinate, particular Ideas, or in truth any thing at all, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will diſcover, that it is not neceſſary (even in the ſtricteſt Reaſonings) ſignificant Names which ſtand for Ideas ſhou'd, every time they are us'd, excite in the Underſtanding the Ideas they are made to ſtand for: In Reading and Diſcourſing Names being for the moſt part uſed as Letters are in *Algebra*,

Algebra, in which thô a particular quantity be mark'd by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not requiſite that in every ſtep each Letter ſuggeſt to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to ſtand for.

§ 20. Beſides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly ſuppos'd. There are other Ends, as the raiſing of ſome Paſſion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in ſome particular Diſpoſition; to which the former is in many Caſes barely ſubſervient, and ſometimes intirely omitted, when theſe can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar uſe of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himſelf, and ſee if it does not oft happen either in Hearing or Reading a Diſcourſe, that the Paſſions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admiration, Diſdain, *&c.* ariſe immediately in his Mind upon the perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming between,

tween. At first, indeed, the Words might have occasion'd Ideas that were fitting to produce those Emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with those Passions, which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promise of a *Good thing*, thô we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threaten'd with Danger sufficient to excite a Dread, thô we think not of any particular Evil likely to befall us, nor yet frame to our selves an Idea of Danger in Abstract? If any one shall join ever so little Reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often used in the propriety of Language without the Speakers designing them for marks of Ideas in his own, which he wou'd have 'em raise in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names themselves

ſelves do not ſeem always ſpoken, with a deſign to bring into our view the Ideas of thoſe Individuals that are ſuppoſed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells me *Ariſtotle hath ſaid it*, all I conceive he means by it, is to diſpoſe me to embrace his Opinion with the Deference and Submiſſion which Cuſtom has annex'd to that Name. And this effect is oft ſo inſtantly produced in the Minds of thoſe who are accuſtom'd to reſign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philoſopher, as it is impoſſible any Idea either of his Perſon, Writings, or Reputation ſhou'd go before. So cloſe and immediate a Connexion may Cuſtom eſtabliſh, betwixt the very word *Ariſtotle* and the Motions of Aſſent and Reverence in the Minds of ſome Men. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why ſhou'd I inſiſt on thoſe things, which every one's Experience, will, I doubt not, plentifully ſuggeſt unto him?

§ 21. We

§ 21. We have, I think, ſhewn the Impoſſibility of *abſtract Ideas*. We have conſider'd what has been ſaid for them by their ableſt Patrons; and endeavor'd to ſhew they are of no Uſe for thoſe Ends, to which they are thought neceſſary. And laſtly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be Language. It cannot be deny'd that Words are of excellent Uſe, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowlege which has been purchas'd by the joint Labours of Inquiſitive Men in all Ages and Nations, may be drawn into the view and made the poſſeſſion of one ſingle Perſon. But moſt parts of Knowlege have been ſo ſtrangely perplex'd and darken'd by the abuſe of Words, and general ways of Speech wherein they are deliver'd, that it may almoſt be made a Queſtion whether Language, has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the Sciences. Since therefore Words are ſo apt to impoſe on the Underſtanding, I

am reſolv'd in my Inquiries to make as little uſe of them as poſſibly I can. Whatever Ideas I conſider, I ſhall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, ſo far as I am able, thoſe Names which long and conſtant Uſe hath ſo ſtrictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages.

§ 22. Firſt, I ſhall be ſure to get clear of all Controverſies purely Verbal; the ſpringing up of which weeds in almoſt all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and ſound Knowlege. Secondly, this ſeems to be a ſure way to extricate my ſelf, out of that fine and ſubtile Net of *abſtract Ideas*, which has ſo miſerably perplex'd and entangled the Minds of Men, and that with this peculiar Circumſtance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by ſo much the deeper was he like to be enſnar'd, and faſter held therein.

in. Thirdly, so long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divested of Words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The Objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv'd in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike, that are not truly so. To discern the Agreements or Disagreements there are between my Ideas, to see what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requisite, than an attentive Perception of what passes in my own Understanding.

§ 23. But the attainment of all these Advantages does presuppose an intire deliverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promise my self; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an Union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas. Which Difficulty seems to have been very much increas'd by the Doctrine

ctrine of *Abſtraction*. For ſo long as Men thought abſtract Ideas were annexed to their Words, it does not ſeem ſtrange that they ſhou'd uſe Words for Ideas: It being found an impracticable thing to lay aſide the Word, and retain the abſtract Idea in the Mind, which in it ſelf was perfectly inconceivable. This ſeems to me the principal Cauſe, why thoſe Men who have ſo emphatically recommended to others, the laying aſide all uſe of Words in their Meditations, and Contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet fail'd to perform it themſelves. Of late many have been very ſenſible of the abſurd Opinions and inſignificant Diſputes, which grow out of the abuſe of Words. And in order to remedy theſe Evils they adviſe well, that we attend to the Ideas ſignified, and draw off our Attention, from the Words which ſignifie them. But how good ſoever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they cou'd not have a due regard to it themſelves, ſo long as they thought the only immediate uſe of Words was to

ſignifie

ſignifie Ideas, and that the immediate ſignification of every general Name was a *determinate, abſtract Idea.*

§ 24. But theſe being known to be Miſtakes, a Man may with greater Eaſe prevent his being impos'd on by Words. He that knows he has no other than particular Ideas, will not puzzle himſelf in vain to find out and conceive the abſtract Idea, annexed to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always ſtand for Ideas, will ſpare himſelf the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wiſh'd that every one wou'd uſe his utmoſt Endeavors, to obtain a clear view of the Ideas he'd conſider, ſeparating from them all that dreſs and incumbrance of Words which ſo much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we conſult the Writings of Learned Men

Men, and trace the dark Foot-ſteps of Antiquity, we need only draw the Curtain of Words, to behold the faireſt Tree of Knowlege, whoſe Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

§ 25. Unleſs we take care to clear the firſt Principles of Knowlege, from the embarras and deluſion of Words, we may make infinite Reaſonings upon them to no purpoſe; we may draw Conſequences from Conſequences, and be never the Wiſer. The farther we go we ſhall only loſe our ſelves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and Miſtakes. Whoever therefore deſigns to Read the following Sheets, I do Intreat him that he wou'd make my Words the Occaſion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the ſame Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in Writing them. By this means, it will be eaſy for him to diſcover the Truth or Falſity of what I ſay. He will be out of all danger

of

of being deceiv'd by my Words, and I do not ſee how he can be led into an Error by conſidering his own Naked, undiſguiſed Ideas.

OF

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ BIBLIOTHEK
NIEDERSÄCHSISCHE LANDESBIBLIOTHEK
Signatur: Leibn. Marg. 52, [52] - 40
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OF THE PRINCIPLES OF Human Knowlege.

PART I.

§ 1. IT is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowlege, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses, or else such as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind, or lastly Ideas formed by help of Memory and Imagination; either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceiv'd in the aforesaid ways. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive Hard

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and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Reſiſtance, *&c.* and of all theſe more and leſs either as to Quantity or Degree. Smelling furniſhes me with Odors; the Palate with Taſtes, and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Compoſition. And as ſeveral of theſe are obſerv'd to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and ſo to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Taſte, Smell, Figure and Conſiſtence having been obſerv'd to go together, are accounted one diſtinct Thing, ſignified by the name *Apple*. Other Collections of Ideas conſtitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book and the like ſenſible Things; which as they are pleaſing or diſagreeable excite the Paſſions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, *&c.*

§ 2. But beſides all that endleſs variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowlege, there is likewiſe ſomething which knows or perceives them, and exerciſes divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering, *&c.* about them. This perceiving,

ceiving, active Being is what I call *Mind*, *Spirit*, *Soul* or *my Self*. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intirely distinct from them, wherein they Exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are Perceiv'd, for the Existence of an Idea consists in being Perceiv'd.

§ 3. That neither our Thoughts, nor Passions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagination, Exist without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense, however Blended or Combin'd together (that is whatever Objects they compose) cannot Exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowlege may be obtain'd of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the Term *Exist* when apply'd to sensible Things. The Table I Write on, I say, Exists, *i. e.* I See and Feel it, and if I were out of my Study I shou'd say it Existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my Study I might

perceive it, or that ſome other Spirit actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, *i. e.* it was Smelt; There was a Sound, *i. e.* it was Heard; a Colour or Figure and it was perceiv'd by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can underſtand by theſe and the like Expreſſions. For as to what is ſaid of the Abſolute Exiſtence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceiv'd, that is to me perfectly Unintelligible. Their *Eſſe* is *Percipi*, nor is it poſſible they ſhou'd have any Exiſtence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.

§ 4. It is indeed an Opinion ſtrangely prevailing amongſt Men, that Houſes, Mountains, Rivers and in a word all ſenſible Objects have an Exiſtence Natural or Real, diſtinct from their being perceiv'd by the Underſtanding. But with how great an Aſſurance and Acquieſcence ſoever, this Principle may be entertained in the World: Yet whoever ſhall find in his Heart to call it in Queſtion may, if I miſtake not, perceive it

it to involve a manifeſt Contradiction. For what are the forementiond Objects but the things we perceive by Senſe, and what, I pray you, do we perceive beſides our own Ideas or Senſations, and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of theſe or any Combination of them ſhou'd Exiſt unperceiv'd?

§ 5. If we throughly examine this Tenent, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Doctrine of *Abſtract Ideas*. For can there be a nicer Strain of Abſtraction then to diſtinguiſh the Exiſtence of ſenſible Objects from their being Perceiv'd, ſo as to conceive them Exiſting Unperceiv'd? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extenſion and Figures, in a word the Things we See and Feel what are they but ſo many Senſations, Notions, Ideas or Impreſſions on the Senſe, and is it poſſible to ſeparate, even in thought, any of theſe from Perception? For my part I might as eaſily divide a Thing from it Self. I may, indeed, divide in my Thoughts or conceive apart from each other thoſe Things which

which, perhaps, I never perceiv'd by Senſe ſo divided. Thus I imagine the Trunk of a Human Body without the Limbs, or conceive the Smell of a Roſe without thinking on the Roſe it ſelf. So far I will not deny I can Abſtract, if that may properly be called *Abſtraction*, which extends only to the conceiving ſeparately ſuch Objects, as it is poſſible may really exiſt or be actually perceived aſunder. But my conceiving or imagining Power does not extend beyond the poſſibility of real Exiſtence or Perception. Hence as it is impoſſible, for me to See or Feel any Thing without an actual Senſation of that Thing, ſo is it impoſſible for me to conceive in my Thoughts any ſenſible Thing or Object diſtinct from the Senſation or Perception of it. In truth the Object and the Senſation are the ſame thing, and cannot therefore be Abſtracted from each other.

§ 6. Some Truths there are ſo near and obvious to the mind that a Man need only open his Eyes to ſee 'em. Such I take

take this Important one to be, *viz.* that all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all thoſe Bodies which compoſe the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subſiſtence without a Mind, that their *Eſſe* is to be Perceiv'd or Known; that conſequently ſo long as they are not actually Perceiv'd by Me, or do not Exiſt in my Mind or that of any other Created Spirit, they muſt either have no Exiſtence at all, or elſe ſubſiſt in the Mind of ſome Eternal Spirit: It being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the Abſurdity of Abſtraction, to attribute to any ſingle part of them an Exiſtence independent of a Spirit. To make this appear with all the Light and Evidence of an Axiom, it ſeems ſufficient if I can but awaken the Reflexion of the Reader, that he may take an impartial View of his own Meaning, and turn his Thoughts upon the Subject it ſelf, free and diſengaged from all Embarras of Words and Prepoſſeſſion in favour of received Miſtakes.

§ 7. From

§ 7. From what has been ſaid, 'tis evident, there is not any other Subſtance than *Spirit* or that which perceives. But for the fuller Demonſtration of this Point, let it be conſider'd, the ſenſible Qualities are Colour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Taſte, *&c. i. e.* the Ideas perceiv'd by Senſe. Now for an Idea to Exiſt in an unperceiving Thing is a manifeſt Contradiction, for to have an Idea is all one as to perceive, that therefore wherein Colour, Figure, *&c.* Exiſt muſt perceive them; Hence 'tis clear there can be no unthinking Subſtance or *Subſtratum* of thoſe Ideas.

§ 8. But ſay you, thô the Ideas themſelves do not Exiſt without the Mind, yet there may be Things like them whereof they are Copies or Reſemblances, which Things Exiſt without the Mind, in an unthinking Subſtance. I anſwer an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea, a Colour, or Figure, can be like nothing but another Colour or Figure. If we look but never ſo little into our

our Thoughts, we ſhall find it impoſſible for us to conceive a Likeneſs except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether thoſe ſuppos'd Originals or External Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures or Repreſentations, be themſelves Perceivable or no? If they are, then they are Ideas and we have gain'd our Point; but if you ſay they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be Senſe, to aſſert a Colour is like ſomething which is inviſible; Hard or Soft, like ſomething which is Intangible, and ſo of the reſt.

§ 9. Some there are who make a diſtinction betwixt *Primary* and *Secondary* Qualities: By the former, they mean Extenſion, Figure, Motion, Reſt, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number: By the latter they denote all other Senſible Qualities as Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, *&c.* the Ideas we have of theſe they acknowlege not to be the Reſemblances, of any thing exiſting without the Mind or unperceiv'd, but they will have our Ideas of the Primary Qualities

to bePatterns or Images of things which exiſt without the Mind, in an unthinking Subſtance which they call *Matter*. By Matter, therefore, we are to underſtand an Inert, Senſeleſs Subſtance, in which Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* do actually ſubſiſt, But it is evident from what we have already ſhewn, that Extenſion, Figure and Notion are only Ideas exiſting in the Mind, and that an Idea can be like nothing but another Idea. and that conſequently neither They nor their Archetypes can Exiſt in an unperceiving Subſtance. Hence it is plain, that the very Notion of what is called *Matter* or *Corporeal Subſtance*, involves a Contradiction in it. Inſomuch that I ſhou'd not think it neceſſary to ſpend more time in expoſing it's Abſurdity. But becauſe the Tenent of the Exiſtence of Matter ſeems to have taken ſo deep a Root in the Minds of Philoſophers, and draws after it ſo many ill Conſequences, I chuſe rather to be thought Prolix and Tedious, than omit any thing that might conduce to the full Diſcovery and Extirpation of that Prejudice. § 10. They

§ 10. They who assert that Figure, Motion, and the rest of the Primary or Original Qualities do Exist without the Mind, in unthinking Substances, do at the same time acknowlege that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, *&c.* do not, which they tell us are Sensations existing in the Mind alone, that depend on and are occasion'd by the different Size, Texture, Motion, *&c.* of the minute Particles of Matter. This they take for an undoubted Truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all Exception. Now if it be certain, that those Original Qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible Qualities, and not, even in Thought, capable of being Abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they Exist only in the Mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any Abstraction of Thought, conceive the Extension and Motion of a Body, without all other sensible Qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an Idea of a Body Extended and Moving, but I must withal give it

ſome Colour or other ſenſible Quality which is acknowleg'd to Exiſt only in the Mind. In ſhort, Extenſion, Figure, and Motion, abſtracted from all other Qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other ſenſible Qualities are, there muſt theſe be alſo, *i. e.* in the Mind and no where elſe.

§ 11. Again, *Great* and *Small*, *Swift* and *Slow*, are allow'd to Exiſt no where without the Mind, being intirely relative and changing as the Frame or Poſition of the Organs of Senſe varies. The Extenſion therefore which Exiſts without the Mind, is neither Great nor Small, the Motion, neither Swift nor Slow, that is, they are nothing at all But ſay you they are Extenſion in General, and Motion in General: Thus we ſee how much the Tenent of extended, moveable Subſtances Exiſting without the Mind depends on that ſtrange Doctrine of *Abſtract Ideas*. And here I can't but remark, how nearly the Vague and indeterminate Deſcription of Matter or Corporeal Subſtance which the Modern Philoſophers

losophers are run into by their own Principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridicul'd Notion of *Materia Prima*, to be met with in *Aristotle* and his Followers. Without Extension Solidity cannot be conceiv'd; since therefore it has been shewn that Extension Exists not in an unthinking Substance, the same must also be true of Solidity.

§ 12. That Number is intirely the Creature of the Mind, even thô the other Qualities be allow'd to Exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, that the same thing bears a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind views it with different respects, Thus, the same Extension is One or Three or Thirty Six, according as the Mind considers it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on Mens Understanding, that it is strange to think how any one shou'd give it an absolute Existence without the Mind. We say one Book, one Page, one Line, *&c.* all these are equally Unites, thô some

ſome contain ſeveral of the others. And in each Inſtance 'tis plain, the Unite relates to ſome particular Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put together by the Mind.

§ 13. Unity I know ſome will have to be a ſimple or uncompounded Idea, accompanying all other Ideas into the Mind. That I have any ſuch Idea anſwering the Word *Unity*, I do not find, and if I had, methinks, I cou'd not miſs finding it, on the contrary it ſhou'd be the moſt familiar to my Underſtanding ſince if is ſaid to accompany all other Ideas, and to be perceiv'd by all the ways of Senſation and Reflexion. To ſay no more it is an *abſtract Idea*.

§ 14. I ſhall farther add, that after the ſame manner, as modern Philoſophers prove Colours, Taſtes, *&c.* to have no Exiſtence in Matter, or without the Mind, the ſame thing may be likewiſe prov'd of all other ſenſible Qualities whatſoever. Thus, for Inſtance, it is ſaid that Heat and Cold, are Affections only of the Mind, and not at all

all Patterns of real Beings, exiſting in the Corporeal Subſtances which excite them, for that the ſame Body which appears Cold to one Hand, ſeems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extenſion, are not Patterns or Reſemblances of Qualities exiſting in Matter, becauſe to the ſame Eye at different Stations, or Eyes of a different Texture at the ſame Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing ſettled and determinate without the Mind? again, 'Tis prov'd that Sweetneſs is not really in the Sapid Thing, becauſe the thing remaining unalter'd the Sweetneſs is changed into Bitter, as in caſe of a Fever or otherwiſe vitiated Palate. Is it not as reaſonable to ſay, that Motion is not without the Mind, ſince if the Succeſſion of Ideas in the Mind become Swifter, the Motion, it is acknowledg'd, ſhall appear Slower without any external Alteration.

§ 15. In ſhort, let any one conſider thoſe Arguments, which are thought manifeſtly

manifeſtly to prove that Colours, Taſtes, *&c.* Exiſt only in the Mind, and he ſhall find they may with equal force, be brought to prove the ſame thing of Extenſion, Figure, and Motion. Thô it muſt be confeſs'd this method of Arguing does not ſo much prove that there is no Extenſion, Colour, *&c.* in an outward Object, as that we do not know by Senſe which is the true Extenſion or Colour of the Object. But the Arguments foregoing plainly ſhew it to be impoſſible that any Colour or Extenſion at all, or other ſenſible Quality whatſoever, ſhou'd Exiſt in an unthinking Subject without the Mind, or in truth, that there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing as an outward Object.

