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
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To
Mr Leibnitz

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# A DEFENCE OF THE ESSAY OF Human Understanding,

Written by Mr. *Lock*.

Wherein its Principles with reference to *Morality*, *Reveal'd Religion*, and the *Immortality of the Soul*,, are Consider'd and Justify'd: In Answer to

Some

## REMARKS on that Essay.

*London*, Printed for *Will. Turner* at the *Angel* at *Lincolns-Inn* Back-Gate, and *John Nutt* near *Stationers-Hall*. 1702.

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# To the *Excellent* Mr. Lock.

*SIR*,

I Do not preſume to addreſs theſe Papers to you as a Champion in your Cauſe, but as an Offender, to make the beſt Apology I can for a Bold unlicenc'd Undertaking; that Excellence of the Eſſay of *Human Underſtanding*, which gave me Courage in encountring a Caviller againſt it, ſtrikes me with Shame and Awe, when I think of coming before you; like a Raſh Lover, that fights in Defence of a Lady's Honour, the juſter his Cauſe is, the more Reaſon he has to fear her Reſentment, for not leaving it to aſſert it ſelf by its own Evidence, and the more it ſecures him of Succeſs againſt his Adverſary, the leſs Pretence he has to her Forgiveneſs: But, Sir, The Eſſay of *Human Underſtanding* is a Publick Concern, which every one has a Right and Intereſt to defend; It came too late into the World to be receiv'd without Oppoſition, as it might have been in the firſt Ages of Philoſophy, before Mens Heads were prepoſſeſt with imaginary Science; at leaſt, no doubt, if ſo Perfect a Work cou'd have been produc'd ſo Early, it wou'd have prevented a great deal of that unintelligible Jargon, and vain Pretence to Knowledge of things out of the reach of Human Underſtanding, which make a great part of the School-Learning, and diſuſe the Mind to Plain andſolid Truth.

But

But the Great Mr. *Lock* was reſerv'd for a Curious and Learned Age, to *break in upon this Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance*, and by ſetting Men on conſidering firſt *the Bounds of Human Underſtanding*, to help them in a cloſe Purſuit of True and Uſeful Knowledge: And is it poſſible for a Lover of Truth to be unmov'd, or ſilently ſuffer any injurious Inſinuations of ſo Excellent a Deſign.

Your Time, Sir, is too precious to be employ'd in taking notice of them, you ſtill go on in farther deſigns for our Advantage and Improvement; and whilſt you labour in that Great End to which you were Deſtin'd, *The good of Mankind*, 'tis every one's Duty to be watchful for you, and zealous to ſecure the Benefits you have already done us.

'Tis confeſs'd, the vaſt diſproportion between one of ſo mean Abilities as the Author of this Defence; and the Incomparable Mr. *Lock*, might with Reaſon have deter'd from the Attempt. But I did not preſume to conſider my ſelf in any kind of Compariſon with him, I only obſerv'd the Adveſaries Strength and Thought (with Reaſon and Juſtice on my ſide) I need not be diſcourag'd to enter the Liſts with him; And I am perſwaded, what I have done will leave him no cauſe of Triumph, how much ſoever it is unworthy of you: I wiſh, Sir, you may only find it enough worth your notice, to incite you to ſhew the World, how far it falls ſhort of doing Juſtice to your Principles, which you may do without interrupting the Great Buſineſs of your Life, by a Work that will be an Univerſal Benefit, and which you have giv'n the World ſome Right to

exact

exact of you; Who is there so capable of pursuing to a *Demonstration* those Reflections on the Grounds of *Morality* which you have already made? Which on the Hints you have giv'n, is impatiently expected from you by many who lament the Great Need there is of it in this Age; That Consideration, no doubt, will animate one who has ever shewn a careful Zeal for the Advancement of Practical Religion; and I cannot but think a Man so greatly qualify'd for such an Undertaking, was giv'n in Mercy to an Age in which it is more than ever wanting, for never any Age abounded like this with open Advocates of Irreligion, upon pretended Rational Grounds, To silence these unhappy Reasoners, by a Demonstration of the Obligations their Nature lays upon them, is a Work worthy of the Excellent Mr. *Lock*; And perhaps the weakness of this Defence may shew you, that those who mean well to Religion, have no little need of your Instruction; in hopes of which, I have ventur'd to Publish these Papers, not without much Apprehension and Awe of your Displeasure; But Sir, in my Offence you must perceive my Zeal, and tho' I have not the Happiness to be known to you, believe me with the Profoundest Respect.