§ 16. But let us examine a little the receiv'd Opinion: It is ſaid Extenſion is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the *Subſtratum* that ſupports it. Now I deſire that you wou'd explain to me what is meant by Matter's *ſupporting* Extenſion: Say you, I have no Idea of Matter and therefore cannot

cannot explain it. I anſwer, thô you have no poſitive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you muſt at leaſt have a Relative Idea of Matter; thô you know not what it is, yet you muſt be ſuppoſed to know what Relation it bears to Accidents, and what is meant by its ſupporting them. 'Tis evident *Support* cannot here be taken in its uſual or literal Senſe, as when we ſay that Pillars ſupport a Building; in what Senſe therefore muſt it be taken? For my part I am not able to diſcover any Senſe at all that can be applicable to it.

§ 17. If we inquire into what the moſt accurate Philoſophers declare themſelves to mean by *Material Subſtance*; we ſhall find them acknowlege, they have no other meaning annexed to thoſe Sounds, but the Idea of Being in general, together with the Relative Notion of its ſupporting Accidents. The general Idea of Being appeareth to me the moſt abſtract and incomprehenſible of all other, and as for its ſupporting Accidents, this, as we have juſt now obſerv'd

ſerv'd, cannot be underſtood in the common Senſe of thoſe Words, it muſt therefore be taken in ſome other Senſe, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I conſider the two Parts or Branches which make the ſignification of the Words *Material Subſtance*, I am convinced there is no diſtinct meaning annext to them. But why ſhou'd we trouble our ſelves any farther, in diſcuſſing this Material *Subſtratum* or Support of Figure and Motion, *&c.* does it not ſuppoſe they have an Exiſtence without the Mind? And is not this a direct Repugnancy and altogether Inconceivable?

§ 18. But thô it were poſſible that ſolid, Figur'd moveable Subſtances may Exiſt without the Mind, correſponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it poſſible for us to know this? Either we muſt know it by Senſe or by Reaſon. As for our Senſes, by them we have the Knowlege only of our Senſations, Ideas, or thoſe things that are immediately perceiv'd by Senſe, call 'em what

what you will: But they do not inform us that things Exiſt without the Mind, or unperceiv'd, like to thoſe which are perceiv'd. This the Materialiſts themſelves acknowlege. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowlege at all of External Things, it muſt be by Reaſon, inferring their Exiſtence from what is immediately perceiv'd by Senſe. But I do not ſee what reaſon can induce us to believe the Exiſtence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, ſince the very Patrons of Matter themſelves do not pretend, there is any neceſſary Connexion betwixt them and our Ideas. I ſay it is granted on all Hands (and what happens in Dreams, Frenzys and the like puts it beyond diſpute) that it is poſſible we might be affected with all the Ideas we have now, thô there were no Bodies Exiſting without reſembling them. Hence it is evident the Suppoſition of External Bodies is not neceſſary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced ſometimes, and might poſſibly be produced always in

the ſame Order, we ſee them in at preſent, without their Concurrence.

§ 19. But, thô we might poſſibly have all our Senſations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought eaſier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by ſuppoſing External Bodies in their likeneſs rather than otherwiſe, and ſo it might be at leaſt probable there are ſuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be ſaid, for thô we give the Materialiſts their External Bodies, they by their one confeſſion are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced: Since they own themſelves unable to comprehend in what manner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is poſſible it ſhou'd imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it is evident the Production of Ideas or Senſations in our Minds, can be no reaſon why we ſhou'd ſuppoſe Matter or Corporeal Subſtances, ſince that is acknowleg'd to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this Suppoſition. If therefore it were poſſible for Bodies

Bodies to Exiſt without the Mind, yet to hold they do ſo, muſt needs be a very precarious Opinion; ſince it is to ſuppoſe, without any reaſon at all, that God has Created innumerable Beings that are intirely uſeleſs, and ſerve to no manner of purpoſe.

§ 20. In ſhort, thô there were External Bodies, 'tis impoſſible we ſhou'd ever come to know it; and if there were not, we ſhou'd have the very ſame Reaſons to think there were that we have now. Suppoſe, what no one can deny poſſible, an Intelligence to be affected with the ſame train of Senſations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in the ſame order and with like vividneſs in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reaſon to believe the Exiſtence of Corporeal Subſtances, repreſented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can poſſibly have for believing the ſame thing? Of this there can be no Queſtion, which one Conſideration were enough to make any reaſonable Perſon, ſuſpect the ſtrength of whatever Arguments

Arguments he may think himſelf to have, for the Exiſtence of Bodies without the Mind.

§ 21. Where it neceſſary to add any farther Proof againſt the Exiſtence of Matter, after what has been ſaid, I cou'd inſtance ſeveral of thoſe Errours and Difficulties (not to mention Impieties) which have ſprung from that Tenent. It has occaſion'd numberleſs Controverſies and Diſputes in Philoſophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I ſhall not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well becauſe I think, Arguments *a Poſteriori* are unneceſſary for confirming what has been, if I miſtake not, ſufficiently demonſtrated *a Priori*, as becauſe I ſhall hereafter find occaſion to ſpeak ſomewhat of them.

§ 22. I am affraid I have given cauſe to think, I am needleſly Prolix in handling this Subject. For to what purpoſe is it to dilate on that which may be demonſtrated with the utmoſt Evidence

in

in a Line or Two, to any one that's capable of the leaſt Reflexion? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, and ſo trying whether you can conceive it poſſible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour to Exiſt without the Mind, or Unperceiv'd. This eaſy Tryal may perhaps make you ſee, that what you contend for, is a downright Contradiction. Inſomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this Iſſue; if you can but conceive it poſſible for one Extended, moveable Subſtance, or in general, for any one Idea or any thing like an Idea to Exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind perceiving it, I ſhall readily give up the Cauſe: And as for all that *compages* of External Bodies you contend for, I ſhall grant you its Exiſtence, thô you cannot either give me any Reaſon why you believe it Exiſts, or aſſign any uſe to it when it is ſuppoſed to Exiſt. I ſay, the bare poſſibility of your Opinions being true, ſhall paſs for an Argument that it is ſo.

§ 23. But

§ 23. But ſay you, ſurely there's nothing eaſier than for me to imagine Trees, for Inſtance, in a Park, or Books Exiſting in a Cloſet, and no Body by to perceive them. I anſwer you may ſo, there is no difficulty in it: But what is all this, I beſeech you, more than framing in your Mind certain Ideas which you call *Books* and *Trees*, and at the ſame time omitting to frame the Idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your ſelf Perceive or Think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpoſe: It only ſhews you have the power of Imagining or Forming Ideas in your Mind; but it does not ſhew that you can conceive it poſſible, the Objects of your Thought may Exiſt without the Mind; to make out this, it is neceſſary that you conceive them Exiſting unconceiv'd or unthought of, which is a manifeſt Repugnancy. When we do our utmoſt to conceive the Exiſtence of External Bodies, we are all the while only Contemplating our own Ideas. But the Mind taking no notice of

of it ſelf, is deluded to think it can and does conceive Bodies Exiſting unthought of or without the Mind; thô at the ſame time they are apprehended by or Exiſt in it ſelf. A little Attention will diſcover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here ſaid, and make it unneceſſary to inſiſt on any other Proofs againſt the Exiſtence of Material Subſtance.

§ 24. Cou'd Men but forbear to amuſe themſelves with Words, we ſhou'd I believe, ſoon come to an Agreement in this Point. It is very obvious upon the leaſt inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know whether it be poſſible for us to underſtand what is meant, by the *abſolute Exiſtence of ſenſible Objects in themſelves, or without the Mind.* To me 'tis evident thoſe Words mark out either a direct Contradiction, or elſe nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way, than to intreat they wou'd calmly attend to their own Thoughts: And if by this Attention, the Emptineſs or Repugnancy of

thoſe Expreſſions does appear, ſurely nothing more is requiſite for their Conviction. 'Tis on this therefore that I inſiſt, *viz.* that the abſolute Exiſtence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earneſtly recommend to the attentive Thoughts of the Reader.

§ 25. All our Ideas, Senſations, Notions or the things which we perceive by whatſoever Names they may be diſtinguiſh'd, are viſibly Inactive, there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Object of Thought cannot Produce, or make any Alteration in another. To be ſatisfied of the Truth of this, there is nothing elſe requiſite but a bare Obſervation of our Ideas. For ſince they and every part of them Exiſt only in the Mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is Perceiv'd: But whoever ſhall attend to his Ideas, whether of Senſe or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Power or Activity, there is, therefore, no ſuch

ſuch thing contained in them. A little Attention will diſcover to us that the very Being of an Idea implies Paſſiveneſs and Inertneſs in it, inſomuch that it is impoſſible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ſtrictly ſpeaking, to be the Cauſe of any thing: Neither can it be the Reſemblance or Pattern of any active Being, as is evident from *Sect.* VIII. Whence it plainly follows that Extenſion, Figure and Motion, cannot be the Cauſe of our Senſations. To ſay, therefore, that theſe are the effects of Powers reſulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, Size, *&c.* of Corpuſcles muſt certainly be falſe.

§ 26. We perceive a continual Succeſſion of Ideas, ſome are anew Excited, others are Changed or totally Diſappear. There is therefore ſome Cauſe of theſe Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Cauſe cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It muſt therefore be a Subſtance, but it has been ſhewn that

there is no Corporeal or Material Substance: It remains therefore that the Cauſe of Ideas is an Incorporeal, active Subſtance or Spirit.

§ 27. A Spirit is one Simple, Undivided, active Being, as it perceives Ideas, it is called the *Underſtanding*, and as it produces or otherwiſe operates about them, it is called the *Will*. Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Paſſive and Inert, *vid. Sect.* XXV, they cannot repreſent unto us, by way of Image or Likeneſs, that which Acts. A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which ſhall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is abſolutely impoſſible. Such is the Nature of *Spirit* or that which Acts, that it cannot be of it ſelf Perceived, but only by the Effects which it produceth. If any Man ſhall doubt of the Truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active Being; and whether he has Ideas of

of two Principal Powers, mark'd by the Names *Will* and *Underſtanding*, diſtinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Subſtance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of its ſupporting or being the Subject of the aforeſaid Powers, which is ſignified by the Name *Soul* or *Spirit*. This is what ſome hold; but ſo far as I can ſee, the Words *Will*, *Underſtanding*, *Mind*, *Soul*, *Spirit*, do not ſtand for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at all, but for Something which is very different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot be like unto, or repreſented by, any Idea whatſoever.

§ 28. I find I can Excite Ideas in my Mind at pleaſure, and vary and ſhift the Scene as oft as I think fit. 'Tis no more than Willing, and ſtraightway this or that Idea ariſes in my Fancy: And by the ſame Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind Active. Thus

Thus much is certain, and grounded on Experience: But when we talk of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas exclusive of Volition, we only amuse our selves with Words.

§ 29. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually perceiv'd by Sense have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light I open my Eyes, 'tis not in my Power to chuse whether I shall See or no, or to determine what particular Objects shall present themselves to my View; And so likewise as to the Hearing and other Senses, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

§ 30. The Ideas of Sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of the Imagination, they have likewise a Steddiness, Order and Coherence, and are not excited at Random, as those which are the effects of Human Wills often

often are, but in a regular Train or Series, the admirable Connexion whereof ſufficiently teſtifies the Wiſdom and Benevolence of its Author. Now the ſet Rules or eſtabliſh'd Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Senſe, are called the *Laws of Nature*: And theſe we learn by Experience, which teaches us that ſuch and ſuch Ideas are attended with ſuch and ſuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courſe of Things.

§ 31. This gives us a ſort of Foreſight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefit of Life. And without this we ſhou'd be eternally at a loſs, we cou'd not know how to act any thing that might procure us the leaſt Pleaſure, or remove the leaſt Pain of Senſe. That Food Nouriſhes, Sleep Refreſhes, and Fire Warms us; that to Sow in the Seed-time is the way to Reap in the Harveſt, and, in general, that to obtain ſuch or ſuch Ends, ſuch or ſuch Means are conducive, all this we know, not by diſcovering any neceſſary

ceſſary Connexion between our Ideas, but only by the Obſervation of the ſettled Laws of Nature, without which we ſhou'd be all in Uncertainty and Confuſion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage himſelf in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant juſt Born.

§ 32. And yet this conſiſtent, uniform Working which ſo evidently diſplays the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of that Governing Spirit whoſe Will conſtitutes the Laws of Nature, is ſo far from leading our Thoughts to Him, that it rather ſends 'em a wandering after ſecond Cauſes. For when we perceive certain Ideas of Senſe conſtantly follow'd by other Ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas themſelves, and make one the Cauſe of another, than which nothing can be more Abſurd and Unintelligible. Thus, for Example, having obſerv'd that when we perceive by Sight a certain round, luminous Figure, we at the ſame time perceive by Touch the Idea or Senſation called

called *Heat*, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the cauſe of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Motion and Colliſion of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

§ 33. The Ideas imprinted on the Senſes by the Author of Nature are called *real things*, and thoſe excited in the Imagination being leſs Regular, Vivid and Conſtant, are more properly termed *Ideas*, or *Images of Things*, which they copy and repreſent. But then our Senſations, be they never ſo Vivid and Diſtinct, are nevertheleſs *Ideas*, *i. e.* they Exiſt in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Senſe are allow'd to have more reality in them, *i. e.* to be more Strong, Orderly and Coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; but this is no Argument that they Exiſt without the Mind. They are alſo leſs dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Subſtance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of a-

nother and more Powerful Spirit: yet ſtill they are *Ideas*, and certainly no *Idea*, whether Faint or Strong, can Exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind perceiving it.

§ 34. Before we proceed any farther, it is neceſſary we ſpend ſome Time in Anſwering Objections which may probably be made againſt the Principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I ſeem too Prolix to thoſe of quick Apprehenſions, I deſire I may be excuſed, ſince all Men do not equally apprehend things of this Nature; and I am willing to be underſtood by every one. Firſt, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and ſubſtantial in Nature is baniſh'd out of the World: And inſtead thereof a Chimerical Scheme of Ideas takes place. All things that Exiſt, Exiſt only in the Mind, that is, they are purely Notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon and Stars? What muſt we think of Houſes, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all theſe but

but ſo many Chimeras and Illuſions on the Fancy? To all which, and whatever elſe of the ſame ſort may be objected, I Anſwer, that by the Principles premis'd, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we See, Feel, Hear, or any wiſe Conceive or Underſtand, remains as ſecure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a *rerum natura*, and the Diſtinction between Realities and Chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from *Sect.* XXIX, XXX, and XXXIII, where we have ſhewn what is meant by *real Things* in oppoſition to *Chimeras*, or Ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally Exiſt in the Mind, and in that Senſe are alike *Ideas*.

§ 35. I do not Argue againſt the Exiſtence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by Senſe or Reflexion. That the things I ſee with my Eyes and touch with my Hands do Exiſt, really Exiſt, I make not the leaſt Queſtion. The only thing whoſe Exiſtence we deny, is that which Philoſophers call Mat-

ter or Corporeal Subſtance. And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the reſt of Mankind, who, I dare ſay, will never miſs it. The Atheiſt, indeed, will want the Colour of an empty Name to ſupport his Impiety; and the Philoſophers may poſſibly find, they have loſt a great Handle for Trifling and Diſputation. But that's all the Harm that I can ſee done.

§ 36. If any Man thinks we detract from the Exiſtence or Reality of things, he is very far from Underſtanding what has been premis'd in the plaineſt Terms I cou'd think of. Take here an Abſtract of what has been ſaid. There are Spiritual Subſtances, Minds or Human Souls which will or excite Ideas in themſelves at pleaſure: but theſe are faint, weak, and unſteady in reſpect of others they perceive by Senſe, which being impreſs'd upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, ſpeak themſelves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wiſe than Human Spirits. Theſe latter are ſaid to have more *Reality*

ality in them than the former: By which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct, and that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Sense, the Sun that I see by Day is the real Sun, and that which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the Sense here given of *Reality*, 'tis evident that every Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general each part of the Mundane System, is as much a *Real Being* by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term *Reality* different from what I do, I intreat them to look into their own thoughts and see.

§ 37. It will be urg'd that thus much at least is true, *viz.* that we take away all Corporeal Substances. To this my Answer is, That if the word *Substance* be taken in the vulgar Sense, for a Combination of Sensible Qualities, such as Extension, Solidity, Weight, *&c.* This we cannot be accused of taking away. But if it be taken in a Philosophic Sense, for the support of Accidents or Qualities

ties without the Mind: then, indeed, I acknowlege that we take it away, if one may be ſaid to take away that which never had any Exiſtence, not even in the Imagination.

§ 38. But after all, ſay you, it ſounds very harſh to ſay we Eat and Drink Ideas, and are Cloathed with Ideas. I acknowlege it does ſo, the word *Idea* not being uſed in common Diſcourſe to ſignifie the ſeveral Combinations of ſenſible Qualities, which are called *Things*: and it is certain that any Expreſſion which varies from the familiar Uſe of Language will ſeem harſh and ridiculous. But this does not concern the Truth of the Propoſition, which in other Words is no more than this, *viz.* we are Fed and Cloathed with thoſe Things which we perceive immediately by our Senſes. The Hardneſs or Softneſs, the Colour, Taſte, Warmth, Figure, *&c.* which combin'd together conſtitute the ſeveral ſorts of Victuals and Apparel, have been ſhewn to Exiſt only in the Mind that perceives them; and

and this is all that's meant by calling 'em *Ideas*, which Word if it was as ordinarily uſed as *Thing*, wou'd ſound no Harſher nor more Ridiculous than it. I am not for diſputing about the Propriety, but the Truth of the Expreſſion. If therefore you agree with me that we Eat, and Drink, and are Clad with the immediate Objects of Senſe which cannot Exiſt unperceiv'd or without the Mind: I ſhall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to Cuſtom, that they ſhou'd be called Things rather than Ideas.

§ 39. If it be demanded why I make uſe of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Cuſtom call them Things. I anſwer, I do it for two Reaſons: Firſt, becauſe the Term *Thing*, in contradiſtinction to *Idea*, is generally ſuppoſed to denote ſomewhat Exiſting, without the Mind; Secondly, becauſe *Thing* hath a more comprehenſive Signification than *Idea*, including Spirits or thinking Things as well as Ideas. Since therefore the Objects of Senſe

Senſe Exiſt only in the Mind, and are withal thoughtleſs and inactive, I choſe to mark them by the word *Idea* which implies thoſe Properties.

§ 40. But ſay what we can, ſome one perhaps may be apt to Reply, he will ſtill believe his Senſes, and never ſuffer any Arguments, how plauſible ſoever, to prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it ſo, aſſert the Evidence of Senſe as high as you pleaſe, we are willing to do the ſame. That what I See, Hear and Feel doth Exiſt, *i. e.* is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own Being. But I do not ſee how the Teſtimony of Senſe can be alleg'd, as a proof for the Exiſtence of any Thing, which is not perceiv'd by Senſe. We are not for having any Man turn *Sceptic*, and disbelieve his Senſes; on the contrary we give them all the Streſs and Aſſurance imaginable; nor are there any Principles more oppoſite to Scepticiſm, than thoſe we have laid down, as ſhall be hereafter clearly ſhewn.