*Sir,*

*Your most Humble,*

*And most Obedient Servant.*

PRE-

# PREFACE.

*AS the Science of true Morality is of the moſt Univerſal and higheſt Concernment to Mankind, no doubt, thoſe Writers who eſtabliſh it upon the cleareſt, moſt obvious, and the moſt ſolid Grounds, do the Beſt Service to Religion, which has receiv'd no little prejudice, by the Attempts of ſome well-meaning Men to ſupport it upon Metaphyſical Notions, upon falſe or abſtruſe Reaſonings: And as there appears a hearty Zeal for ſetting Men right in that great Concern, in all the Writings of the Excellent Author of the Eſſay of* Human Underſtanding, *I know no Philoſopher before him that has fix'd Morality upon ſo ſolid a Foundation, as he gives many Hints of in that Eſſay, where ever the Subject will permit; A Foundation ſtrong enough to ſatisfie the Wiſeſt, and plain enough to be conceiv'd by the weakeſt Capacities. And yet there have not been wanting ſome, who have tax'd that admirable Eſſay with Principles prejudicial, or not ſufficient to thoſe Great Ends, which are evidently the main Scope of all that Author's Works; So hard it is for Men, who have been us'd to receive Truth in a particular Dreſs, to know her when ſtrip't of thoſe falſe Colours and borrow'd Ornaments, with which ſhe is too often diſguis'd; at leaſt, this is the worſt I wou'd think of ſuch Cavillers, the moſt favourable Judgment that can be made of them, is that they*

*they have either mistaken Mr.* Lock's *Principles, or the true Grounds of Morality, and write out of too great a Fondness of their own* Hypothesis, *or Ignorance of his.*

*But as there are no Reflections so weak or ill grounded, that some or other may not be deceiv'd by, I have met with two or three, who upon reading some Remarks on the Essay of Human Understanding (which fell but lately into my Hands) concluded it contain'd very dangerous Principles, and without farther Examination, condemn'd the Essay, having never read, or as they own'd, very little consider'd it; on which account, several who have a great respect for Mr.* Lock, *have wish'd he had leisure to answer the Difficulties objected against his Principles by the Remarker; But as I did not think them strong enough to need so great a Hand to remove them, I perswaded my self I might do something towards it, which at first I design'd only for my own satisfaction, and those few Friends who had spoke to me of them, But in examining their Force I found them so much grounded on Mistakes, not only of the Principles the Author contends against, but of the Foundation of those Grand Points he contends for, that it fell unavoidably in my way to make some Reflections upon the* True Grounds of Morality, *and the danger of establishing a Point of so great Concern as that, and the Immortality of the Soul, upon false or uncertain* Hypothesis, *which having been frequently attempted, and by well designing Men, made me think it might not be unuseful to publish these Papers; And I hope, whatever may tend to removing any Prejudices against a Book of so great use as the Essay of* Human Understanding,

*ing, will be thought of some Consequence to the Publick; and tho' I am far from pretending to have set the Principles I defend in all the Lustre they are capable of, I doubt not, that I have sufficiently shewn the Weakness of the Objections against them, and that all impartial Readers will easily perceive, that whatever is defective in this Defence, can only be imputed to want of Judgment in the Undertaker, equal to the Truth and Justice of the Cause.*

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## ERRATA.

Page 21. *l.* 32. *dele* the. *p.* 23. *l.* 12. *r.* the Veracity of their. *p.* 74. *l.* 7. *r.* to Mr.

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# A VINDICATION Of an ESSAY Concerning *Human Understanding.*

'TIS happy for Mankind, when Men of an elevated Genius, and uncommon Penetration, have too a truly Noble and Beneficent Nature, above any low particular Ends, and Resolute enough to encounter all the Oppositions they must meet in an unbyass'd search of Truth, from those who having with much pains Imbib'd the Opinions of Reverenced Authors, are unwlling to unlearn all their former Knowledge, to examine what they have been taught for first Principles not to be question'd, and lay aside their Sacred *Ipse dixit.* He who dares attempt against this establish'd Monarchy over Mens Judgments, must be

look'd on as a troubleſome and dangerous Innovater, and needs a mighty Force of Reaſon and generous Courage, to break through all the Prejudices of Men, and free them from a willing Slavery: To that united Force, we owe the excellent Eſſay on Human Underſtanding; and to theſe Prejudices, all the Cavils againſt it.