§ 41. Secondly,

§ 41. Secondly, It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for Inſtance, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones ſelf Burnt, and actually being ſo: If you ſuſpect it to be only the Idea of Fire which you ſee, do but put your Hand into it, and you'll be convinced with a witneſs. This and the like may be urged in oppoſition to our Tenents. To all which the Anſwer is evident from what hath been already ſaid, and I ſhall only add in this place, that if real Fire be very different from the Idea of Fire, ſo alſo is the real Pain that it occaſions, very different from the Idea of the ſame Pain, and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain either is, or can poſſibly be, in an unperceiving Thing or without the Mind, any more than its Idea.

§ 42. Thirdly, It will be objected that we ſee things actually without or at a diſtance from us, and which conſequently do not Exiſt in the Mind, it being abſurd that thoſe Things, which

are ſeen at the Diſtance of ſeveral Miles, ſhou'd be as near to us as our own Thoughts. In anſwer to this, I deſire it may be conſider'd, that in a Dream we do oft perceive Things, as Exiſting at a great diſtance off, and yet for all that, thoſe Things are acknowleg'd to have their Exiſtence only in the Mind.

§ 43. But for the fuller clearing of this Point, it may be worth while to conſider, how it is that we perceive Diſtance and Things placed at a Diſtance by Sight. For that we ſhou'd in truth ſee External Space, and Bodies actually Exiſting in it, ſome nearer, others farther off, ſeems to carry with it ſome Oppoſition to what hath been ſaid, of their Exiſting no where without the Mind. The Conſideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to my *Eſſay towards a new Theory of Viſion*, which was publiſh'd not long ſince. Wherein it is ſhewn that *Diſtance* or Outneſs is neither immediately of it ſelf perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing

thing that hath a neceſſary Connexion with it: But that it is only ſuggeſted to our Thoughts, by certain viſible Ideas and Senſations attending Viſion, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude or Relation, either with Diſtance, or Things placed at a Diſtance. But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they came to ſignify and Suggeſt them to us, after the ſame manner that Words of any Language Suggeſt the Ideas they are made to ſtand for. Inſomuch that a Man Born Blind, and afterwards made to ſee, wou'd not, at firſt Sight, think the things he ſaw to be without his Mind, or at any Diſtance from him. *vid. Sect.* XLI. of the forementioned Treatiſe.

§ 44. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely diſtinct and heterogeneous. The former are Marks and Prognoſtics of the latter. That the proper Objects of Sight neither Exiſt without the Mind, nor are the Images of External Things, was ſhewn even in that Treatiſe. Thô throughout the

ſame, the contrary be ſuppoſed true of Tangible Objects: Not that to ſuppoſe that Vulgar Error, was neceſſary for eſtabliſhing the Notion therein laid down, but becauſe it was beſide my Purpoſe to Examine and Refute it in a Diſcourſe concerning *Viſion*. So that in ſtrict Truth the Ideas of Sight, when we apprehend by them Diſtance and Things placed at a Diſtance, do not Suggeſt or mark out to us Things actually Exiſting at a Diſtance, but only admoniſh us what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at ſuch and ſuch diſtances of Time, and in conſequence of ſuch or ſuch Actions. It is, I ſay, evident from what has been ſaid in the foregoing Parts of this Treatiſe, and in *Sect.* CXLVII and elſewhere of the Eſſay concerning Viſion, that Viſible Ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what Tangible Ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in caſe we Excite this or that Motion in our own Bodies. But for a fuller Information in this Point, I refer to the Eſſay it ſelf.

45. Fourthly

§ 45. Fourthly, It will be objected that from the foregoing Principles it follows, Things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The Objects of Senſe Exiſt only when they are Perceived: The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer than while there is ſome Body by to perceive them. Upon ſhutting my Eyes all the Furniture in the Room is reduc'd to nothing, and barely upon opening 'em it is again created. In anſwer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been ſaid in *Sect.* III, IV, *&c.* and deſire he will conſider whether he means any thing, by the actual Exiſtence of an Idea, diſtinct from its being perceiv'd. For my part after the niceſt Inquiry I cou'd make, I am not able to diſcover that any thing elſe is meant by thoſe Words. And I once more intreat the Reader to ſound his own Thoughts, and not ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed on by Words. If he can conceive it poſſible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to Exiſt without

out

out being perceived, then I give up the Cauſe: But if he cannot, he will acknowlege it is unreaſonable for him to ſtand up in Defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an Abſurdity, the not aſſenting to thoſe Propoſitions which at Bottom have no meaning in them.

§ 46. It will not be amiſs to obſerve, how far the receiv'd Principles of Philoſophy are themſelves chargeable with thoſe pretended Abſurdities. It is thought ſtrangely Abſurd that upon cloſing my Eye-lids, all the Viſible Objects round me ſhou'd be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what Philoſophers commonly acknowlege, when they agree on all Hands that Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are meer Senſations that Exiſt no longer than they are perceiv'd? Again it may to ſome perhaps ſeem very incredible, that things ſhou'd be every moment creating, yet this very Notion is commonly taught in the Schools. For the

Schoo-

Schoolmen, thô they acknowlege the Exiſtence of Matter and that the whole mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are nevertheleſs of Opinion that it cannot ſubſiſt without the Divine Conſervation, which by them is expounded to be a continual Creation.

§ 47. Farther, a little Thought will diſcover to us, that thô we allow the Exiſtence of Matter or Corporeal Subſtance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the Particular Bodies of what kind ſoever do none of them Exiſt whilſt they are not perceived. For it is evident from *Sect.* XI, *&c.* that the Matter Philoſophers contend for is an incomprehenſible Somewhat which hath none of thoſe particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Senſes are diſtinguiſhed one from another. But to make this more plain, it muſt be remarked that the Infinite Diviſibility of Matter is now univerſally allow'd, at leaſt by the moſt approv'd and conſiderable Philoſophers,

ſophers, who on the receiv'd Principles demonſtrate it beyond all exception. Hence it follows, there is an infinite number of Parts in each Particle of Matter, which are not perceiv'd by Senſe. The reaſon, therefore, that any particular Body ſeems to be of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of Parts to Senſe, is, not becauſe it contains no more, ſince in it ſelf it contains an infinite number of Parts, but becauſe the Senſe is not acute enough to diſcern them. In proportion therefore as the Senſe is render'd more acute, it perceives a greater number of Parts in the Object *i. e.* the Object appears greater, and its Figure varies, thoſe Parts in its Extremities which were before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from thoſe perceived by an obtuſer Senſe. And at length, after various changes of Size and Shape, when the Senſe becomes infinitely acute, the Body ſhall ſeem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the Body, but only in the Senſe. Each Body,

therefore

therefore, consider'd in it self is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all Shape or Figure. From which it follows that thô we shou'd grant the Existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the Materialists themselves are by their own Principles forced to acknowlege, that neither the particular Bodies perceived by Sense, nor any thing like them Exists without the Mind. Matter, I say, and each Particle thereof is according to them Infinite and Shapeless, and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodies which compose the visible World, any one whereof does not Exist longer than it is perceiv'd.

§ 48. But after all, if we consider it, the Objection proposed in *Sect.* XLV; will not be found reasonably charg'd on the Principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any Oject̃ion at all against our Notions. For thô we hold indeed the Objects of Sense to be nothing else but Ideas which cannot Exist unperceiv'd: yet we may not hence con-

clude they have no Exiſtence except only while they are perceiv'd by us, ſince there may be ſome other Spirit that perceives them thô we do not. Wherever Bodies are ſaid to have no Exiſtence without the Mind, I wou'd not be underſtood to mean this or that particular Mind, but all Minds whatſoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing Principles, that Bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or Exiſt not at all during the Intervals between our perception of them.

§ 49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected, that if Extenſion and Figure exiſt only in the Mind, it follows that the Mind is extended and figured; ſince Extenſion is a Mode or Attribute which (to ſpeak with the Schools) is predicated of the Subject in which it Exiſts. I anſwer, Thoſe qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceiv'd by it, that is not by way of *Mode* or *Attribute* but only by way of *Idea*, and it no more follows the Soul or Mind is extended becauſe

cauſe Extenſion Exiſts in it alone, than it does that it is Red or Blue becauſe thoſe Colours are on all Hands acknowleg'd to Exiſt in it, and no where elſe. As to what Philoſophers ſay of Subject and Mode, that ſeems very groundleſs and unintelligible. For inſtance, in this Propoſition, a Die is Hard, Extended and Square, they will have it that the word *Die* denotes a Subject or Subſtance, diſtinct from the Hardneſs, Extenſion, and Figure which are predicated of it, and in which they Exiſt. This I can't comprehend : To me a Die ſeems to be nothing diſtinct from thoſe things which are termed its Modes or Accidents. And to ſay a Die is Hard, Extended and Square, is not to attribute thoſe Qualities to a ſubject diſtinct from and ſupporting them, but only an Explication of the meaning of the word *Die*.

§ 50. Sixthly, you'll ſay there have been a great many things explain'd by Matter and Motion, take away theſe and you deſtroy the whole Corpuſcular

Philoſophy, and undermine thoſe Mechanical Principles which have been applied with ſo much ſucceſs to account for the *Phænomena*. In ſhort, whatever Advances have been made, either by Ancient or Modern Philoſophers, in the Study of Nature do all proceed on the Suppoſition, that Corporeal Subſtance or Matter doth really Exiſt. To this, I anſwer, that there is not any one *Phænomenon* explain'd on that Suppoſition, which may not as well be explain'd without it, as might eaſily be made appear by an induction of Particulars. To Explain the *Phenomena*, is all one as to ſhew why upon ſuch and ſuch Occaſions, we are affected with ſuch and ſuch Ideas. But how Matter ſhou'd Operate on a Spirit, or produce any Idea in it, is what no Philoſopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident, there can be no uſe of Matter in Natural Philoſophy. Beſides, they who attempt to account for Things, do it, not by Corporeal Subſtance but, by Figure, Motion, *&c.* which are in truth no more than meer Ideas, and therefore

cannot

cannot be the cauſe of any thing, as hath been already ſhewn *vid. Sect.* XXV.

§ 51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not ſeem abſurd, to take away Natural Cauſes, and aſcribe every thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits? We muſt no longer ſay upon theſe Principles that Fire Heats, or Water Cools, but that a Spirit Heats, *&c.* wou'd not a Man be deſervedly laught at, who ſhou'd talk after this manner? I anſwer he wou'd ſo, in ſuch Things we ought to *Think with the Learned, and Speak with the Vulgar.* They who to demonſtration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican Syſtem, do nevertheleſs ſay the Sun Riſes, the Sun Sets or comes to the Meridian: And if they affected a contrary Stile, in common talk, it wou'd without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little Reflexion on what is here ſaid will make it manifeſt, that the common uſe of Language wou'd receive no manner of Alteration or Diſturbance from the admiſſion of our Tenents.

§ 52.

§ 52. In the ordinary affairs of Life, any Phraſes may be retain'd, ſo long as they Excite in us proper Sentiments, or Diſpoſitions to act in ſuch a manner as is neceſſary for our well-being, how falſe ſoever they may be, if taken in a ſtrict and Speculative Senſe. Nay this is unavoidable ſince, Propriety being regulated by Cuſtom, Language is ſuited to the received Opinions which are not always the trueſt. Hence it is impoſſible even in the moſt rigid, Philoſophic Reaſonings, ſo far to alter the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we ſpeak, as never to give a handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Inconſiſtencies. But a fair and ingenuous Reader will collect the Senſe, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of a Diſcourſe, making allowances for thoſe unaccurate Modes of Speech, which uſe has made inevitable.

§ 53. As to the Opinion that there are no Corporeal Cauſes, this has been heretofore maintain'd by ſome of the School-

Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the Modern Philoſophers, who thô they allow Matter to Exiſt, yet will have GOD alone to be the immediate efficient Cauſe of all Things. Theſe Men ſaw, that amongſt all the Objects of Senſe there was none, which had any Power or Activity included in it, and that by conſequence this was likewiſe true, of whatever Bodies they ſuppoſed to Exiſt without the Mind, like unto the immediate Objects of Senſe. But then, that they ſhou'd ſuppoſe an innumerable multitude of Created Beings, which they acknowlege are not capable of producing any one effect in Nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpoſe, ſince God might have done every thing as well without them, this I ſay thô we ſhou'd allow it poſſible, muſt yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant Suppoſition.

§ 54. In the Eighth Place, the univerſal concurrent aſſent of Mankind may be thought by ſome, an invincible Argument in behalf of Matter, or the Exiſtence

istence of External Things. Must we suppose the whole World to be mistaken, and if so, what cause can be assign'd of so wide-spread and predominant an Error? I answer, First, that upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found, so many as is imagin'd do really believe the Existence of Matter, or Things without the Mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a Contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible, and whether the foregoing Expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one Sense, indeed, Men may be said to believe that Matter Exists, *i. e.* they act as if the immediate Cause of their Sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking Being. But that they shou'd clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those Words, and form thereof a Settled Speculative Opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only Instance wherein Men impose upon themselves, by Imagining they

believe

believe thoſe Propoſitions they have often heard, thô at Bottom they have no meaning in them.

§ 55. But Secondly, Thô we ſhou'd grant a Notion to be never ſo univerſally and ſtedfaſtly adhered to, yet this is but a weak Argument of its truth, to whoever conſiders what a vaſt number of Prejudices and falſe Opinions are every where embraced, with the utmoſt tenaciouſneſs by the unreflecting (which are the far-greater) part of Mankind. There was a time when the *Antipodes* and Motion of the Earth, were look'd upon as monſtrous Abſurdities, even by Men of Learning: And if it be conſider'd what a ſmall proportion they bear to the reſt of Mankind, we ſhall find that at this Day, thoſe Notions have gain'd but a very inconſiderable footing in the World.

§ 56. But it is demanded, that we aſſign a cauſe of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the World. To this I anſwer, That Men knowing

they perceiv'd ſeveral Ideas, whereof they themſelves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within, nor depending on the operation of their Wills, this made 'em maintain, thoſe Ideas or Objects of Perception had an Exiſtence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever dreaming that a Contradiction was involved in thoſe Words. But Philoſphers having plainly ſeen, that the immediate Objects of Perception do not Exiſt without the Mind, they in ſome degree corrected the miſtake of the Vulgar, but at the ſame time run into another which ſeems no leſs Abſurd, *viz.* that there are certain Objects really Exiſting without the Mind, or having a ſubſiſtence diſtinct from being perceived, of which our Ideas are only Images or Reſemblance, imprinted by thoſe Objects on the Mind. And this Notion of the Philoſophers ows its Origine to the ſame cauſe with the former, namely their being conſcious that they were not the Authors of their own Senſations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from

from without, and which therefore must have some cause, distinct from the Minds on which they are imprinted.

§ 57. But why they shou'd suppose the Ideas of Sense to be excited in us, by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to *Spirit* which alone can act, may be accounted for, First, because they were not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our Ideas Existing without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly, because the supreme Spirit which Excites those Ideas in our Minds, is not mark'd out and limited to our view by any particular, finite Collection of sensible Ideas, as Human Agents are by their Size, Complexion, Limbs, Motions, *&c.* And Thirdly, because his Operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the Course of Nature is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are ready to own the presence of a Superiour Agent. But when we see things go on in the ordinary Course, they do not Excite in us any Reflexion,

their Order and Concatenation, thô it be an Argument of the greateſt Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs in their Creator, is yet ſo conſtant and familiar to us, that we do not think 'em the immediate effects of a *Free Spirit*: eſpecially ſince Inconſtancy and Mutability in acting, thô it be an Imperfection, is look'd on as a mark of *Freedom*.

§ 58. Tenthly, It will be objected, that the Notions we advance are inconſiſtent with ſeveral ſound Truths in Philoſophy and Mathematics. For Example, The Motion of the Earth is now univerſally admitted by Aſtronomers, as a Truth grounded on the cleareſt and moſt convincing Reaſons. But on the foregoing Principles there can be no ſuch thing. For Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it Exiſts not, but the Motion of the Earth is not perceiv'd by Senſe. I Anſwer, That Tenent, if rightly underſtood, will be found to agree with the Principles we have premiſed: For the Queſtion, whether the Earth moves or no

no, amounts in reality to no more than this, *viz.* whether we have reaſon to conclude, from what hath been obſerv'd by Aſtronomers, that if we were placed in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances, and ſuch or ſuch a Poſition and Diſtance, both from the Earth and Sun, we ſhou'd perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and appearing in all reſpects like one of them: And this, by the Eſtabliſh'd Rules of Nature, which we have no reaſon to miſtruſt, is reaſonably collected from the Phænomena.

§ 59. We may from the Experience we have had, of the Train and Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, often make, I will not ſay uncertain Conjectures, but, ſure and well grounded Predictions, concerning the Ideas we ſhall be affected with purſuant to a great Train of Actions, and be enabled to paſs a right Judgement of what wou'd have appear'd to us, in caſe we were placed in Circumſtances, very different from thoſe we are in at preſent. Herein conſiſts

ſiſts the Knowlege of Nature, which may preſerve its uſe and certainty very conſiſtently with what hath been ſaid. It will be eaſy, to apply this to whatever Objections of the like ſort may be drawn, from the Magnitude of the Stars, or any other Diſcoveries in Aſtronomy or Nature.

§ 60. In the eleventh Place, it will be demanded to what purpoſe ſerves that curious Organization of Plants, and the admirable Mechaniſm in the Parts of Animals; might not Vegetables grow, and ſhoot forth Leaves and Bloſſoms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without, as with all that variety of Internal Parts ſo elegantly contriv'd and put together, which being Ideas, have nothing Powerful or Operative in them, nor have any neceſſary connexion with the effects aſcribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a *fiat*, or act of his will, we muſt think all that's fine and artificial in the Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be made

made in vain. By this Doctrine, thô an Artiſt has made the Spring and Wheels, and every Movement of a Watch, and adjuſted them in ſuch a manner, as he knew wou'd produce the Motions he deſign'd; yet he muſt think all this done to no purpoſe, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day. If ſo, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the Movements, and putting them together? Why does not an empty Caſe ſerve as well as another; and how comes it to paſs, that whenever there is any Fault in the going of a Watch, there is ſome correſponding Diſorder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be ſaid of all the Clock-work of Nature, great part whereof is ſo wonderfully Fine and Subtile, as ſcarce to be diſcern'd by the beſt Microſcope. In ſhort it will be ask'd, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Cauſe aſſign'd

of

of an innumerable multitude of Bodies and Machines, fram'd with the most exquisite Art, which in the common Philosophy have very apposite Uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of Phænomena.

§ 61. To all which, I answer, First, That thô there were some Difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the Uses by it assign'd to the several parts of Nature, which I cou'd not solve by the foregoing Principles, yet this Objection cou'd be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those Things, which may be prov'd *a Priori*, with the utmost Evidence and Rigor of Demonstration. Secondly, But neither are the receiv'd Principles free from the like Difficulties; for it may still be demanded, to what end God shou'd take those roundabout Methods of effecting things by Instruments and Machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the meer command of his Will, without all that *apparatus*: Nay, if we nar-

narrowly consider it, we shall find the Objection may be retorted with greater force, on those who hold the Existence of those Machines without the Mind; for it has been made evident, that Solidity, Bulk, Figure, Motion, *&c.* have no *Activity* or *Efficacy* in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in Nature, *vid. Sect.* XXV. whoever therefore supposes them to Exist (allowing the Supposition possible) when they are not perceived, does it manifestly to no purpose, since the only use that is assign'd to them, as they Exist unperceiv'd, is that they produce those perceivable Effects which, in truth, cannot be ascrib'd to any thing but Spirit.