When the Light of Truth Shines too clear and ſtrong to be directly Fac'd, the only Shelter for thoſe who would not feel its Force, is to ſeek for far fetch'd dangerous Conſequences, ſuppos'd Inconſiſtencies, with Revealed Truths, and Myſteries of Faith, deduc'd by a long Train of Arguments, which engaging in an intricate Diſpute, ſhades them with ſome pretence, for not Confeſſing the Splendor of that Truth, they cannot Encounter, Inconſiſtencies with Reveal'd Truths, when the real neceſſary Conſequence of any Principles being ſufficient Proofs againſt them, how Plauſibe ſoever they appear; But Mr. *Lock* has ſo well Vindicated his Eſſay from thoſe imputed to it, by the moſt conſiderable of his Oppoſers, that the reſt cou'd only hope to Triumph in his Neglect of their Attempts, who by the help of ſome Suppoſitions, and many Miſtakes, have endeavour'd to draw an Odium on that excellent Eſſay.

The Remarker, whom I have now under Conſideration, in his firſt Letter, p. 4. deſires to be inform'd how far all the Prin-

Principles of that ingenious Eſſay, taken together, will give us a ſure Foundation for Morality, Reveal'd Religion, and a future Life, which he does not find that they do; What his Reaſons, or rather Difficulties (as he terms them) are, is my deſign to conſider, and endeavour to ſatisfy. In his ſecond Remarks, he mentions an Anſwer of Mr. *Lock*'s, which I have not Read, but ſuppoſe, by what he quotes out of it, that it was rather deſign'd to ſhew the weakneſs of his Objections, than to give a full Anſwer to them, Mr. *Lock*, perhaps, thinking it ſufficient to ſhew they required none; but I find they are ſtill of weight with the Remarker, his Second and Third Remarks, being only Enlargments upon the ſame Heads.

I ſhall therefore Examine them in their Order, taking on each Head the Subſtance of what I find relating to it in all the three Remarks, that the Anſwer lying together, may be the more clear, and the better Conſider'd, which, I hope, will be done by the Remarker without Prejudice, as it was Writ, with a deſign to ſatisfy him, and in a ſincere Love of Truth, to do Juſtice to a Book which, I think, removes the Obſtacles to it, and ſhews the Method of attaining it clearer and more effectually, and is Writ in an exacter Method than any before it, to vindicate it from a Defect in the Foundation of Certainty, in thoſe things

which are of greateſt Concern to us, which I doubt not to do, it being clear to me, that whatever we can know at all, muſt be diſcoverable by Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; For I cannot find any other way to Knowledge, or that we have any one Idea not derived from Senſation and Reflection. But let us ſee how thoſe points may be eſtabliſh'd on them, for which the Remarker doubts their Force; and firſt of Morality, or Natural Religion, of which, he thus begins:

1ſt. *R.p.* 4. *As to Morality, we think the great Foundation of it, is the diſtinction of Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice.* —— *And I do not find that my Eyes, Ears, Noſtrils or any other outward Senſes, make any diſtinction of theſe things, as they do of Colours, Sounds,* &c. —— *Nor from any Ideas taken in from them, or from their Reports, am I Conſcious that I do, or can conclude that there is ſuch a diſtinction in the Nature of things.* In

2. *R. p.* 8. which Words, he ſays, he thought he had taken in enough to comprehend both Mr. *Lock*'s Principles of Knowledge, *Senſation and Reflection*, which I ſhould not have thought, but ſince he owns he deſign'd them to do ſo, we will ſuppoſe both expreſt, and proceed with him. *I allow that we may infer from Obſervation and Reaſon, that ſuch a diſtinction is uſeful to Society, but both Philoſophers and Divines, you know, make a more immutable and intrinſick Diſtinction, which is that I cannot make out from your Principles.* ——

*Thi*

*This I am sure of, that the Distinction, suppose of Gratitude and Ingratitude, Fidelity and Infidelity, Justice and Injustice, and such others, is as sudden without any Ratiocination, and as sensible and peircing, as the Difference I feel from the Scent of a Rose and* Assa-fœtida. One would think here, he were doubting whether upon Mr. *Lock*'s principles we can distinguish *Gratitude* from *Ingratitude*, *Fidelity* from *Infidelity*, &c. that is; know that breaking a Trust, is not keeping a Trust, *&c.* which (as all other Moral Virtues, as Mr. *Lock* has shewn) are a Collection of simple Ideas, received from Sensation and Reflection; But since he allow'd above, that *we can from Observation and Reason, infer such a Distinction to be useful to Society*, and by consequence, that we can by them perceive such a Distinction, we will guess his meaning here, to be, that the perception of the *Morality* and *Immorality* of these things is as sudden, *&c. as the difference he feels from the scent of a Rose, and* Assa-fœtida; tho' I do not know what it is, to perceive the *Morality and Immorality* of these things *without any Ratiocination*; *Justice and Injustice*, I think, depend upon the Rights of Men, whether Natural, or establish'd by particular Societies, and therefore to know what they are, 'tis necessary to know what Right is, which sure requires some *Reflection*; but to know that *Injustice* is *Evil*, without any *Reflection*, seems to me, no more than to know that the term *Injustice*,

*Ff p 9. l. 14.*

ſtice, ſtands for ſomething that we don't know, which is Evil; unleſs it will be ſaid that we may know it to be a detaining any one's Right, without knowing what Right is, which will be a very inſignificant Knowledge: But if the Remarker means that as ſoon as he knows what it is to have a Right to a Thing, he perceives, that to detain from a Man what he has ſuch a Right to, is Evil, without any farther Reflection, I underſtand him, but ſee not how it can be objected againſt the force of Mr. *Lock*'s principles, being only a perception of the diſagreement of theſe two Ideas, of one Man's having a Right to a Thing, and another's having a Right to take it away: But this only by the way.

Let us now Conſider that for which this ſudden preception without Ratiocination is brought as a Proof, *viz.* That the Grounds of the Diſtinction of Moral Good and Evil, is in *the Nature of the Things themſelves*, abſtract from the good of Society; which is that he cannot make out from Mr. *Lock*'s Principles. By which Diſtinction in the Nature of Things, if he means that without reſpect to Men, or to Society, tho' Mankind had never been, or never been deſign'd, Juſtice, Gratitude, Fidelity, *&c.* had been Good, and their contraries Evil; I Confeſs my ſelf incapable of having a Notion of theſe Vertues abſtract from any Subject, to conceive. For Example,

that

that it would have been good to be Faithful to a Truſt, tho' there had never been any one to Truſt, or be Truſted: Nor do I find that the Aſſertors of this Diſtinction in the Nature of Things, have any real Idea of them more abſtracted than I have, which will appear in Examining their particular Inſtances; I will take that which the Remarker gives, being one of the moſt inconteſted Principles in Morality, *That it is a wicked Thing, for a Man maliciouſly to kill his Friend, or his Father, or any other innocent Perſon. The Truth of this*, he ſays, *ſeems to him as Clear and Eternal, as any Propoſition in Mathematicks*; and it ſeems to me as Clear, that it cannot poſſibly be Conceived at all, either *True* or *Falſe*, in it ſelf, *i. e.* without any Relation to Man. I deſire any one, to try whether he can Conceive it to be an Eternal Truth, That 'tis a wicked Thing, for a Man to kill his Father, or his Friend, tho' there had never been, or deſign'd to be, ſuch a Thing as Friend, Father, or Man; but whether he can or not, it will ſtill be a Truth as *certain and immutable* as any Propoſition in Mathematicks; No Mathematician that I know of, thinks it neceſſary to eſtabliſh the immutability of this Truth, That the three Angels of a Triangle, are equal to two Right ones; To affirm that it is true, without any relation to Angels or Triangles, either of theſe Propoſitions are ſufficient-

2. R. p 26.

ly eſtabliſh'd, if it is, and always muſt be true, ſuppoſing thoſe things to which it relates, to exiſt.

2 R. p. 22. But here the Remarker's Queſtion will be made, Upon what Grounds muſt it be ſo? If *Good* and *Evil*, Vertue and Vice, are not ſuch in their own Nature, *they muſt be ſo from the Arbitrary Will of God, and all Things are indifferent, till he declare This, or That, to be Sin, according to his Pleaſure*: That is, he might if he had ſo pleas'd, have made *Vertue*, *Vice*; and *Vice*, *Vertue*: To which, I anſwer, That God having made Man ſuch a Creature as he is, it is as impoſſible that Good and Evil ſhould change their reſpects to him, as that *Pleaſure* can be *Pain*, and *Pain Pleaſure*, which no one in his Senſes will Affirm, and yet, I think, no Body has ſuppos'd them to be real Exiſtences, independent of any Subject; And if the Relation which Moral Good and Evil has to Natural Good and Evil, were ſufficiently obſerved, there would be as little diſpute about the Nature and Reality of *Vertue* and *Vice*: Thoſe who think they are only Notions in the Mind, would be convinced they are as Real as Natural, Good and Evil; all *Moral Good* conſiſting in Doing, Willing, or Chuſing, for one's ſelf or others, what ever is a *Natural Good*; and all *Moral Evil*, in Doing, Willing, or Chuſing whatever is a *Natural Evil*, to one's ſelf or others. This, I doubt not,

not, will appear a full Definition, when Try'd by every Inſtance of *Moral Good* and *Evil*, to all who reflect on it; unleſs there are any who do not place the Perfection and Imperfection, the Advantages and Diſadvantages of the *Mind*, in their Account of *Natural Good* or *Evil*; which I believe no Rational Man will own.