§ 62 But to come nigher the Difficulty, it must be observ'd, that thô the Fabrication of all those Parts and Organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any Effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain general

neral Laws, that run thrô the whole Chain of Natural Effects, these are learn'd by the Observation and Study of Nature, and are by Men applied as well to the framing artificial Things, for the Use and Ornament of Life, as to the explaining the various *Phænomena*, which Explication consists only in shewing the Conformity, any particular Phænomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the *Uniformity*, there is in the Production of natural Effects, as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several Instances, wherein Philosophers pretend to account for Appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous Use in these regular, constant Methods of working, observ'd by the Supreme Agent, has been shewn in *Sect.* XXXI. and it is no less visible, that a particular Size, Figure, Motion and Disposition of Parts are necessary, thô not absolutely to the producing any Effect, yet to the producing it according to the Standing, Mechanical Laws of Nature. Thus, for Instance, It cannot be denied

denied that God, or the Intelligence that ſuſtains and rules the ordinary courſe of Things, might if He were minded to produce a Miracle, cauſe all the Motions on the Dial-plate of a Watch, thô no Body had ever made the Movements, and put them in it: But yet if he will act agreeably to the Rules of Mechaniſm, by him for wiſe Ends eſtabliſh'd and maintain'd in the Creation, it is neceſſary that thoſe Actions of the Watchmaker, whereby he makes the Movements and rightly adjuſts them, precede the production of the aforeſaid Motions, as alſo that any diſorder in them be attended with the Perception of ſome correſponding Diſorder, in the Movements, which being once Corrected all is right again.

§ 63. It may, indeed, on ſome Occaſions be neceſſary, that the Author of Nature diſplay his over-ruling Power, in producing ſome Appearance out of the ordinary Series of Things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of Nature, are proper to ſurpriſe and awe

Men into an acknowledgment of the of the Divine Being: But then they are to be uſed but ſeldom, otherwiſe there is a plain reaſon, why they ſhou'd fail of that Effect. Beſides, God ſeems to chooſe the convincing our Reaſon of his Attributes by the works of Nature, which diſcover ſo much Harmony and Contrivance in their Make, and are ſuch plain Indications of Wiſdom and Beneficence in their Author, rather than to aſtoniſh us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and ſurpriſing Events.

§ 64. To ſet this Matter in a yet clearer Light, I ſhall obſerve that what has been objected in *Sect.* LX. amounts in reality to no more than this. Ideas are not any how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion between them, like to that of Cauſe and Effect: There are alſo ſeveral Combinations of them, made in a very Regular and Artificial Manner, which ſeem like ſo many Inſtruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as it were behind the Scenes, have a ſecret

Operation

Operation in producing thoſe Appearances, which are ſeen on the Theatre of the World, being themſelves diſcernible only to the curious Eye of the Philoſopher. But ſince one Idea cannot be the Cauſe of another, to what purpoſe is that Connexion? And ſince thoſe Inſtruments, being barely *inefficacious Perceptions* in the Mind, are not ſubſervient to the Production of Natural Effects; it is demanded why they are made, or, in other Words, what reaſon can be aſſign'd, why God ſhou'd make us upon a cloſe inſpection into His Works, behold ſo great variety of Ideas, ſo artfully laid together, and ſo much according to Rule: It not being imaginable, that he'd be at the Expence (if one may ſo ſpeak) of all that Art and Regularity to no purpoſe.

§ 65. To all which my Anſwer is, Firſt, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, but only of a Mark or *Sign* with the Thing *ſignified*. The Fire which I ſee, is not the Cauſe of the Pain I ſuffer

ſuffer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the Noiſe that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion, or colliſion of the ambient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Secondly, The reaſon why Ideas are form'd into Machines, *i. e.* artificial and regular Combinations, is the ſame with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to ſignifie, a great number of Effects and Actions, 'tis neceſſary they be variouſly combin'd together: And to the end their Uſe be permanent and univerſal, theſe Combinations muſt be made by *Rule*, and with *wiſe Contrivance*. By this means abundance of Information is convey'd unto us, concerning what we are to expect from ſuch and ſuch Actions, and what Methods are proper to be taken, for the Exciting ſuch and ſuch Ideas: Which in effect, is all that I conceive to be diſtinctly meant, when it is ſaid that by diſcerning the Figure, Texture, and Mechaniſm of the inward Parts of Bodies, whether Natural or Artificial,

we may attain to know the ſeveral Uſes and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the Thing.

§ 66. Hence it is evident, that thoſe Things, which under the Notion of a Cauſe co-operating or concurring to the production of Effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great Abſurdities, may be very naturally explain'd, and have a proper and obvious Uſe aſſign'd 'em, whenthey are conſider'd only as Marks, or Signs for our Information. And it is the ſearching after, and endeavouring to underſtand this Language (if I may ſo call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the Employment of the Natural Philoſopher; and not the pretending to explain Things by Corporeal Cauſes, which Doctrine ſeems to have too much eſtranged the Minds of Men, from that active Principle, that ſupreme and wiſe Spirit, *in whom we Live, Move, and have our Being.*

§ 67 In the Twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected, that thô it be clear from

from what has been ſaid, that there can be no ſuch thing as an Inert, Senſeleſs, Extended, Solid, Figured, Moveable Subſtance Exiſting without the Mind, ſuch as Philoſophers deſcribe Matter: Yet if any Man ſhall leave out of his Idea of *Matter*, the poſitive Ideas of Extenſion, Figure, Solidity and Motion, and ſay that he means only by that word, an Inert, Senſeleſs Subſtance that Exiſts without the Mind or unperceiv'd, which is the Occaſion of our Ideas, or at the preſence whereof God is pleaſed to excite Ideas in us: It doth not appear, but that Matter taken in this Senſe may poſſibly Exiſt. In Anſwer to which I ſay, Firſt, That it ſeems no leſs Abſurd to ſuppoſe a Subſtance without Accidents, than it is to ſuppoſe Accidents without a Subſtance. But Secondly, Thô we ſhou'd grant this unknown Subſtance may poſſibly Exiſt, yet where can it be ſuppoſed to be? That it Exiſts not in the Mind is agreed, and that it Exiſts not in Place is no leſs certain; ſince all Place or Extenſion Exiſts only in the Mind as hath been

been already prov'd. It remains therefore that it Exists no where at all.

§ 68. Let us examine a little, the description that is here given us of *Matter.* It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceiv'd : For this is all that's meant by saying it is an Inert, Senseless, Unknown Substance, which is a Definition intirely made up of Negatives,excepting only the relative Notion of its standing under or Supporting : But then it must be observ'd that it *Supports* nothing at all ; and how nearly this comes to the description of a *non-entity*, I desire may be consider'd. But say you it is the *unknown occasion*, at the presence of which, Ideas are Excited in us by the will of God. Now I wou'd fain know, how any thing can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by Sense nor Reflexion, nor capable of producing any Idea in our Minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any Form, nor Exists in any place. The words *to be present*, when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange

Meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

§ 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by *Occaſion*: So far as I can gather from the common Uſe of Language, that Word ſignifies, either the Agent which produces any Effect, or elſe ſomething that is obſerv'd to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary courſe of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above deſcribed, it can be taken in neither of thoſe Senſes. For Matter is ſaid to be Paſſive and Inert, and ſo cannot be an Agent or Efficient Cauſe. It is alſo unperceivable as being devoid of all Senſible Qualities, and ſo cannot be the Occaſion of our Perceptions in the latter Senſe: As when the burning my Finger, is ſaid to be the Occaſion of the Pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling Matter an *Occaſion*? This Term is either uſed in no Senſe at all, or elſe in ſome very diſtant from its receiv'd Signification

§ 70. You

§ 70. You will perhaps ſay that Matter, thô it be not perceiv'd by us, is nevertheleſs perceived by God, to whom it is the Occaſion of Exciting Ideas in our Minds. For, ſay you, ſince we obſerve our Senſations to be imprinted in an orderly and conſtant manner, it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, there are certain Conſtant, and Regular Occaſions of their being produced. That is to ſay, that there are certain permanent, and diſtinct parcels of Matter, correſponding to our Ideas, which thô they do not excite them in our Minds, or any wiſe immediately affect us, as being altogether Paſſive and Unperceivable to Us, they are nevertheleſs to God, by whom they are Perceiv'd, as it were ſo many Occaſions, to remind him when and what Ideas, to imprint on our Minds: that ſo things may go on in a conſtant, uniform manner.

§ 71. In anſwer to this I obſerve, that, as the Notion of Matter is here Stated, the Queſtion is no longer con-

cerning the Exiſtence of a Thing diſtinct from *Spirit* and *Idea*, from Perceiving and being Perceiv'd: But whether there are not certain Ideas, of I know not what Sort, in the Mind of God, which are ſo many Marks or Notes, that direct him how to produce Senſations in our Minds, in a conſtant and regular Method: Much after the ſame manner, as a Muſician is directed by the Notes of Muſic, to produce that harmonious train and compoſition of Sound, which is called a *Tune*; thô they who Hear the Muſic do not Perceive the Notes, and may be intirely ignorant of them. But this Notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick, from what is ſaid of unknown Occaſions) ſeems too extravagant to deſerve a Confutation. Beſides, it is in effect no Objection againſt what we have advanced, *viz.* that there is no ſenſeleſs, unperceiv'd *Subſtance*.

§ 72. If we follow the Light of Reaſon, we ſhall, from the conſtant uniform

form Method of our Senſations, collect the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of the *Spirit* who excites them in our Minds. But this is all that I can ſee reaſonably concluded from thence. To me, I ſay, 'tis evident that the Being of a *Spirit infinitely Wiſe, Good, and Powerful* is abundantly ſufficient, to explain all the Appearances of Nature. But as for *Inert, Senſleſs Matter*, nothing that I perceive has any the leaſt Connexion with it, or leads to the Thoughts of it. And I wou'd fain ſee any one Explain, any the meaneſt *Phænomenon* in Nature by it, or ſhew any manner of Reaſon, thô in the loweſt Rank of Probability, that he can have for its Exiſtence; or even make any tolerable Senſe or Meaning of that Suppoſition. For as to its being an Occaſion, we have, I think, evidently ſhewn that with regard to us it is no Occaſion: It remains therefore that it muſt be, if at all, the Occaſion to God of exciting Ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have juſt now ſeen.

§ 73. It

§ 73. It is worth while to reflect a little, on the Motives which induced Men to ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of Material Subſtance; that ſo having obſerv'd the gradual Ceaſing, and Expiration of thoſe Motives or Reaſons, we may proportionably withdraw the Aſſent that was grounded on them. Firſt, therefore, it was thought that Colour, Figure, Motion, and the reſt of the Senſible Qualities or Accidents, did really Exiſt without the Mind; and for this reaſon, it ſeem'd needful to ſuppoſe ſome unthinking *Subſtratum*, or *Subſtance* wherein they did Exiſt, ſince they cou'd not be conceived to Exiſt by themſelves. Afterwards, in proceſs of time, Men being convinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reſt of the Senſible, Secondary Qualities had no Exiſtence without the Mind, they ſtripped this *Subſtratum* or material Subſtance of thoſe Qualities, leaving only the Primary Ones, Figure, Motion, *&c.* which they ſtill conceived to Exiſt without the Mind, and conſequently, to ſtand in need of a material Support.

port. But it having been ſhewn, that none, even of theſe, can poſſibly Exiſt otherwiſe than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows, that we have no longer any reaſon, to ſuppoſe the being of *Matter*. Nay, that it is utterly impoſſible there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing, ſo long as that Word is taken to denote, an *unthinking Subſtratum* of Qualities or Accidents, wherein they Exiſt without the Mind.

§ 74. But thô it be allow'd by the *Materialiſts*, themſelves, that Matter was thought of only for the ſake of ſupporting Accidents; and the reaſon intirely ceaſing, one might expect the Mind ſhou'd naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was ſolely grounded thereon. Yet the Prejudice is riveted ſo deeply in our Thoughts, that we can ſcarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, ſince the *Thing* it ſelf is indefenſible, at leaſt to retain the *Name*; which we apply to, I know not what, abſtracted and indefinite Notions of *Being*, *Occaſion*,

caſion, &c. thô without any ſhew of Reaſon, at leaſt ſo far as I can ſee. For what is there, I beſeech you, on our part, or what do we perceive amongſt all the Ideas, Senſations, Notions, which are imprinted on our Minds, either by Senſe or Reflexion, from whence may be infer'd the Exiſtence of an inert, thoughtleſs, unperceiv'd Occaſion? and on the other hand, on the part of an *All-ſufficient Spirit*, what can there be that ſhou'd make us believe, or even ſuſpect, he is *directed* by an inert Occaſion to excite Ideas in our Minds?

§ 75. It is a very extraordinary Inſtance of the force of Prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the Mind of Man retains ſo great a Fondneſs, againſt all the evidence of Reaſon, for a ſtupid, thoughtleſs *Somewhat*, by the interpoſition whereof it wou'd, as it were, ſkreen it ſelf, from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the Affairs of the World. But thô we do the utmoſt we can, to ſecure the belief of *Matter*, thô when Reaſon forſakes us, we

we endeavour to ſupport our Opinion on the bare poſſibility of the Thing, and thô we Indulge our ſelves in the full Scope, of an Imagination not regulated by Reaſon, to make out that poor *Poſſibility*, yet the Up-ſhot of all is, that there certain *unknown Ideas* in the Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is all that I conceive to be meant by *Occaſion* with regard to God. And this, at the Bottom, is no longer contending for the *Thing*, but for the *Name*.

§ 76. Whether therefore there are ſuch Ideas in the Mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name *Matter* I ſhan't diſpute. But if you ſtick to the Notion of an unthinking Subſtance, or Support of Extenſion, Motion, *&c.* then to me it is moſt evidently impoſſible, there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing. Since it is a plain Repugnancy, that thoſe Qualities ſhou'd Exiſt in or be ſupported by an unperceiving Subſtance.

§ 77. But ſay you, thô it be granted that there is no thoughtleſs ſupport

of Extenſion, and the other Qualities or Accidents which we Perceive; yet there may, perhaps, be ſome Inert, Unperceiving Subſtance, or *Subſtratum* of ſome other Qualities, as incomprehenſible to us as Colours are to a Man born Blind, becauſe we have not a Senſe adapted to them. But if we had a new Senſe, we ſhou'd poſſibly no more doubt of their Exiſtence, than a Blind-man made to See does of the Exiſtence of Light and Colours. I anſwer, Firſt, if what you mean by the word *Matter* be only the unknown Support of unknown Qualities, it's no matter whether there is ſuch a thing or no; ſince it no way concerns us: And for my part, I do not ſee the Advantage there is in diſputing about we know not *what*, and we know not *why*.

§ 78. But, Secondly, if we had a new Senſe it cou'd only furniſh us with new Ideas or Senſations: And then we ſhou'd have the ſame reaſon, againſt their Exiſting in an unperceiving Subſtance, that has been already offer'd with relation

to

to Figure, Motion, Colour, *&c.* Qualities, as hath been ſhewn, are nothing elſe but *Senſations* or *Ideas*, which Exiſt only in a *Mind* perceiving them; and this is true not only of the Ideas we are acquainted with at preſent, but likewiſe of all poſſible Ideas whatſoever.

§ 79. But you will inſiſt, what if I have no reaſon to believe the Exiſtence of Matter, what if I cannot aſſign any uſe to it, or explain any thing by it, or even conceive what is meant by that Word? Yet ſtill it is no Contradiction to ſay that Matter Exiſts, and that this Matter is *in general* a *Subſtance*, or *Occaſion of Ideas*; thô, indeed, to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular Explication of thoſe Words, may be attended with great Difficulties. I anſwer, when Words are uſed without a Meaning, you may put them together as you pleaſe, without danger of running into a Contradiction. You may ſay, for Example, that *twice Two* is equal to *Seven*, ſo long as you declare you do not take the Words of that Pro-

poſition in their uſual Acception, but for Marks of you know not what. And by the ſame reaſon you may ſay, there is an inert, thoughtleſs Subſtance without Accidents, which is the occaſion of our Ideas. And we ſhall underſtand juſt as much by one Propoſition, as the other.

§ 80. In the laſt place, you will ſay, What if we give up the Cauſe of material Subſtance, and ſtand to it, that Matter is an unknown *Somewhat*, neither Subſtance nor Accident, Spirit nor Idea, Inert, Thoughtleſs, Indiviſible, Immoveable, Unextended, Exiſting in no Place? For, ſay you, Whatever may be urged againſt *Subſtance* or *Occaſion*, or any other poſitive or relative Notion of Matter hath no place at all, ſo long as this *negative* Definition of Matter is adhered to. I anſwer you may, if ſo it ſhall ſeem good, uſe the word *Matter* in the ſame Senſe, that other Men uſe *Nothing*, and ſo make thoſe Terms convertible in your Stile. For after all, this is what appears to me to be the Reſult of

of that Difinition, the Parts whereof when I conſider with Attention, either collectively, or ſeparate from each other, I do not find that there's any kind of Effect or Impreſſion made on my Mind, different from what is excited by term *Nothing*.

§ 81. Upon this, you'll Reply that in the foreſaid Definition, is included, what doth ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from nothing, the poſitive, abſtract Idea of *Quiddity*, *Entity*, or *Exiſtence*. I own indeed, that thoſe who pretend to the Faculty of framing Abſtract, General Ideas, do talk as if they had ſuch an Idea, which is, ſay they, the moſt abſtract and general Notion of all, that is, to me, the moſt Incomprehenſible of all Others. That there are a great variety of Spirits of different Orders and Capacities, whoſe Faculties, both in Number and Extent, are far exceeding thoſe the Author of my Being has beſtowed on me, I ſee no reaſon to deny. And for me, to pretend to determine, by my own few, ſtinted, narrow Inlets of Perception, what Ideas

Ideas the inexhauſtible Power of the SUPREME SPIRIT may Imprint upon 'em, were certainly the utmoſt Folly and Preſumption. Since there may be, for ought that I know, innumerable ſorts of Ideas or Senſations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceiv'd, as Colours are from Sounds. But how ready ſoever I may be, to acknowlege the Scantineſs of my Comprehenſion, with regard to the endleſs variety of Spirits and Ideas, that may poſſibly Exiſt, yet for any one to pretend to a Notion of Entity or Exiſtence, *abſtracted* from *Spirit* and *Idea*, from Perceiving and being Perceiv'd, is, I ſuſpect, a downright Repugnancy nnd Trifling with Words. It remains that we conſider the Objections, which may poſſibly be made on the part of Religion.

§ 82. Some there are who think, that thô the Arguments for the real Exiſtence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reaſon, be allow'd not to amount to Demonſtration, yet the Holy Scriptures are ſo clear in the Point, as will ſufficiently

ently convince every good Christian, that Bodies do really Exist, and are something more than meer Ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable Facts related, which evidently suppose the reality of Timber, and Stone, Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and Human Bodies, *&c.* To which I Answer, that no sort of Writings, whatever Sacred or Profane, which use those and the like Words in the Vulgar Acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in 'em, are in danger of having their Truth call'd in question by our Doctrine. That all those Things do really Exist, that there are Bodies, even Corporeal Substances, when taken in the Vulgar Sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our Principles: And the difference betwixt *Things* and *Ideas*, *Realities* and *Chimeras*, has been distinctly Explain'd, *vid. Sect.* XXIX, XXX, XXXIII, XXXVI, *&c.* And I do not think, that either what Philosophers call *Matter*, or the Existence of Objects without the Mind is any where mention'd in Scripture.

§ 83. Again,

§ 83. Again, whether there be, or be not External Things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper Use of Words, is the marking our Conceptions, or Things only as they are Known and Perceiv'd by us; whence it plainly follows, that in the Tenents we have laid down, there is nothing inconsistent with the right Use and Significancy of *Language* and that Discourse of what kind soever, so far as it is Intelligible, remains Undisturb'd. But all this seems so very manifest, from what hath been largely set forth in the Premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

§ 84. But it will be urg'd, that Miracles do, at least, lose much of their Stress and Import, by our Principles. What must we think of *Moses*'s Rod, was it not *really* turn'd into a Serpent, or was there only a Change of *Ideas* in the Minds of the Spectators? And can it be supposed, that our Saviour did no more at the Marriage-Feast in *Cana*, than impose on the Sight, and Smell, and Taste of

of the Guests, so as to create in them the Appearance or Idea only of Wine? The same may be said of all other Miracles: Which, in consequence of the foregoing Principles, must be look'd upon only as so many Cheats, or Illusions of Fancy. To this I Reply, that the Rod was changed into a real Serpent, and the Water into real Wine. That this does not, in the least, contradict what I have elsewhere said, will be evident from *Sect.* XXXIV, and XXXV. But this Business of *Real* and *Imaginary* has been already so plainly and fully Explain'd, and so often Refer'd to, and the Difficulties about it are so easily Answer'd from what has gone before, that it were an Affront to the Reader's Understanding, to resume the Explication of it in this place. I shall only observe, that if at Table all who were present shou'd See, and Smell, and Taste, and Drink Wine, and find the effects of it, with me there cou'd be no doubt of it's Reality. So that, at Bottom, the Scruple concerning real Miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the

receiv'd Principles, and conſequently makes rather *for*, than *againſt* what has been ſaid.

§ 85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavour'd to propoſe in the cleareſt Light, and gave them all the Force and Weight I cou'd, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our Tenents in their Conſequences. Some of theſe appear at firſt Sight, as that ſeveral Difficult and obſcure Queſtions, on which abundance of Speculation has been thrown away, are intirely baniſh'd from Philoſophy. Whether Corporeal Subſtance can think: Whether Matter be infinitely Diviſible: And how it Operates on Spirit; theſe and the like Inquiries have given infinite Amuſement to Philoſophers, in all Ages. But depending on the Exiſtence of *Matter*, they have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other Advantages there are, as well with regard to *Religion* as the *Sciences*, which it is eaſy for any one to deduce, from what has been premiſed. But this will appear more plainly in the Sequel. § 86. From

§ 86. From the Principles we have laid down, it follows, Human Knowlege many naturally be reduced to two Heads, that of *Ideas*, and that of *Spirits*. Of each of theſe I ſhall treat in Order. And firſt as to Ideas or Unthinking Things, our Knowlege of theſe has been very much obſcur'd, and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous Errors, by ſuppoſing a two-fold Exiſtence of the Objects of Senſe, the one *Intelligible*, or in the Mind, the other *Real* and without the Mind: Whereby Unthinking Things are thought, to have a natural Subſiſtence of their own, diſtinct from being perceiv'd by Spirits. This which, if I miſtake not, hath been ſhewn to be a moſt groundleſs and abſurd Notion, is the very Root of *Scepticiſm*; for ſo long as Men thought that Real Things ſubſiſted without the Mind, and that their Knowlege was only ſo far forth *Real* as it was conformable to *real Things*, it follows, they cou'd not be certain, that they had any real Knowlege at all. For

how can it be known, that the Things which are Perceiv'd, are conformable to thoſe which are not Perceiv'd, or Exiſt without the Mind?

§ 87. Colour, Figure, Motion, Extenſion and the like, conſider'd only as ſo many *Senſations* in the Mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not Perceiv'd. But if they are look'd on as Notes or Images, refered to *Things* or *Archetypes* Exiſting without the Mind, then are we involved all in *Scepticiſm*. We ſee only the Appearances, and not the real Qualities of Things. What may be the Extenſion, Figure, or Motion of any Thing really and abſolutely, or in it ſelf, its impoſſible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our Senſes. Things remaining the ſame, our Ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, repreſent the true Quality really Exiſting in the Thing, it is out of our Reach to determine. So that, for ought we know, all we See, Hear, and Feel, may be only Phan-

Phantome and vain Chimera, and not at all agree with the Real Things, Exiſting in *Rerum Natura*. All this Sceptical Cant follows, from our ſuppoſing a difference between *Things* and *Ideas*, and that the former have a Subſiſtence without the Mind, or Unperceiv'd. It were eaſy to dilate on this Subject, and ſhew how the Arguments urged by *Sceptics* in all Ages, depend on the ſuppoſition of External Objects. But this is too obvious to need being inſiſted on.

§ 88. So long as we attribute a real Exiſtence to Unthinking Things, diſtinct from their being perceiv'd, it is not only impoſſible, for us to know with evidence the Nature of any real, unthinking Being, but even that it Exiſts. Hence it is, that we ſee Philoſophers diſtruſt their Senſes, and doubt of the Exiſtence of Heaven and Earth, of every thing they See or Feel, even of their own Bodies. And after all their labouring and ſtruggle of Thought, they are forced to own, we cannot attain to any ſelf-evident, or demonſtrative Knowlege, of the

the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things. But all this Doubtfulneſs, which ſo Bewilders and Confounds the Mind, and makes *Philoſophy* ridiculous in the Eyes of the World, vaniſhes if we annex a meaning to our Words, and not amuſe our ſelves with the terms *Abſolute*, *External*, *Exiſt*, &c. ſignifying we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thoſe things, which I actually perceive by Senſe: It being a manifeſt Contradiction, that any ſenſible Object ſhou'd be immediately perceiv'd by Sight or Touch, and, at the ſame time, have no Exiſtence in Nature, ſince the very Exiſtence of an unthinking Being, conſiſts in *being perceiv'd*.

§ 89. Nothing ſeems of more Importance, towards Erecting a firm Syſtem of ſound and real Knowlege, which may be Proof againſt the Aſſaults of *Scepticiſm*, than to lay the beginning in a diſtinct Explication, of what is meant by *Thing*, *Reality*, *Exiſtence*: For in vain ſhall we Diſpute, concerning the real Exiſtence

Exiſtence of Things, or pretend to any Knowlege thereof, ſo long as we have not fix'd the meaning of thoſe Words. *Thing* or *Being* is the moſt general Name of all, it comprehends under it two Kinds intirely diſtinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the Name, *viz.* *Spirits* and *Ideas*. The former are *Active*, *Indiviſible*, *Incorruptible Subſtances*: The latter are *Inert*, *Fleeting*, *Periſhable Paſſions*, or *Dependent Beings*, which ſubſiſt not by themſelves, but are ſupported by, or Exiſt in Minds or Spiritual Subſtances.

§ 90. Ideas imprinted on the Senſes are real Things, or do really Exiſt, this we do not deny, but we deny they can ſubſiſt without the Minds which perceive them, or that they are Reſemblances of any Archetypes Exiſting without the Mind: Since the very Being of a Senſation or Idea conſiſts in being perceived, and an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea. Again the Things perceived by Senſe may be termed *External*, with regard to their Origine, in that they are not

not generated from within, by the Mind it ſelf, but imprinted by a Spirit diſtinct from that which perceives them. Senſible Objects may likewiſe be ſaid to be without the Mind, in another ſenſe, namely when they Exiſt in ſome other Mind. Thus when I ſhut my Eyes, the Things I ſaw may ſtill Exiſt, but it muſt be in another Mind.

§ 91. It were a miſtake to think, that what is here ſaid derogates in the leaſt, from the Reality of Things. It is acknowleg'd on the receiv'd Principles, that Extenſion, Motion, and in a Word, all ſenſible Qualities have need of a Support, as not being able to ſubſiſt by themſelves. But the Objects perceiv'd by Senſe, are allow'd to be nothing but Combinations of thoſe Qualities, and conſequently cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the Things perceiv'd by Senſe, an Exiſtence independent of a Subſtance, or Support wherein they may Exiſt, we detract nothing from the receiv'd Opinion of their *Reality*;

Reality, and are guilty of no Innovation in that respect. All the Difference is, that according to us the Unthinking Beings perceiv'd by Sense, have no Existence distinct from being Perceiv'd, and cannot therefore Exist in any other Substance, than those Unextended, Indivisible Substances, or *Spirits*, which act, and think, and perceive them: Whereas Philosophers vulgarly hold, the Sensible Qualities do Exist in an Inert, Extended, Unperceiving Substance, which they call *Matter*, to which they attribute a Natural Subsistence, exterior to all Thinking Beings, or distinct from being perceiv'd by any Mind whatsoever, even the Eternal Mind of the CREATOR, wherein they suppose only Ideas of the Corporeal Substances created by him. If indeed they allow them to be at all Created.

§ 92. For as we have shewn the Doctrine of Matter or Corporeal Substance, to have been the main Pillar and Support of *Scepticism*, so likewise upon the same Foundation have been rais'd all the Impious Schemes of *Atheism* and Irreligion.

Nay ſo great a difficulty has it been thought, to conceive Matter produced out of Nothing, that the moſt Celebrated among the Ancient Philoſophers, even of theſe who maintain'd the Being of a God, have thought Matter to be Uncreated and Coeternal with him. How great a Friend material Subſtance has been to *Atheiſts* in all Ages, were needleſs to relate. All their monſtrous Syſtems have ſo viſible and neceſſary a dependence on it, that when this Corner-Stone is once remov'd, the whole Fabrick cannot chooſe but fall to the Ground. inſomuch that it is no longer worth while, to beſtow a particular Conſideration on the Abſurdities of every wretched Sect of *Atheiſts*.

§ 93. That Impious and Profane Perſons, ſhou'd readily fall in with thoſe Syſtems, which favour their Inclinations, by deriding Immaterial Subſtance, and ſuppoſing the Soul to be Diviſible, and ſubject to Corruption as the Body, which exclude all Freedom, Intelligence, and Deſign from the Formation of

of Things, and inſtead thereof make a Self-exiſtent, Stupid, Unthinking Subſtance the Root and Origine of all Beings. That they ſhou'd hearken to thoſe who deny a Providence, or Inſpection of a Superior Mind over the Affairs of the World, attributing the whole Series of Events either to Blind Chance, or Fatal Neceſſity ariſing from the Impulſe of one Body on another. All this is very natural. And on the other hand, when Men of better Principles obſerve the Enemies of Religion lay ſo great a Streſs on *Unthinking Matter*; and all of them uſe ſo much Induſtry and Artifice to reduce every thing to it; methinks they ſhou'd Rejoyce to ſee them Depriv'd of their grand Support, and driven from that only Fortreſs, without which your *Epicureans*, *Hobbiſts*, and the like, have not even the Shadow of a Pretence, but become the moſt cheap and eaſy Triumph in the World.

§ 94. The Exiſtence of Matter, or Bodies unperceiv'd, has not only been the main Support of *Atheiſts* and *Fataliſts*

lists, but on the Principle does *Idolatry* likewise in all its various Forms, depend. Did Men but consider that the Sun, Moon, and Stars and every other Object of the Sēnses, are only so many Sensations in their Minds, which have no other Existence but barely being Perceiv'd: Doubtless they wou'd never fall down, and worship their own *Ideas*. But rather address their Homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and sustains all Things.

§ 95. The same absurd Principle, by mingling it self with the Articles of our Faith, has occasion'd no small Difficulties to Christians. For Example, about the *Resurrection*, how many Scruples and Objections have been raised by *Socinians* and Others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition, that a Body is denominated the *same*, with regard not to the Form or that which is perceiv'd by Sense, but the Material Substance, which remains the same under several Forms? Take away this *Material Substance*, about the Identity

tity whereof all the Diſpute is, and mean by *Body* what every plain, ordinary Perſon means by that Word, *viz.* that which is immediately Seen and Felt, which is only a Combination of ſenſible Qualities, or Ideas: And then their moſt unanſwerable Objections come to nothing.

§ 96. Matter being once expell'd out of Nature, drags with it ſo many Sceptical and Impious Notions, ſuch an incredible number of Diſputes and puzling Queſtions, which have been Thorns in the ſides of Divines, as well as Philoſophers, and made ſo much fruitleſs Work for Mankind; that if the Arguments we have produced againſt it, are not found equal to Demonſtration (as to me they evidently ſeem) yet I am ſure all Friends to Knowlege, Peace, and Religion have reaſon to wiſh they were.

§ 97. Beſide the external Exiſtence of the Objects of Perception, another great Source of Errors and Difficulties, with

with regard to Ideal Knowlege, is the Doctrine of *Abſtract Ideas*, ſuch as it hath been ſet forth in the Introduction. The plaineſt things in the World, thoſe we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and perfectly know, when they are conſider'd in an Abſtract way, appear ſtrangely difficult and incomprehenſible. Time, Place, and Motion, taken in particular, or concrete, are what every Body knows; but having paſſed thro' the Hands of a Metaphyſician, they become too Abſtract and Fine, to be apprehended by Men of ordinary Senſe. Bid your Servant meet you at ſuch a *Time*, in ſuch a *Place*, and he ſhall never ſtay to deliberate on the meaning of thoſe Words: In conceiving that particular Time and Place, or the Motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the leaſt Difficulty. But if *Time* be taken, excluſive of all thoſe particular Actions and Ideas that diverſifie the Day, meerly for the Continuation of Exiſtence, or Duration in Abſtract, then it will perhaps Gravel even a Philoſopher to comprehend it.

§ 98. For

§ 98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a ſimple Idea of *Time*, abſtracted from the ſucceſſion of Ideas in my Mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all Beings, I am loſt and embrangled in inextricable Difficulties. I have no Notion of it at all, only I hear others ſay, it is infinitely Diviſible, and ſpeak of it in ſuch a manner, as leads me to harbour odd Thoughts of my Exiſtence: Since that Doctrine lays one under an abſolute neceſſity, of thinking, either that he paſſes away innumerable Ages without a Thought, or elſe that he is annihilated every moment of his Life: Both which ſeem equally abſurd. Time therefore being nothing, abſtracted from the Succeſſon of Ideas in our Minds, it follows, that the Duration of any Finite Spirit muſt be eſtimated, by the Number of Ideas or Actions ſucceeding each other, in that ſame Spirit or Mind. Hence it is a plain Conſequence that, the Soul always thinks: And in truth whoever ſhall go about to divide in his Thoughts, or abſtract the

Exiſtence

Exiſtence of a Spirit from its *Cogitation* will, I believe, find it no eaſy Task.

§ 99. So likewiſe, when we attempt to abſtract Extenſion and Motion, from all other Qualities, and conſider them by themſelves,, we preſently loſe ſight of 'em, and run into great Extravagancies. Hence ſpring thoſe odd Paradoxes, that the *Fire is not Hot*, nor *the Wall White*, &c. or that Heat and Colour are in the Objects, nothing but Figure and Motion. All which depend on a two-fold Abſtraction: Firſt it is ſuppoſed that Extenſion, for example, may be abſtracted from all other ſenſible Qualities; and Secondly, that the Entity of Extenſion, may be abſtracted from its being Perceiv'd. But whoever ſhall reflect, and take care to underſtand what he ſays, will, if I miſtake not, acknowlege that all ſenſible Qualities are alike *Senſations*, and alike *Real*, that where the Extenſion is, there is the Colour too, *i. e.* in his Mind, and that their Archetypes, can exiſt only in ſome other *Mind*. And that the Objects of Senſe are nothing but

but thoſe Senſations combin'd, blended or (if one may ſo ſpeak) concreted together: None of all which can be ſuppos'd to Exiſt unperceiv'd. And that, conſequently, the Wall is as truly White, as it is Extended, and in the ſame Senſe.

§ 100. What it is for a Man to be Happy, or an Object Good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an Abſtract Idea of *Happineſs*, preſcinded from all particular Pleaſure, or of *Goodneſs*, from every thing that is Good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewiſe, a Man may be Juſt and Virtuous, without having preciſe Ideas of *Juſtice* and *Virtue*. The opinion that thoſe and the like Words, ſtand for General Notions abſtracted from all particular Perſons and Actions, ſeems to have render'd Morality very difficult, and the Study thereof of ſmall uſe to Mankind. And, in effect, one may make a great progreſs in *School-Ethics*, without ever being the wiſer or better Man for it, or knowing how to behave himſelf in the affairs of Life, more to the Advantage of himſelf, or

his Neighbours, than he did before. This Hint may ſuffice, to let any one ſee, the Doctrine of *Abſtraction*, has not a little contributed, towards ſpoiling the moſt uſeful Parts of Knowlege.

§ 101. The two great Provinces of Speculative Science, converſant about Ideas receiv'd from Senſe, are *Natural Philoſophy* and *Mathematics*; with regard to each of theſe I ſhall make ſome Obſervations. And firſt I ſhall ſay ſomewhat of Natural Philoſophy. On this Subject it is, that the *Sceptics* triumph: All that ſtock of Arguments they produce to depreciate our Faculties, and make Mankind appear Ignorant and Low, are drawn principally from this Head, namely, that we are under an Invincible Blindneſs, as to the *True* and *Real* Nature of Things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miſerably Banter'd, ſay they, by our Senſes, and amus'd only with the Outſide and Shew of Things. The real Eſſence, the internal Qualities, and Conſtitution of every the meaneſt Object, is hid from our

our view; ſomething there is, in every drop of Water, every grain of Sand, which it is beyond the Power of Human Underſtanding, to Fathom or Comprehend. But it is evident from what has been ſhewn, that all this Complaint is groundleſs, and that we are influenced by Falſe Principles, to that degree as to miſtruſt our Senſes, and think we know nothing, of thoſe things which we perfectly comprehend.

§ 102. One great Inducement, to our pronouncing our ſelves Ignorant of the Nature of Things, is, the current Opinion that every thing includes within it ſelf, the Cauſe of its Properties: Or that there is in each Object, an inward Eſſence, which is the Source whence its diſcernible Qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for Appearances by Occult Qualities, but of late they are moſtly reſolved into Mechanical Cauſes. *viz.* the Figure, Motion, Weight, *&c.* of inſenſible Particles: Whereas, in truth, there is no other Agent or Efficient Cauſe than

Spirit, it being evident, that Motion, as well as all other *Ideas*, is perfectly Inert. *vid. Sect.* XXV. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of Colours, Sounds, *&c.* by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly, we see the Attempts of that Kind, are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said, in general, of those Instances, wherein one Idea or Quality is assign'd for the Cause of another. I need not say, how many *Hypotheses* and Speculations are left out, and how much the study of Nature is Abridged by this Doctrine.