And as this unalterable Relation makes the Real and Immutable Nature of Virtue and Vice undeniable; ſo alſo from thence it is plain, *That the Nature of Man is the Ground or Reaſon of the Law of Nature*; *i. e.* of Moral Good and Evil. But if the Remarker will rather have it, that the Nature of theſe things, is the Reaſon of the Nature of Man, that they are Eſſentially in the Nature of God, which is the Rule of his Will, and according to which he form'd Man; let it be ſo, as it is unqueſtionable that he cannot will any thing contrary to his Nature; But however the Moral Attributes of God, Goodneſs, Juſtice, *&c.* are in him (who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities) This I ſay (which Mr. *Lock* has obſerved of our Idea of their Infinity) that we have no Idea of them, but what carries with it a Reſpect to their Objects, *the natural Good or Evil of his Creatures*; and we could have no Idea of them at all without Reflection upon our ſelves; for whatever is the Original Standard of Good and Evil; it is plain, we have no Notion

tion of them but by their Conformity, or Repugnancy to our Reaſon, and with relation to our Nature; and that what according to it we perceive to be good, we aſcribe to the Supream Being; For we cannot know that the Nature of God is Good, before we have a Notion of Good; it muſt be then by reflecting upon our own Nature, and the Operations of our Minds, that we come to know the Nature of God; which therefore cannot *be to us* the Rule of Good and Evil, unleſs we will argue in a Circle, that by our Notion of Good, we know the Nature of God, and by the Nature of God, we know what is Good.

From whence it will follow, that the Nature of Man, and the Good of Society, are *to us* the Reaſon and Rule of Moral Good and Evil; and there is no danger of their being leſs immutable on this Foundation than any other, whilſt Man continues *a Rational and Sociable Creature*: If the Law of Nature is the Product of Human Nature it ſelf (as the Great *Grotius* ſpeaks) it muſt ſubſiſt as long as Human Nature; Nor will this Foundation make it the leſs Sacred, ſince it cannot be doubted, that it is originally the Will of God, whilſt we own him the Author of that Nature, of which this Law is a Conſequence.

If then in Mr. *Lock*'s way we can perceive what is Conformable, or not, to our own Nature, which cannot be doubted; if by reflecting on our ſelves, we

we can come to know there muſt be a Supream Being, the Source of all others, which he has admirably ſhewn; we have a Sacred and Immutable Foundation for Natural Religion on his Principles; This being a plain and infallible Inference, that the Author of our Being does require thoſe things of us to which he has ſuited our Nature, and viſibly annexed our Happineſs, which he has made the neceſſary Motive of all our Actions; for it is inconſiſtent with that Divine Wiſdom, which we ſee has fitted all other things to their proper and certain End, to have form'd us after ſuch a manner, that if we employ thoſe Faculties which he has given us, we cannot but judge that ſuch things are fit to be done, and others to be avoided, and this to no end at all; Much leſs can we ſuppoſe he has deſign'd us to act contrary to the neceſſary Motives of our Actions, and Judgment of our Minds, it being a flat Contradiction, that Infinite Wiſdom and Power, ſhou'd form any of his Works ſo diſproportionate to their End. *Eſs. B 4. c. x.*

It will not be much from the purpoſe here to take notice of the Folly of thoſe Men, who think to weaken the Authority of Religion by calling it a Politick Contrivance, eſtabliſh'd for the good of Government or Society; which is as much as to ſay, it is the leſs Obligatory, becauſe it is neceſſary; whereas

that

that very thing ſhews it to be our indiſpenſable Duty, and of Divine Authority, without any Revelation, ſince the Divine Workmanſhip, *Human Nature* cou'd not ſubſiſt without it; If they cou'd prove it unpolitick or diſtructive to Society, it wou'd be much more for their purpoſe, for ſuch a Religion muſt neceſſarily be falſe; nothing can be a *Law to Nature*, which of direct Conſequence wou'd *deſtroy Nature*.