§ 103. The great Mechanical Principle now in Vogue is *Attraction*. That a Stone falls to the Earth, or the Sea swells towards the Moon, may to some appear sufficiently explain'd thereby. But how are we Enlighten'd by being told this is done by Attraction? Is it that, that Word signifies the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, instead of their being impell'd or protruded towards each other?

other? But nothing is determin'd of the Manner or Action, and it may as truly (for ought we know) be termed *Impulse* or *Protrusion* as *Attraction*. Again, the Parts of Steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by Attraction; but in this, as in the other Instances, I do not perceive, that any thing is signified besides the Effect it self; for as to the manner of the Action whereby it is produced, or the Cause which produces it, these are not so much as aim'd at.

§ 104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several *Phænomena*, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For Example, in the Falling of a Stone to the Ground, In the Rising of the Sea towards the Moon, in Cohesion, Crystallization, *&c.* there is something alike, namely an Union or Mutual Approach of Bodies. So that any one of these, or the like *Phænomena*, may not seem Strange, or Surprising, to a Man woh has nicely observ'd and compar'd the Effects of Nature.

ture. For that only is thought ſo which is uncommon, or a thing by it ſelf, and out of the ordinary Courſe of our Obſervation. That Bodies ſhou'd tend towards the Center of the Earth, is not thought ſtrange, becauſe 'tis what we perceive every moment of our Lives. But that they ſhou'd have a like Gravitation towards the Center of the Moon, may ſeem odd and unaccountable to moſt Men, becauſe it's diſcern'd only in the Tides. But a Philoſopher, whoſe Thoughts take in a larger compaſs of Nature, having obſerv'd a certain ſimilitude of Appearances, as well in the Heavens as the Earth, that argue innumerable Bodies to have a mutual Tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general Name *Attraction*, whatever can be reduced to that he thinks juſtly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides, by the Attraction of the Terraqueous Globe towards the Moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular Example of a general Rule or Law of Nature.

§ 105. If

§ 105. If, therefore, we consider the Difference there is betwixt Natural Philosophers, and other Men, with regard to their Knowlege of the *Phænomena*, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter Knowlege of the efficient Cause that produces them, for that can be no other than the *Will of a Spirit*, but only in a greater Largeness of Comprehension, whereby Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements are discover'd in the Works of Nature, and the particular Effects explain'd, *i. e.* reduced to general Rules, *vid. Sect.* LXII. which Rules grounded on the Analogy, and Uniformness observ'd in the Production of Natural Effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by the Mind, for that they extend our Prospect beyond what is present, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable Conjectures, touching Things that may have happen'd at very great distances of Time and Place, as well as to predict Things to come; which sort of Endeavour towards Omniscience, is much affected by the Mind.

§ 106. But

§ 106. But we ſhou'd proceed warily in ſuch Things, for we are apt to lay too great a Streſs on Analogies, and to the prejudice of Truth, humour that Eagerneſs of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowlege into general Theoremes. For Example, In the buſineſs of Gravitation,or mutual Attraction, becauſe it appears in many Inſtances, ſome are ſtraightway for pronouncing it *Univerſal*; and that *to Attract, and be Attracted by, every other Body is an Eſſential Quality, inherent in all Bodies whatſoever.* Whereas, its evident the Fix'd Stars have no ſuch Tendency towards each other; and ſo far is that Gravitation, from being *Eſſential* to Bodies, that, in ſome Inſtances a quite contrary Principle ſeems to ſhew it ſelf: As in the Perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elaſticity of the Air. There is nothing Neceſſary or Eſſential in the Caſe, but it depends intirely on the Will of the *Governing Spirit*, who cauſes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other, according to various

ous Laws; whilſt he keeps others at a fix'd Diſtance; and to ſome he gives a quite contrary Tendency to fly aſunder, juſt, as he ſees convenient.

§ 107. After what has been premis'd, I think we may lay down the following Concluſions. Firſt, 'Tis plain, Philoſophers amuſe themſelves in vain, when they inquire for any Natural, Efficient Cauſe, diſtinct from a *Mind* or *Spirit*. Secondly, Conſidering the whole Creation is the Workmanſhip of a *Wiſe and Good Agent*, it ſhou'd ſeem to become Philoſophers, to employ their Thoughts (contrary to what ſome hold) about the Final Cauſes of Things: For beſides that this wou'd prove a very pleaſing Entertainment to the Mind, it might be of great Advantage, in that it not only diſcovers to us the Attributes of the CREATOR, but may alſo direct us in ſeveral Inſtances to the proper Uſes and Applications of Things; and I muſt confeſs, I ſee no reaſon, why pointing out the various Ends, to which Natural Things are adapted, and for which they

were originally, with unſpeakable Wiſdom, contriv'd, ſhou'd not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philoſopher. Thirdly, from what has been premis'd no reaſon can be drawn, why the Hiſtory of Nature ſhou'd not ſtill be ſtudied, and Obſervations and Experiments made, which, that they are of uſe to Mankind, and enable us to draw any general Concluſions, is not the Reſult of any immutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themſelves, but only of GOD'S Goodneſs and Kindneſs to Men, in the Adminiſtration of the World. *vid. Sect.* XXX and XXXI. Fourthly, By a diligent Obſervation of the *Phænomena* within our View, we may diſcover the general Laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other *Phænomena*, I do not ſay *Demonſtrate*; for all Deductions of that kind, depend on a Suppoſition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly, and in a conſtant obſervance of thoſe Rules, we take for Principles: Which we cannot evidently know.

§ 108. It

§ 108. It appears from *Sect.* LXVI, *&c.* that the ſteady, conſiſtent Methods of Nature, may not unfitly be Stiled the *Language* of its *Author*, whereby he diſcovers his *Attributes* to our View, and directs us how to act for the Convenience and Felicity of Life. And to me, thoſe Men who frame General Rules from the *Phænomena*, and afterwards derive the *Phænomena* from thoſe Rules, ſeem to be Grammarians, and their Art the Grammar of Nature. Two ways there are of Learning a Language, either by Rule or by Practiſe: A Man may be well read in the Language of of Nature, without underſtanding the Grammar of it, or being able to ſay, by what Rule a Thing is ſo or ſo. And as 'tis very poſſible to Write Improperly, thro' too ſtrict an Obſervance of General Grammar-rules: So in Arguing from General Laws of Nature, 'tis not impoſſible we may ſtretch the Analogy too far, and by that means run into Miſtakes.

§ 109. To carry on the reſemblance, as in reading other Books, a Wiſe Man will chuſe to fix his Thoughts, on the Senſe and apply it to Uſe, rather than lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on the Language; ſo in peruſing the Volume of Nature, methinks it is beneath the Dignity of the Mind, to affect an Exactneſs, in reducing each particular *Phænomenon* to general Rules, or ſhew how it follows from them. We ſhou'd propoſe to our ſelves nobler Views, namely to recreate and exalt the Mind, with a proſpect of the Beauty, Order, Extent, and Variety of Natural Things: Hence, by proper Inferences, to enlarge our Notions of the Grandeur, Wiſdom, and Beneficence of the CREATOR: And laſtly, to make the ſeveral Parts of the Creation, ſo far as in us lies, ſubſervient to the Ends they were deſign'd for, GOD'S Glory, and the Suſtentation and Comfort of our Selves and Fellow-Creatures.

§ 110. The beſt Grammar of the kind we are ſpeaking of, will be eaſily acknow-

knowleg'd to be a Treatiſe of Mechanics, demonſtrated and applied to Nature, by a Philoſopher of a Neighbouring Nation whom all the World Admire. I ſhall not take upon me to make Remarks, on the Performance of that Extraordinary Perſon: Only ſome Things he has advanced, ſo directly oppoſite to the Doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we ſhou'd be wanting, in the regard due to the Authority of ſo great a Man, did we not take ſome notice of them. In the Entrance of that juſtly admired Treatiſe, Time, Space and Motion, are diſtinguiſhed into *Abſolute* and *Relative*, *True* and *Apparent*, *Mathematical* and *Vulgar*: Which Diſtinction, as it is at large explain'd by the Author, does ſuppoſe thoſe Quantities to have an Exiſtence without the Mind: And that they are ordinarily conceiv'd with relation to ſenſible Things, to which nevertheleſs, in their own Nature, they bear no Relation at all.

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§ 111. As for *Time*, as it is there taken in an abſolute or abſtracted Senſe, for

for the Duration or Perſeverance of the Exiſtence of Things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what has been already ſaid, on that Subject. For the reſt, this Celebrated Author holds there is an *Abſolute Space*, which, being unperceivable to Senſe, remains in it ſelf ſimilar and immoveable: And Relative Space to be the meaſure thereof, which being moveable, and defin'd by its Situation in reſpect of Senſible Bodies, is vulgarly taken for Immoveable Space. *Place* he Defines, to be that Part of Space which is occupied by any Body. And according as the Space is Abſolute or Relative, ſo alſo is the Place. *Abſolute Motion* is ſaid to be the Tranſlation of a Body, from Abſolute Place to Abſolute Place, as Relative Motion is, from one Relative Place to another. Now becauſe the Parts of Abſolute Space, do not fall under our Senſes, inſtead of them we are obliged to uſe their Senſible Meaſures: And ſo define both Place and Motion with reſpect to Bodies, which we regard as immoveable. But it is ſaid, in Philoſophical Matters we muſt Abſtract from

from our Senſes, ſince it may be, that none of thoſe Bodies, which ſeem to be quieſcent, are truely ſo : And the ſame thing which is mov'd Relatively, may be really at reſt. As likewiſe one and the ſame Body may be in Relative Reſt and Motion, or even mov'd with contrary Relative Motions, At the ſame time, according as its place is variouſly defin'd. All which Ambiguity is to be found in the apparent Motions, but not at all in the true or abſolute, which ſhou'd therefore he alone regarded in Philoſophy. And the True, we are told, are diſtinguiſh'd from Apparent or Relative Motions, by the following Properties. Firſt, In True or Abſolute Motion, all Parts which preſerve the ſame Poſition with reſpect to the Whole, partake of the Motions of the Whole. Secondly, The Place being moved, that which is placed therein is alſo mov'd : So that a Body moving in a place which is in Motion, doth participate the Motion of its Place. Thirdly, True Motion is never generated or changed, otherwiſe then by Force impreſſed on the Body it ſelf. Fourthly, True Motion

tion is always changed, by Force impreſſed on the Body moved. Fifthly, In Circular Motion barely Relative, there is no Centrifugal Force, which nevertheleſs in that which is True or Abſolute, is proportional to the Quantity of Motion.

§ 112. But notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, I muſt confeſs, it does not appear to me, that there can be any Motion other than *Relative*, So that to conceive Motion, there muſt be at leaſt conceived two Bodies, whereof the Diſtance or poſition in regard to each other is varied. Hence if there was one only Body in being, it cou'd not poſſibly be mov'd. This to me ſeems very evident, in that the Idea I have of Motion does neceſſarily involve relation it. Whether others can conceive it otherwiſe, a little Attention may ſatisfie them.

§ 113. But tho' in every Motion, it be neceſſary to conceive more Bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely that on which the Force cauſing

causing the change, in the Distance or Situation of the Bodies, is impressed. For however some may define Relative Motion, so as to term that Body *mov'd*, which changes its Distance from some other Body, whether the Force causing that Change were impressed on it, or no: Yet I can't assent to this, for since we are told, Relative Motion is that which is perceiv'd by Sense, and regarded in the ordinary Affairs of Life, it follows that every Man of common Sense knows what it is, as well as the best Philosopher: Now I ask any one, whether in his Sense of Motion, as he walks along the Streets, the Stones he passes over may be said to *move*, because they change Distance with his Feet? To me it appears, that thô Motion includes a Relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary, that each term of the Relation be denominated from it. As a Man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a Body may be moved to, or from, another Body which which is not, therefore, it self in Moti-

on, I mean *Relative Motion*, for other I am not able to conceive.

§ 114. As the Place happens to be variouſly defin'd, the Motion which is related to it varies. A Man in a Ship may be ſaid to be Quieſcent, with relation to the ſides of the Veſſel, and yet move, with relation to the Land. Or he may move Eaſtward in reſpect of the one, and Weſtward in reſpect of the other. In the common Affairs of Life, Men never go beyond the Earth, to define the place of any Body: And what is quieſcent in reſpect of that, is accounted *abſolutely* to be ſo. But Philoſophers, who have a greater Extent of Thought, and juſter Notions of the Syſtem of Things, diſcover even the Earth it ſelf to be moved. In order therefore to fix their Notions, they ſeem to conceive the Corporeal World as Finite, and the utmoſt, unmoved Walls or Shell thereof to be the Place, whereby they eſtimate True Motions. If we ſound our own Conceptions, I believe we may find all the Abſolute Motion we

we can frame an Idea of, to be at Bottom no other than Relative Motion thus defined. For as I have already ſaid, abſolute Motion excluſive of all external Relation is incomprehenſible: And to this kind of Relative Motion, all the above-mention'd Properties, Cauſes, and Effects aſcribed to Abſolute Motion will, if I miſtake not, be found to agree. As to what is ſaid of the Centifugal Force, that it does not at all belong to Circular, Relative Motion: I do not ſee how this follows from the Experiment which is brought to prove it. See *Philoſophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, p. 9. *in Schol. Def.* VIII. For the Water in the Veſſel, at that time wherein it is ſaid to have the greateſt Relative, Circular Motion, has, I think, no Motion at all: As is plain from the foregoing Section.

§ 115. For, to denominate a Body *Moved*, it is requiſite, firſt, that it change its Diſtance or Situation with regard to ſome other Body, Secondly, that the force occaſioning that Change be im-

preſſed on it. If either of theſe be wanting, I do not think that agreeably to the Senſe of Mankind, or the Propriety of Language, a Body can be ſaid to be in Motion. I grant, indeed, that it is poſſible for us to think a Body, which we ſee change its Diſtance from ſome other, to be moved, tho' it have no force impreſſed on it, (in which Senſe there may be apparent Motion,) but then it is, becauſe the Force cauſing the change of Diſtance, is imagin'd by us to be impreſs'd on that Body thought to move. Which, indeed, ſhews we are capable of miſtaking a thing to be in Motion which is not, but does not prove that, in the common acceptation of *Motion*, a Body is moved meerly becauſe it changes Diſtance from another; ſince as ſoon as we are undeceiv'd, and find that the moving Force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So on the other hand, when one only Body (the Parts whereof preſerve a given Poſition between themſelves) is imagin'd to Exiſt; ſome there are who think that it can be moved all manner

of

of ways, tho' without any change of Diſtance or Situation to any other Bodies; which we ſhou'd not deny, if they meant only that it might have an impreſſed Force, which, upon the bare creation of other Bodies, wou'd produce a Motion of any certain Quantity and Determination. But that an actual Motion (diſtinct from the impreſſed Force, or Power productive of Change of Place in caſe there were Bodies preſent whereby to define it) can Exiſt in ſuch a ſingle Body, I muſt confeſs I am not able to comprehend.

§ 116. From what has been ſaid, it follows, that the Philoſophic Conſideration of Motion, does not imply the being of an *Abſolute Space*, diſtinct from that which is perceiv'd by Senſe, and related to Bodies: Which that it cannot Exiſt without the Mind, is clear upon the ſame Principles, that demonſtrate the like of all other Objects of Senſe. And, perhaps, if we inquire narrowly into the Matter, we ſhall find we cannot even frame an Idea of *Pure Space*, exclu-

excluſive of all Body. This I muſt confeſs, is above my Capacity, as being a moſt Abſtract Idea. When I excite a Motion in ſome part of my Body, if it be Free or without Reſiſtance, I ſay there is *Space*: But if I find a Reſiſtance, then I ſay there is *Body*: and in proportion as the Reſiſtance to Motion is leſſer or greater, I ſay the *Space* is more or leſs *Pure*. So that when I ſpeak of pure or empty Space, it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Word *Space* ſtands for an Idea diſtinct from, or conceivable without Body and Motion. Tho' indeed, we are apt to think, every Noun Subſtantive ſtands for a diſtinct Idea, that may be ſeparated from all others: Which has occaſion'd infinite Miſtakes. When therefore ſuppoſing all the World to be Annihilated beſides my own Body, I ſay there ſtill remains *Pure Space*: Thereby nothing elſe is meant, but only that I conceive it poſſible, for the Limbs of my Body to be mov'd on all ſides, without the leaſt Reſiſtance: But if that too were Annihilated, then there cou'd be no Motion, and conſequently no Space.

Some,

Some, perhaps, may think the Senſe of Seeing does furniſh 'em with the Idea of Pure Space; but it is plain from what we have elſewhere ſhewn, that the Ideas of Space and Diſtance are not obtain'd by that Senſe. See the *Eſſay concerning Viſion.*

§ 117. What is here laid down ſeems to put an end, to all thoſe Diſputes, and Difficulties, that have ſprung up amongſt the Learned concerning the nature of *Pure Space.* But the chief Advantage ariſing from it, is, that we are freed from that dangerous *Dilemma*, to which ſeveral, who have imploy'd their Thoughts on that Subject, imagine themſelves reduced. *viz.* of thinking either that Real Space is GOD, or elſe that there is ſomething beſide GOD which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, Indiviſible, Immutable, *&c.* Both which may juſtly be thought pernicious and abſurd Notions. It is certain that not a few Divines, as well as Philoſophers of great Note, have, from the Difficulty they found in conceiving, either Limits or Annihilation of

of Space, concluded it must be *Divine*. And some of late, have set themselves particularly to shew, the Incommunicable Attributes of God agree to it. Which Doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet, I must confess, I do not See how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the receiv'd Opinions.

§ 118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: We come now to make some Inquiry concerning that other great Branch of Speculative Knowlege, *viz. Mathematics*. These, how Celebrated soever they may be, for their clearness and certainty of Demonstration, which is hardly any where else to be found, cannot nevertheless be suppos'd altogether free from Mistakes, if so be that in their Principles there lurks some secret Error, which is common to the Professors of those Sciences with the rest of Mankind. Mathematicians, tho' they deduce their Theorems from a great Height of Evidence, yet their first Principles are limited by the consideration of Quantity: And

And they do not aſcend into any Inquiry concerning thoſe Tranſcendental Maxims, which influence all the particular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does conſequently participate of the Errors involved in them. That the Principles laid down by Mathematicians are true, and their way of Deduction from thoſe Principles clear and inconteſtable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may be certain Erroneous Maxims of greater Extent than the Object of Mathematics, and, for that reaſon, not expreſly mention'd, tho' tacitly ſuppoſed throughout the whole progreſs of that Science; and that the ill effects of thoſe ſecret, unexamin'd Errors are diffuſed thrô all the Branches thereof. To be plain, we ſuſpect the Mathematicians are no leſs deeply concern'd than other Men, in the Errors ariſing from the Doctrine of Abſtract, General Ideas, and the Exiſtence of Objects without the Mind.