But if any one thinks it better eſtabliſh'd on the Nature of God, I have ſhewn how we come to the Knowledge of it in Mr. *Lock*'s way, by aſcribing to him whatever by its Conformity to our Nature we perceive to be Good; becauſe we ſee that we cannot admit any Imperfection in the Supream Being, without a Contradiction (which I ſhall ſhew in Mr. *Lock*'s Way, when I come to the next Head) and having by the *Effect* found out the *Cauſe*, we may then conclude the Nature of God to be the Arch-Type of ours, becauſe we cannot ſuppoſe the moſt Perfect Being can will any thing contrary to his own Nature; For if he cou'd, the Rule of that Will muſt be ſomething leſs Perfect than himſelf, (for whatever is moſt Perfect is God) and therefore to will any thing contrary to his own Nature, wou'd be an Imperfection in him, which to admit in the moſt perfect Being, is a Contradiction. Thus (when

I have more fully ſhewn how we come by the Idea of Perfection, in the Supream Being) the Remarker may perceive, that we can in Mr. *Lock*'s way, arrive to the Original Notion of intrinſick Holineſs, into which 'tis ultimately reſolv'd, which he is ſo much concern'd to find, and that I hope will reconcile him to Mr. *Lock*'s Principles. 2. R. p.

And if he will attentively examine his own without Prepoſſeſſion, if he will trace his Idea of God, and of Moral Good and Evil, to their firſt Source, I believe he will find he has no other Principle of Knowledge than Mr. *Lock*; and that the Miſtake lies, in that being taught Truths after they are diſcover'd, and finding them agreeable to our Reaſon, we immediately aſſent to them, without reflecting how they were firſt found out, and are apt to conclude thoſe things which we find firſt in our Knowledge, to be the firſt Principles of Knowledge; tho' they were proceeded to by many Steps and Degrees, and were the laſt eſtabliſh'd in the Diſcovery.

But the Remarker will object that Mr. *Lock* does not eſtabliſh Morality upon the Nature of Man, and the Nature of God, but *ſeems to ground his Demonſtration upon Future Puniſhments and Rewards, and upon the Arbitrary Will of the Law-Giver; and he does not think theſe* 2. R. p. 2

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*the first Grounds of Good and Evil.* To which I answer, First, supposing it were so, the question is not what Mr. *Lock* thinks, but what may be prov'd from his Principles. But secondly, I say that
R. p. 4. Mr. *Lock* does ground his Demonstration upon *the Nature of God and Man*, as will plainly appear by his express
words, which are these. *The Idea of a*
E. B 4. *Supream Being, infinite in Power, Goodness,*
c. 3. s. 18. *and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of our selves, as understanding Rational Creatures, being such as are clear in us, wou'd, I suppose, if duly consider'd and pursu'd, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration.* Nothing can be clearer than this, and in all those places which the Remarker quotes out of Mr. *Lock*, where he seems to establish Morality upon *the Will of God, and Rewards and Punishments*, he is speaking of it as it has the Force of a Law; and the Remarker cannot deny, whatever he thinks, *the first Grounds of Good and Evil*; or however clearly we may see the *Nature of these things*, we may approve or condemn them, but they can only have the Force of a *Law* to us, consider'd as *the Will of the Supream Being*, who can, and certainly will Reward the Compliance with, and Punish the Deviation from that Rule

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which he has made knowable to us by the Light of Nature.

But that we can only know these things to be his Will by their Conformity to our Nature, and that therefore they cannot be Arbitrary, I have before shewn; and that he will Punish or Reward us according to our Obedience or Disobedience to it, is a consequence of his Nature; so that, tho' Mr. *Lock* says that the Will of God, Rewards and Punishments, can only give Morality the Force of a Law, that does not make them the *first Grounds* of Good and Evil, since by his Principles, to know what the Will of God is (antecedently to Revelation) we must know what is Good by the Conformity it has to our Nature, by which we come to know the Nature of God, which therefore may be to him the first Ground or Rule of Good; tho' *the Will of God, &c.* can only enforce it as a *Law*.

I cannot here omit to take notice of a Question the Remarker asks on this Subject; How, pray you, upon these Principles, do you preserve the Distinction (that good old Distinction, which it may be you despise) of *Bonum Utile*, and *Honestum*? In your way, either the Parts are Coincident, or *Bonum Utile*, is superiour to *Bonum Honestum*. I'm afraid the Remarker will have hard Thoughts of me, if I should say I do not 2. *R. p.* 25.

not like his good old Distinction, and that I think the Parts are Coincident; I know not whether he will have a better Opinion of me, when I tell him I do not mean it in the way which he injuriously insinuates to be Mr. *Lock*'s, but that nothing can be truly Profitable, that is not Honest. However, not to cavil about Words, this I am sure of, that there is no Ground for the Remarkers, Reflection in those Principles which he is dissatisfy'd with, *viz. That morally Good and Evil, is the Conformity or Disagreement of our Actions to the Divine Law*; which Mr. *Lock* says *is the only true Touch-stone of Moral Rectitude, and that by comparing them to this Law, Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions*, that is, *whether as Duties or Sins, they are like to procure them Happiness or Misery from the Hands of the Almighty.* Upon these Principles *Bonum Utile*, can never be Superior to *Bonum Honestum*, in Mr. *Lock*'s Way, till the Remarker can shew him some Moral Evil, that is not contrary to the Divine Law, or a Way to escape the Hands of the Almighty, when we disobey him.

*Ess.* B. 2 c. 28.

What has been said, will be sufficient to answer all that the Remarker has said directly on this Point, but what further concerns it, *of Natural Conscience*, and the Proofs of the *Moral Attributes*

*butes of God* will be consider'd in their order, which leads us to the second Head, of which the Remarker.

*As to Reveal'd Religion, my Difficulty is only this, how it can be prov'd from your Principles, that the Author of the Revelation is veracious*; and p. 7. *to establish the certainty of Reveal'd Religion, we must know the Moral Attributes of the Divine Nature, such as Goodness, Justice, Holiness, and particularly Veracity. Now these I am not able to deduce from your Principles. You have prov'd very well an Eternal All-Powerful and All-Knowing Being: but, &c.* The Remarker, it seems, does not find what Mr. *Lock* says, after he has *very well prov'd* an Eternal, most Powerful, and most Knowing Being; That *from this Idea duly consider'd, will easily be deduc'd all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being*; the Remarker is *not able to do it*, tho' to help him, Mr. *Lock* says, *he may be asham'd to have rais'd such a doubt as this*, viz. *whether an Infinitely Powerful and Wise Being be veracious, or no, unless he concludes Lying to be no Mark of Weakness, and Folly.* As I find in his Words repeated by the Remarker, which he complains of, *as misrepresenting, and perverting his Sense*; *The Question is not* (says he) *whether God be veracious, but whether, according to your Principles, he can be prov'd to be so.* Answ. But the Question is, *whether an Infinitely Powerful, and*

1st. R. p. 6.

Ess. B. 4. C. 10. S. 6

2d. R. p. 3.

*Wiſe Being, is veracious or no*, for ſuch a Being, Mr. *Lock* has *very well prov'd*, as the Remarker owns, ſo that the Doubt muſt be, whether, as ſuch, he muſt be veracious; For if the Remarker allows *Veracity* to be a Conſequence of *Infinite Power and Wiſdom*, the Veracity of God is prov'd by Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; and this is an abſurd Queſtion, whether the Veracity of God can be prov'd from his Principles, if *Falſhood* is allow'd to be *a Mark of Weakneſs and Folly*, for then it cannot poſſibly be admitted in a Being which he has prov'd of *Infinite Wiſdom and Power*; and I know no better way of proving any thing, than by proving Principles upon which it cannot be deny'd without a Contradiction; So that Mr. *Lock* has not *perverted* the Remarker's Senſe, for he cannot avoid this Dilemma, Either he concludes Falſhood, to be *a Mark of Weakneſs and Folly*, or he does not; if not, then Mr. *Lock* has rightly repreſented his Senſe; if he does, then this is an abſurd Queſtion, whether one who has prov'd an Infinitely Powerful and Wiſe Being, can prove he is not Falſe.

But this is not ſufficient for the Remarker, he is *not able to deduce* one Attribute from another; Let us ſee then what is his way to know the Moral Attributes of God, which he tells is this, he *aſcribes Veracity to God, becauſe it is*

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*a Perfection.* But from what Grounds does he conclude, that whatever is a Perfection muſt be in God? Will he ſay, that it is a Principle imprinted on the Mind, without any Reflection; that is, we clearly ſee that God muſt be Perfect, we don't know why; or will he not rather ſay, That the want of any Perfection, wou'd imply either that he does not know what is Beſt, or cannot attain it, and therefore is inconſiſtent with Infinite Wiſdom, and Power? Or that to ſuppoſe there may be a Being of Greater Perfection than the Supream Source of all Being, is a groſs Contradiction? I believe, if he reflects attentively on the Progreſs of the Mind in the Knowledge of God, he will find Perfection is not firſt in our Notion of him, (as an ingenious Author has ſhewn) but that having diſcover'd a firſt Being, the Source of all others, and what attributes, we muſt neceſſarily aſcribe to him as ſuch, we perceive that to admit any Imperfection in him, would be a Contradiction to our firſt neceſſary Conceptions of him; which Mr. *Lock* has eſtabliſh'd in his Way, and tells us that from them, all his other Attributes will eaſily be deduc'd. Norris *Reſon and Religion*

But this will not ſatisfie the Remarker, unleſs Mr. *Lock* tells us *what is to be underſtood by Perfection in his Way; how it is deriv'd from the* Senſes, *and how* 1ſt. R. p. 8.