§ 119. *Arithmetic* has been thought to have for its Object, Abſtract Ideas of

Number. Of which to understand the Properties and mutual Habitudes, is supposed no mean part of Speculative Knowlege. The Opinion of the pure and intellectual Nature of Numbers in Abstract, has made 'em in esteem with those Philosophers, who seem to have affected an uncommon Fineness and Elevation of Thought. It hath set a Price on the most trifling Numerical Speculations, which in practice are of no use, but serve only for Amusement. And hath heretofore so far infected the Minds of some, that they have dreamt of mighty *Mysteries* involved in Numbers, and attempted the Explication of Natural Things by them. But if we narrowly inquire into our own Thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low Opinion of those high Flights and Abstractions, and look on all Inquiries about Numbers, only as so many *difficiles nugæ*, so far as they are not subservient to practise, and promote the benefit of Life.

§ 120. Unity in Abstract we have before

before consider'd *vid. Sect.* XIII. from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows, there is not any such Idea. But Number being defin'd a *Collection of Unites*, we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as Unity or Unite in Abstract, there are no Ideas of Number in Abstract denoted by the Numeral Names and Figures. The Theories, therefore, in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the Names and Figures, as likewise from all Use and Practice, as well as from the particular things number'd, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their Object. Hence we may see, how intirely the Science of Numbers is subordinate to Practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes, when consider'd as a matter of meer Speculation.

§ 121. However, since there may be some, who, deluded by the specious Shew of Discovering Abstracted Verities, waste their time in Arithmetical Theoremes and Problemes, which have not any Use: It will not be amiss, if we more

fully consider, and expose the Vanity of that Pretence; And this will plainly appear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in its Infancy, and observing what it was that originally put Men on the Study of that Science, and to what Scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, Men, for ease of Memory and help of Computation, made use of Counters, or in writing of Single Stroaks, Points or the like, each whereof was made to signifie an Unite *i. e.* some one thing of whatever Kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards, they found out the more compendious ways, of making one Character stand in place of several Stroaks, or Points. And lastly, the Notation of the *Arabians* or *Indians* came into use, wherein by the repetition of a few Characters or Figures, and varying the Signification of each Figure according to the the place it obtains, all Numbers may be most aptly expres's'd; Which seems to have been done in Imitation of Language, so that an exact Analogy is observ'd betwixt the Notation by Figures, and Names, the nine simple Figures

gures anſwering the nine firſt numeral Names, and Places in the former correſponding to Denominations in the latter. And agreeably to thoſe Conditions of the ſimple and local Value of Figures, were contrived Methods of finding from the given Figures or Marks of the Parts, what Figures and how placed, are proper to denote the whole or *vice verſa*. And having found the ſought Figures, the ſame Rule or Analogy being obſerv'd throughout, it is eaſy to read them into Words; and ſo the Number becomes perfectly known. For then the Number of any particular Things is ſaid to be known, when we know the Name or Figures (with their due arangement) that according to the ſtanding Analogy belong to them. For theſe Signs being known, we can by the Operations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of any Part of the particular Sums ſignified by them; and thus computing in Signs, (becauſe of the connexion eſtabliſh'd betwixt them and the diſtinct multitudes of Things, whereof one is taken for an Unite, we may be able rightly

rightly to ſum Up, Divide, and Proportion the things Themſelves that we intend to Number.

§ 122. In *Arithmetic*, therefore, we regard not the *Things* but the *Signs*, which nevertheleſs are not regarded for their own ſake, but becauſe they direct us how to act with relation to Things, and diſpoſe rightly of them. Now agreeably to what we have before obſerv'd, of words in general (*vid. Sect.* XIX *Introd.*) it happens here likewiſe, that abſtract Ideas are thought to be ſignified by Numeral Names or Characters, while they do not ſuggeſt Ideas of particular Things to our Minds. I ſhall not at preſent, enter into a more particular Diſſertation on this Subject, but only obſerve that it's evident from what has been ſaid, thoſe Things which paſs for abſtract Truths and Theorems concerning Numbers, are, in reality, converſant about no Object diſtinct from particular numerable Things, except only Names and Characters, which originally came to be conſider'd, on no other account

count but their being *Signs*, or capable to repreſent aptly, whatever particular Things Men had need to compute. Whence it follows, that to ſtudy them for their own ſake wou'd be juſt as wiſe, and to as good purpoſe, as if a Man neglecting the true Uſe or original Intention and ſubſerviency of Language, ſhou'd ſpend his time in impertinent Criticiſms upon Words, or Reaſonings and Controverſies purely Verbal.

§ 123. From Numbers we proceed to ſpeak of *Extenſion*, which is the Object of Geometry. The *Infinite* Diviſibility of *Finite* Extenſion tho' it is not expreſly laid down, either as an Axiom or Theoreme in the Elements of that Science, yet, is throughout the ſame every where ſuppos'd, and thought to have ſo inſeparable and eſſential a Connexion, with the Principles and Demonſtrations in Geometry, that Mathematicians never admit it into Doubt, or make the leaſt Queſtion of it. And as this Notion is the Source from whence do ſpring, all thoſe Amuſing Geometrical Paradoxes,

doxes, which have ſuch a direct Repugnancy to the plain, common Senſe of Mankind, and are admitted with ſo much Reluctance, into a Mind not yet debauched by Learning: So is it the principal occaſion of all that nice and extream Subtilty, which renders the Study of *Mathematics* ſo very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear, that no Finite Extenſion contains innumerable Parts, or is infinitely Diviſible, it follows that we ſhall at once clear the Science of Geometry, from a great number of Difficulties and Contradictions which have ever been eſteemed a Reproach to Human Reaſon, and withal make the Attainment thereof, a buſineſs of much leſs Time and Pains, then it hitherto has been.

§ 124. Every particular, Finite Extenſion, which may poſſibly be the Object of our Thought, is an *Idea* Exiſting only in the Mind, and conſequently each Part thereof muſt be perceiv'd. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable Parts, in any Finite Extenſion that I conſider, it

it is certain they are not contained in it: But it's evident, that I can't distinguish innumerable Parts in any particular Line, Surface, or Solid, which I either perceive by Sense, or Figure to my self in my Mind: Wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me, than that the Extensions I have in View, are no other than my own Ideas, and it is no less plain, that I cannot resolve any one of my Ideas, into an infinite Number of other Ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely Divisible. If by *Finite Extension* be meant something distinct from a Finite Idea: I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny any thing of it. But if the terms *Extension*, *Parts*, *&c.* are taken in any Sense conceivable *i. e.* for Ideas; then to say, a Finite Quantity or Extension consists of Parts infinite in Number, is so manifest and glaring a Contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowleges it to be so. And it's impossible, it shou'd ever gain the assent of any reasonable Creature, who is not brought

to it by gentle and ſlow Degrees, as a Pagan Convert to the belief of *Tranſubſtantiation.* Ancient and rooted Prejudices do often paſs into Principles: And thoſe Propoſitions which once obtain the force and credit of a *Principle*, are not only themſelves, but likewiſe whatever's deducible from them, thought privileg'd from all Examination. And there's no Abſurdity ſo groſs, which, by this means, the Mind of Man may not be prepared to ſwallow.

§ 125. He whoſe Underſtanding is prepoſſeſt with the Doctrine of Abſtract, general Ideas, may be eaſily perſwaded, that (whatever be thought of the Ideas of Senſe,) Extenſion in *Abſtract* is infinitely Diviſible. And any one, who thinks the Objects of Senſe Exiſt without the Mind, will not ſtick to affirm, a Line but an Inch long may contain innumerable Parts, really Exiſting, thô too ſmall to be diſcern'd. Theſe Errors are grafted, as well in the Minds of *Geometricians*, as of other Men, and have a like influence on their Reaſonings;

nings; and it were no difficult thing, to shew how the Arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of Extension, are bottom'd on them. But this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner. At present we shall only observe in general, whence it is the Mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that Doctrine.

§ 126. It has been observ'd in another place, that the Theorems and Demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about Universal Ideas. *vid. Sect.* XV. *Introd.* Where it is explain'd in what Sense this ought to be understood, namely, the particular Lines and Figures included in the Diagram, are supposed to stand for innumerable Others of different Sizes, or, in other Words, the Geometer considers them abstracting from their Magnitude, which does not imply, that he forms an Abstract Idea, but only that he cares not what the particular Magnitude is, whether Great or Small,

but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the Demonſtration : Hence it follows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an Inch long, muſt be ſpoken of, as tho' it contain'd ten-thouſand Parts, ſince it is regarded, not in it ſelf, but as it is univerſal, and it is univerſal only in its Signification, whereby it repreſents innumerable Lines greater than it ſelf, in which may be diſtinguiſh'd ten-thouſand Parts or more, tho' there may not in it. After this manner, the properties of the Lines ſignified are (by a very uſual Figure) transfer'd to the Sign, and thence, thro' Miſtake, thought to appertain to it conſider'd in its own nature.

§ 127. Becauſe there is no number of Parts ſo great, but its poſſible there may be a Line containing more, the Inch-line is ſaid to contain Parts more than any aſſignable Number; which is true, not of the Inch taken abſolutely, but only for the things ſignified by it. But Men not retaining that Diſtinction in their Thoughts, ſlide into a belief, that the ſmall particular Line deſcribed on Paper contains

contains in it ſelf Parts innumerable. There is no ſuch thing as the ten-thouſandth Part of an *Inch*; but there is of a *Mile* or *Diameter of the Earth*, which may be ſignified by that Inch. When therefore, I Delineate a Triangle on Paper, and take one ſide not above an Inch, for Example, in length to be the *Radius*: This I conſider as divided into 10000 or 100000 Parts, or more. For tho' the ten-thouſandth Part of that Line, conſider'd in it ſelf, is nothing at all, and conſequently may be neglected without any Error or Inconveniency; yet theſe deſcribed Lines being only Marks, ſtanding for greater Quantities, whereof, it may be, the ten-thouſandth Part is very conſiderable, it follows that, to prevent notable Errors in Practice, the *Radius* muſt be taken of 10000 Parts, or more.

§ 128. From what has been ſaid the reaſon is plain why, to the end any Theorem become univerſal in its Uſe, its neceſſary we ſpeak of the Lines deſcribed on Paper, as tho' they contain'd Parts which

which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, we ſhall, perhaps, diſcover that we cannot conceive an Inch it ſelf as conſiſting of, or being diviſible into, a thouſand Parts, but only ſome other Line which is far greater than an Inch, and repreſented by it. And that when we ſay a Line is *infinitely Diviſible*. We mean (if we mean any thing) a Line which is *infinitely Great*. What we have here obſerv'd ſeems to be the chief Cauſe, why, to ſuppoſe the infinite diviſibility of Finite Extenſion, has been thought neceſſary in Geometry.

§ 129. The ſeveral Abſurdities and Contradictions which flow'd from this falſe Principle might, one wou'd think, have been eſteem'd ſo many Demonſtrations againſt it. But, by I know not what *Logic*, it is held that Proofs *a poſteriori* are not to be admitted, againſt Propoſitions relating to Infinity. As tho', it were not impoſſible, even for an Infinite Mind, to reconcile Contradictions. Or as if any thing Abſurd and

Repugnant

Repugnant cou'd have a neceſſary connexion with Truth, or flow from it. But whoever conſiders the weakneſs of this Pretence, will think it was contrived on purpoſe, to humour the Lazineſs of the Mind, which had rather acquieſce in an indolent Scepticiſm, than be at the Pains, to go through with a ſevere Examination of thoſe Principles it has ever embraced for true.

§ 130. Of late the Speculations about Infinites have run ſo high, and grown to ſuch ſtrange Notions, as have occaſion'd no ſmall Scruples and Diſputes, among the Geometers of the preſent Age. Some there are of great Note, who not content with holding, that Finite Lines may be divided into an Infinite number of Parts, do yet farther maintain, that each of thoſe Infiniteſimals is it ſelf ſubdiviſible, into an infinity of other Parts, or Infiniteſimals of a ſecond Order, and ſo on *ad infinitum*. Theſe, I ſay, aſſert, there are Infiniteſimals of infiniteſimals of Infiniteſimals, *&c.* without ever coming to an end. So that, accord-

according to them an Inch does not barely contain an infinite number of Parts, but an Infinity of an Infinity of an Infinity *ad infinitum* of Parts. Others there be who hold, all orders of Infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all, thinking it, with good reason, Absurd, to imagine there is any positive Quantity or Part of Extension, which, tho' multiplyed Infinitely, can never equal the smallest given Extension. And yet on the other hand, it seems no less Absurd, to think the Square, Cube, or other Power of a positive, real Root, shou'd it self be nothing at all; which they, who hold Infinitesimals of the first Order, denying all of the subsequent Orders, are obliged to maintain.

§ 131. Have we not, therefore, reason to conclude, they are *both* in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as Parts infinitely Small, or an infinite number of Parts contain'd in any Finite Quantity? But you'll say, that if this Doctrine obtains, it will follow, the very Foundations of Geometry are destroy'd:

deſtroy'd: And thoſe Great Men who, have raiſed that Science to ſo aſtoniſhing an Height, have been all the while building a Caſtle in the Air. To this it may be Replied, that whatever is uſeful in Geometry, and promotes the benefit of Human Life, does ſtill remain firm and unſhaken on our Principles. That Science conſider'd as Practical, will rather receive Advantage, than any Prejudice from what has been ſaid. But to ſet this in a due Light, and ſhew how Lines and Figures may be meaſur'd, and their Properties inveſtigated, without ſuppoſing Finite Extenſion to be infinitely Diviſible, may be the proper Buſineſs of another place. For the reſt, tho' it ſhou'd follow that ſome of the more intricate and ſubtile Parts of *Speculative Mathematics* may be pared of, without any prejudice to Truth; yet I do not ſee, what Damage will be thence derived to Mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wiſh'd, that Men of the greateſt Abilities and moſt obſtinate Application, wou'd draw off their Thoughts from thoſe Amuſements,

and imploy them in the ſtudy of ſuch Things, as lie nearer the concerns of Life, or have a more direct Influence on the Manners.

§ 132. If it be ſaid that ſeveral Theorems undoubtedly true, are diſcover'd by methods in which Infiniteſimals are made uſe of, which cou'd never have been, if their Exiſtence included a contradiction in it. I anſwer, that upon a thorough Examination it will not be found, that in any Inſtance it is neceſſary to make uſe of or conceive Infiniteſimal Parts of finite Lines, or even Quantities leſs than the *Minimum Senſibile*: Nay it will be evident this is never done, it being impoſſible. And whatever Mathematicians may think of *Fluxions* or the *Differential Calculus* and the like, a little Reflexion will ſhew them, that in working by thoſe Methods, they do not conceive or imagine Lines or Surfaces leſs than what are perceivable to Senſe. They may, indeed, call thoſe little and almoſt Inſenſible Quantities *Infiniteſimals* or *Infiniteſimals of Infiniteſimals*,

mals, if they pleaſe: But at Bottom this is all, they being in truth Finite, nor does the Solution of Problemes require the ſuppoſing any other. But this will be more clearly made out hereafter.

§ 133. By what we have hitherto ſaid, 'tis plain that very numerous and and important Errors have taken their Riſe, from thoſe falſe Principles which were impugned in the foregoing Parts of this Treatiſe. And the Oppoſites of thoſe erroneous Tenents, at the ſame time, appear to be moſt fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable Conſequences highly advantagious, to true Philoſophy as well as to Religion. Particularly, *Matter* or *the Abſolute Exiſtence of Corporeal Objects*, have been ſhewn to be that wherein the moſt avow'd and pernicious Enemies of all Knowlege, whether Human or Divine, have ever placed their chief Strength and Confidence. And ſurely, if by diſtinguiſhing the real Exiſtence of unthinking Things from their being perceiv'd,

ceiv'd, and allowing them a Subſiſtence of their own out of the Minds of Spirits, no one thing is explained in Nature, but, on the contrary, a great many inexplicable Difficulties ariſe: If the Suppoſition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on ſo much as one ſingle Reaſon: If its Conſequences cannot endure the light of Examination and free Inquiry, but ſkreen themſelves under the dark and general pretence of *Infinites being Incomprehenſible*: If withal the Removal of this *Matter* be not attended with the leaſt evil Conſequence, if it be not even miſſed in the World, but every thing as well, nay much eaſier conceiv'd without it: If in fine, both *Sceptics* and *Atheiſts* are for ever ſilenced upon ſuppoſing only Spirits and Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is perfectly agreeable both to *Reaſon* and *Religion*: Methinks we may expect it ſhou'd be admitted and firmly embraced, tho' it were propos'd only as an *Hypotheſis*, and the Exiſtence of Matter had been allow'd poſſible, which yet, I think, we have

have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

§ 134. True it is, that in consequence of the foregoing Principles, several Disputes and Speculations, which are esteem'd no mean Parts of Learning, are rejected as useless, and in effect conversant about nothing at all. But how great a Prejudice soever against our Notions, this may give to those who have already been deeply Engag'd, and made large Advances in Studies of that Nature : Yet by Others, we hope it will not be thought any just ground of Dislike, to the Principles and Tenents herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of Study, and make Human Sciences far more Clear, Compendious, and Attainable than they were before.

§ 135. Having dispatch'd what we intended to say concerning the knowlege of *Ideas*, the Method we propos'd leads us, in the next place, to treat of *Spirits* : With regard to which, perhaps, Human Knowlege is not so deficient

ficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great Reaſon that's aſſign'd, for our being thought Ignorant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of it. But ſurely it ought not to be look'd on as a defect in a Human Underſtanding, that it does not perceive the Idea of *Spirit*, if it is manifeſtly impoſſible there ſhou'd be any ſuch *Idea*. And this if I miſtake not, has been demonſtrated in *Sect* XXVII to which I ſhall here add that a Spirit has been ſhewn to be the only Subſtance, or Support wherein Unthinking Beings or Ideas can Exiſt : But that this *Subſtance* which ſupports or perceives Ideas, ſhou'd it ſelf be an *Idea* or like an *Idea* is evidently Abſurd.

§ 136. It will perhaps be ſaid, that, we want a Senſe (as ſome have imagin'd) proper to know Subſtances withal, which if we had, we might know our own Soul, as we do a Triangle. To this I anſwer, that in caſe we had a new Senſe beſtow'd upon us, we cou'd only receive thereby ſome new Senſati-

ons

ons or Ideas of Senſe. But, I believe, no Body will ſay, that what he means by the terms *Soul* and *Subſtance*, is only ſome particular ſort of Idea or Senſation. We may therefore infer, that, all things duly conſider'd, it is not more reaſonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furniſh us with an Idea of Spirit, or Active, Thinking Subſtance, than it wou'd be if we ſhou'd blame them for not being able to comprehend a *round Square*.

§ 137. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known after the manner of an Idea or Senſation, have riſen many abſurd and heterodox Tenents, and much Scepticiſm about the Nature of the Soul. 'Tis even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a doubt in ſome, whether they had any Soul at all diſtinct from their Body, ſince upon inquiry they cou'd not find they had an Idea of it. That an *Idea* which is Inactive, and the Exiſtence whereof conſiſts in being Perceiv'd, ſhou'd be the Image or Likeneſs of an Agent

Agent ſubſiſting by it ſelf, ſeems to need no other Refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by thoſe Words. But, perhaps, you'll ſay, that tho' an *Idea* cannot reſemble a *Spirit*, in its Thinking, Acting, or Subſiſting by it ſelf, yet it may in ſome other reſpects: And it is not neceſſary, that an Idea or Image be in all reſpects like the Original.

§ 138. I anſwer, If it does not in thoſe mention'd, it is impoſſible it ſhou'd repreſent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Willing, Thinking, and Perceiving Ideas, and there remains nothing elſe wherein the Idea can be like a Spirit. For by the Word *Spirit* we mean only that which Thinks, Wills, and Perceives, this, and this alone, conſtitutes the Signification of that Term. If, therefore, it is impoſſible that any degree of thoſe Powers, ſhou'd be repreſented in an Idea or Notion, 'tis evident there can be no Idea or Notion of a Spirit.

§ 139. But

§ 139. But it will be objected, that if there is no Idea ſignified by the terms *Soul*, *Spirit*, and *Subſtance*, they are wholly inſignificant, or have no meaning in 'em. I anſwer thoſe Words do mean or ſignify a real Thing, which is neither an Idea nor like an Idea, but that which perceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reaſons about them. What I am my ſelf, that which I denote by the term I, is the ſame with what is meant by *Soul*, or *Spiritual Subſtance*. But if I ſhou'd ſay, that I was nothing, or that I was an Idea or Notion, nothing cou'd be more evidently Abſurd than either of theſe Propoſitions. You'll perhaps, inſiſt, that this is only Quarrelling at a Word, and that ſince the immediate ſignifications of other Names, are by common conſent called *Ideas*, no reaſon can be aſſign'd, why that which is ſignified by the name *Spirit* or *Soul* may not partake in the ſame Appellation. I anſwer, all the Unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that they are intirely Paſſive, and their Exiſtence

istence consists only in being perceiv'd: Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an active being, whose Existence consists not in Being perceiv'd, but in perceiving Ideas and Thinking. It is, therefore, necessary in order to prevent Equivocation and confounding Natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between *Spirit* and *Idea*. *Vid. Sect.* XXVII.

§ 140. In a large Sense, indeed, we may be said to have an Idea of *Spirit*, that is, we understand the meaning of the Word otherwise we cou'd not affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits, by means of our own, which we suppose to be Resemblances of them. So we know other Spirits by means of our own Soul, which, in that Sense, is the Image or Idea of them, it having a like respect to other Spirits, that Blueness or Heat by me perceiv'd has to those Ideas perceiv'd by another.

§ 141. The

§ 141. The *natural Immortality of the Soul* is a neceſſary Conſequence of the foregoing Doctrine. But before we attempt to prove this, 'tis fit that we explain the meaning of that Tenent. It muſt not be ſuppoſed, that they who aſſert the natural Immortality of the Soul are of opinion, that, it is abſolutely incapable of Annihilation, even by the infinite power of the CREATOR, who firſt gave it Being. But only that it is not liable to be broken, or diſſolv'd, by the ordinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of Man to be only a thin, vital Flame, or Syſtem of animal Spirits, make it Periſhing and Corruptible as the Body, ſince there is nothing more eaſily diſſipated than ſuch a Being, which it is naturally impoſſible ſhou'd ſurvive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it is inclos'd. And this Notion has been greedily embraced, and cheriſh'd by the worſt Part of Mankind, as the moſt effectual Antidote againſt all Impreſſions of Vertue and Religion. But it has

been made evident, that Bodies, of what frame or Texture ſoever, are barely paſſive Ideas in the Mind, which is more diſtant and heterogeneous from them, than Light is from Darkneſs. We have ſhewn that the Soul is Indiviſible, Incorporeal, Unextended, and it is conſequently Incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer, than that the Motions, Changes, Decays, and Diſſolutions which we hourly ſee befal natural Bodies (and which is what we mean by the *courſe of Nature*) cannot poſſibly affect an Active, Simple, Uncompounded Subſtance: Such a being, therefore, is Indiſſoluble by the force of Nature, that is to ſay, *the Soul of Man is naturally Immortal.*

§ 142. After what has been ſaid, 'tis, I ſuppoſe, plain that our Souls are not to be known in the ſame manner as ſenſeleſs, inactive Objects, or by way of *Idea*. *Spirits* and *Ideas* are things ſo wholly different, that when we ſay, *they Exiſt*, *they are Known*, or the like, theſe Words muſt not be thought to ſignifie

ſignifie any thing common to both Natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: And to expect, that by any multiplication or enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, ſeems as Abſurd as if we ſhou'd hope to *ſee a Sound.* This is inculcated becauſe I imagine it may be of Moment, towards clearing ſeveral important Queſtions, and preventing ſome very dangerous Errors concerning the Nature of the Soul.

§ 143. It will not be amiſs to add, that the Doctrine of *Abſtract Ideas* has had no ſmall ſhare, in rendering thoſe Sciences Intricate and obſcure, which are particularly converſant about Spiritual Things. Men have imagin'd they cou'd frame abſtract Notions, of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, and conſider them preſcinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it ſelf, as from their reſpective Objects and Effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous Terms, preſum'd to ſtand for abſtract Notions,

Notions, have been introduced into Metaphyſics and Morality, and from theſe have grown Infinite Diſtractions and Diſputes amongſt the Learned.

§ 144. But nothing ſeems more to have contributed, towards engaging Men in Controverſies and Miſtakes, with regard to the Nature and Operations of the Mind, than the being uſed to ſpeak of thoſe things, in Terms borrow'd from ſenſible Ideas. For Example, The Will is termed the *Motion* of the Soul: This infuſes a Belief, that the Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impell'd and determin'd by the Objects of Senſe, as neceſſarily as that is by the Stroak of a Racket. Hence ariſe endleſs Scruples and Errors of dangerous Conſequence in Morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and Truth appear Plain, Uniform, and Conſiſtent, cou'd but Philoſophers be prevail'd on, to depart from ſome receiv'd prejudices and modes of Speech, and retiring into themſelves attentively conſider their own meaning. But the Difficulties ariſing on this Head, demand

a more particular Diſquiſition, than ſuits with the Deſign of this Treatiſe.

§ 145. From what has been ſaid, 'tis plain, that we cannot know the Exiſtence of other Spirits, otherwiſe than by their Operations, or the Ideas by them excited in us. I perceive ſeveral Motions, Changes, and Combinations of Ideas, that inform me there are certain particular Agents, like my ſelf, which accompany them, and concur in their Production. Hence, the Knowlege I have of other Spirits is not immediate, as is the Knowlege of my Ideas, but depending on the Intervention of Ideas, by me refer'd to Agents or Spirits diſtinct from my ſelf, as Effects or concomitant Signs.

§ 146. But tho' there be ſome things which convince us, Human Agents are concern'd in producing them; yet it is evident to every one, that thoſe things which are call'd the works of Nature, *i. e.* the far greater part of the Ideas or Senſations perceived by us, are not produced

duced by, or dependent on, the Wills of Men. There is therefore ſome other Spirit that cauſes them, ſince it is repugnant that they ſhou'd ſubſiſt by themſelves. *See Sect.* XXIX. But if we attentively conſider the conſtant Regularity, Order, and Concatenation of Natural Things, the ſurpriſing Magnificence, Beauty and Perfection of the larger, and the Exquiſite Contrivance of the ſmaller Parts of the Creation, together with the exact Harmony and Correſpondence of the whole, but, above all, the never enough admir'd Laws of Pain and Pleaſure, and the Inſtincts or natural Inclinations, Appetites, and Paſſions of Animals, I ſay if we conſider all theſe things, and at the ſame time attend to the meaning and import of the Attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wiſe, Good and Perfect, we ſhall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforeſaid Spirit, *who works all in all*, and *by whom all things conſiſt.*

§ 147. Hence it is evident, that GOD, is known as certainly and immediately

diately as any other Mind or Spirit whatsoever, distinct from our selves. We may even assert, that the Existence of GOD is far more evidently perceiv'd than the Existence of Men; because the Effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable, than those ascribed to Human Agents. There is not any one Mark that denotes a Man, or Effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the Being of that Spirit, who is the *Author of Nature.* For it is evident that in affecting other Persons, the will of Man has no other Object, than barely the Motion of the Limbs of his Body, but that such a Motion shou'd be attended by, or excite, any Idea in the Mind of another, depends wholly on the Will of the CREATOR. He alone it is who, *upholding all things by the word of his Power*, maintains that Intercourse between Spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the Existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear Light which enlightens every one, is it self invisible to the greatest part of Mankind.

§ 148 It ſeems to be a general Pretence of the Unthinking Herd, that they cannot ſee GOD. Cou'd we but ſee him, ſay they, as we ſee a Man, we ſhou'd believe that he is, and believing obey his Commands. But alas we need only open our Eyes to ſee the Sovereign Lord of all Things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our Fellow-Creatures. Not that I imagine, we ſee GOD (as ſome will have it) by a direct and immediate View, or ſee Corporeal Things, not by themſelves but, by ſeeing that which repreſents them in the Eſſence of GOD, which Doctrine is, I muſt confeſs, to me Incomprehenſible. But I ſhall explain my Meaning. A Human Spirit or Perſon is not perceiv'd by Senſe, as not being an Idea; when therefore we ſee the Colour, Size, Figure, and Motions of a Man, we perceive only certain Senſations or Ideas excited in our own Minds: And theſe, being exhibited to our view in ſundry, diſtinct Collections ſerve to mark out unto us the Exiſtence of

of Finite, and Created Spirits like our ſelves. Hence 'tis plain, we do not ſee a Man, if by *Man* is meant that which Lives, Moves, Perceives, and Thinks as we do: But only ſuch a certain Collection of Ideas, as directs us to think there is a diſtinct Principle of Thought and Motion, like to our ſelves, accompanying and repreſented by it. And after the ſame manner we ſee GOD; all the difference is, that, whereas ſome one finite and narrow aſſemblage of Ideas denotes a particular Human Mind, whitherſoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places, perceive manifeſt Tokens of the Divinity: Every thing we See, Hear, Feel or any wiſe perceive by Senſe, being a Sign or Effect of the Power of GOD: as is our Perception of thoſe very Motions, which are produced by Men.

§ 149. 'Tis therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to any one that's capable of the leaſt Reflexion, than the Exiſtence of GOD, or a Spirit who is intimately preſent to our Minds,

producing in them all that variety of Ideas or Senſations, which continually affect us, on whom we have an abſolute and intire Dependence, in ſhort *in whom we Live, and Move, and have our Being.* That the Diſcovery of this great Truth which lies ſo near and obvious to the Mind, ſhou'd be attain'd to by the Reaſon of ſo very few, is a ſad inſtance of the Stupidity and Inattention of Men, who, thô they are Surrounded with ſuch clear manifeſtations of the Deity, are yet ſo little affected by them, that they ſeem, as it were, blinded with exceſs of Light.

§ 150. But you'll ſay has Nature no ſhare in the Production of Natural Things, and muſt they be all aſcrib'd to the immediate and ſole Operation of God? I anſwer, if by *Nature* is meant only the viſible *Series* of Effects, or Senſations imprinted on our Minds, according to certain fixt and general Laws: Then 'tis plain, that Nature taken in this Senſe cannot produce any thing at all. But if by *Nature* is meant ſome

ſome Being diſtinct from God, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and things perceiv'd by Senſe, I muſt confeſs, that Word is to me an empty Sound, without any intelligible Meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this Acceptation, is a vain *Chimera* introduced by thoſe Heathens, who had not juſt Notions of the Omnipreſence and infinite Perfection of God. But it is more unaccountable, that it ſhou'd be receiv'd among *Chriſtians* profeſſing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which conſtantly aſcribe thoſe Effects to the immediate Hand of God, that Heathen Philoſophers are wont to impute to *Nature*. *The Lord, he cauſeth the Vapours to aſcend; he maketh Lightnings with Rain; he bringeth forth the Wind out of his Treaſures.* Jerem. Chap. 10. v. 13. *He turneth the ſhadow of Death into the Morning, and maketh the Day dark with Night.* Amos Chap. 5. v. 8. *He viſiteth the Earth, and maketh it ſoft with Showers: He bleſſeth the Springing thereof, and crowneth the Year with his Goodneſs; ſo that the Paſtures are cloathed with Flocks, and the Valleys are cover'd over*

over with Corn. See Pſal. 65. But notwithſtanding that this is the conſtant Language of Scripture; yet we have I know not what Averſion from believing, that God concerns himſelf ſo nearly in our Affairs. Fain wou'd we ſuppoſe him at a great diſtance off, and ſubſtitute ſome blind, unthinking Deputy in his ſtead, thô (if we may believe Saint *Paul*) *he be not far from every one of us.*

§ 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected, that the ſlow, gradual and round-about Methods obſerv'd in the Production of Natural Things, do not ſeem to have for their Cauſe the immediate Hand of an *Almighty Agent.* Beſides, Monſters, untimely Births, Fruits blaſted in the Bloſſom, Rains falling in deſert Places, Miſeries incident to Human Life, and the like, are ſo many arguments that the whole frame of Nature, is not immediately actuated and ſuperintended by a Spirit of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs. But the Anſwer to this Objection is in a good meaſure plain from *Sect.* LXII, it being viſible,

visible, that the aforesaid Methods of Nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general Rules, and after a steady and consistent Manner; which argues both the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God. For, it doth hence follow, that the Finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolv'd and careless Sinner, which gives him an oppertunity to harden in his Impiety, and grow ripe for Vengeance. *vid. Sect.* LVII. Such is the Artificial Contrivance of this mighty Machine of Nature, that whilst its Motions and various Phænomena strike on our Senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is it self unperceivable to Men of Flesh and Blood. *Verily* (saith the Prophet) *thou art a God that hidest thy self.* Isaiah Chap. 45. ver. 15. But thô the Lord conceal himself from the Eyes of the *Sensual* and *Lazy*, who will not be at the least expence of Thought; yet to an unbiassed and attentive Mind, nothing can be more plainly legible, than the intimate Presence of an *All-wise Spirit*, who Fashions, Regulates, and Sustains the

the whole Syſtem of Beings. Secondly, It is clear from what we have elſewhere obſerv'd, that the Operating according to general and ſtated Laws, is ſo neceſſary for our Guidance in the affairs of Life, and letting us into the Secret of Nature, that without it, all Reach and Compaſs of Thought, all Human Sagacity and Deſign cou'd ſerve to no manner of Purpoſe: It were even impoſſible, there ſhou'd be any ſuch Faculties or Powers in the Mind, *vid. Sect.* XXXI. Which one Conſideration abundantly out-ballances whatever particular Inconveniences may thence ariſe.

§ 152. But we ſhou'd further conſider, that the very Blemiſhes and Defects of Nature are not without their Uſe, in that they make an agreeable ſort of Variety, and augment the Beauty of the reſt of the Creation, as Shades in a Picture ſerve to ſet off the brighter and more enlighten'd Parts. We wou'd likewiſe do well to examine, whether our taxing the Waſte of Seeds and Embryo's, and accidental Deſtruction of Plants

Plants and Animals, before they come to full Maturity, as an Imprudence in the Author of Nature, be not the effect of Prejudice, contracted by our Familiarity with impotent and saving Mortals. In *Man*, indeed, a thrifty Management of those Things, which he cannot procure without much Pains and Industry, may be esteem'd *Wisdom*. But we must not imagine, that the inexplicably fine Machine of an Animal or Vegetable, costs the Great CREATOR any more Pains or Trouble in its Production, than a Pebble does: nothing being more evident, than that an Omnipotent Spirit, can indifferently produce every thing, by a meer *Fiat* or act of his Will. Hence it is plain, that the splendid Profusion of Natural Things shou'd not be interpreted, Weakness or Prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather be look'd on as an Argument of the Riches of his Power.

§ 153. As for the mixture of Pain or Uneasiness which is in the World,

purſuant to the General Laws of Nature, and the Actions of Finite, Imperfect Spirits; This, in the State we are in at preſent, is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to our Well-being. But our Proſpects are too narrow: We take, for Inſtance, the Idea of ſome one particular Pain into our Thoughts, and account it *Evil*; whereas if we enlarge our View, ſo as to comprehend the various Ends, Connexions, and Dependencies of things, on what Occaſions and in what Proportions, we are affected with Pain and Pleaſure, the Nature of Human Freedom, and the Deſign with which we are put into the World; we ſhall be forced to acknowlege that thoſe particular Things, which conſider'd in themſelves appear to be *Evil*, have the Nature of *Good*, when conſider'd as link'd with the whole Syſtem of Beings.

§ 154. From what has been ſaid it will be manifeſt to any Conſidering Perſon, that it's meerly for want of attention and comprehenſiveneſs of Mind that

that there are any Favourers of *Atheiſm* or the *Manichæan Hereſie* to be found. Little and unreflecting Souls may, indeed, Burleſque the Works of Providence, the Beauty and Order whereof they have not Capacity, or will not be at the Pains, to comprehend. But thoſe who are Maſters of any juſtneſs and extent of Thought and are withal uſed to reflect, can never ſufficiently admire the Divine Traces of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, that ſhine throughout the Oeconomy of Nature. But what Truth is there which glares ſo ſtrongly on the Mind, that by an averſion of Thought, a wilful ſhutting of the Eyes, we may not eſcape ſeeing it, at leaſt with a full and direct view? Is it therefore to be wonder'd at, if the generality of Men, who are ever intent on Buſineſs or Pleaſure, and little uſed to fix or open the Eye of their Mind, ſhou'd not have all that Conviction and Evidence of the Being of God, which might be expected in Reaſonable Creatures?

§ 155. We ſhou'd rather admire, that Men can be found ſo Stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they ſhou'd be unconvinced of, ſuch an evident and momentous Truth. And yet it is to be fear'd that too many of Parts and Leiſure, who live in Chriſtian Countries, are meerly thrô a ſupine and dreadful Negligence ſunk into a ſort of *Demy-Atheiſm.* They can't ſay there is not a GOD, but neither are they convinced that there is. For what elſe can it be but ſome lurking Infidelity, ſome ſecret miſgivings of Mind, with regard to the Exiſtence and Attributes of GOD, which permits Sinners to grow and harden in Impiety? Since it is downright impoſſible, that a Soul pierced and enlighten'd with a thorough Senſe of the Omnipreſence, Holineſs, and Juſtice of that *Almighty Spirit*, ſhou'd perſiſt in a remorſleſs Violation of his Laws. We ought, therefore, earneſtly to meditate and dwell on thoſe important

important Points; that so we may attain Conviction without all Scruple, *that the Eyes of the* LORD *are in every place beholding the Evil and the Good; that he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us Bread to eat and Raiment to put on*; that he is present and conscious to our innermost Thoughts; in fine, that we have a most absolute and immediate Dependence on Him. A clear View of which great Truths cannot chuse but fill our Hearts, with an awful Circumspection and holy Fear, which is the strongest Incentive to *Vertue*, and the best Guard against *Vice*.

§ 156. For after all, what deserves the first place in our Studies, is the Consideration of GOD, and our *Duty*; which to promote as it was the the main drift and design of my Labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual, if, by what I have said I cannot inspire my Readers

Readers with a pious Senſe of the Preſence of GOD: And having ſhewn the Falſeneſs or Vanity of thoſe barren Speculations, which make the chief Employment of Learned Men, the better diſpoſe them to reverence and embrace the Salutary Truths of the GOSPEL, which to Know and to Practiſe, is the higheſt Perfection of Human Nature.

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
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
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