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*it includes Veracity.* The Remarker is very apt to forget, that Mr. *Lock* has another Principle of Knowledge, which he calls *Reflection*, or he thinks it insignificant; perhaps it may be so as to his purpose, but happening to be serviceable in the present Enquiry, I take leave to remind him of it, that we may consider how far it will help us to the Idea of Perfection.

But first, I observe that we have no adequate Idea of Perfection; but perceiving in our selves some *Powers and Faculties*, as of *Knowing*, *Willing*, *Moving*, &c. and of particular Actions, and General Abstract Ideas, that some are congruous; and others repugnant to each other, and to our Reason; we know that some things are better than others; and from every thing about us, and within us, we may learn, that the vastly greater part of them escape the extent of our Power, Knowledge and Goodness, from whence we conclude these things may be far more extensive, ev'n to all that can exist. And the highest possible Degree of these things, which we find it better to have, than to be without, that we call Perfection; which to have an adequate Idea of, we must comprehend the Existence of an Infinite Spirit. But we cannot add any thing to make up this Idea, which we do not find in our selves, only the Degrees, which we perceive must

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be aſcribed far beyond our Meaſures, to that Being from which we receiv'd all our Powers and Faculties, and by whoſe Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs, all things exiſt; for Perfection is only the higheſt Degree, or the beſt Manner of poſſible *Exiſtence*, and that the Eternal Source of all Being, muſt exiſt in the moſt Perfect Manner poſſible, cannot be doubted, for there cannot be a greater Abſurdity, than to ſuppoſe there may be a more Perfect Being, than the Eternal Source of all Being. Thus we ſee how the Idea of Perfection, ſuch as we have, may be deriv'd from *Senſation and Reflection*, and any one who conſiders it, will find, that he has no poſitive Idea of it, and that there is nothing in that Idea which he has, but what the Objects without him, , or the Faculties he perceives in himſelf, have furniſh'd him with; and that therefore it is needleſs to ſeek for any other Original of it.

Having now got the Idea of Perfection, in Mr. *Lock*'s Way, and found that it muſt neceſſarily be aſcrib'd to the Eternal Source of all Being, we muſt next conſider the other part of the Remarker's Queſtion, *How it includes Veracity*, which he is the more concerned to know, becauſe he ſays, *not only the Truth of the Revelation, but alſo of our Faculties in other things, depends upon the Veracity of their Author.* And here he muſt

1ſt. R. p 8.

muſt give me leave to ask him, upon what grounds Veracity is to him a Perfection. He will not ſay becauſe God is veracious, (tho' the Nature of God, is to him the Rule of Good) for he aſcribes Veracity to God, becauſe it is a Perfection, and he does not approve of arguing in a Circle. He muſt then know that Veracity is a Perfection from ſome other Rule, and here I am afraid he will be involv'd in a a great Difficulty, for *the Truth of our Faculties*, he ſays, *depends upon the Veracity of their Author*, but before he can know the Veracity of their Author, he muſt be ſure that Veracity is a Perfection, ſince 'tis only as ſuch he does, or it can be aſcrib'd to him; now by whatſoever means he perceives it to be ſo, how can he be certain that the Faculty by which he receives that Information, does not deceive him? For unleſs he is certain, that Veracity is a Perfection, he cannot be certain that God is veracious, nor therefore of the Truth of his Faculties; He muſt then remain in doubt, whether God is veracious, unleſs he can know it without the help of his Faculties, that is, without the Power or Capacity of knowing it; or he muſt ſuppoſe the Truth of his Faculties without any Proof. If that is not a firſt Principle not to be doubted of, I ſee no defence againſt an incurable Septiciſm, we cannot argue

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for, or againſt any thing, and the Remarker cannot know that his Poſition is true, *viz.* That the Truth of our Faculties depends upon the Veracity of their Author, ſince he muſt take it upon the Credit of thoſe Faculties. Let him doubt the Truth of his Faculties as much as he will, if he affirms any one thing, in that one he muſt believe them upon their own Evidence; and ſince he could not truſt them in other things, till he was certain of their Veracity of the Author; whatever Principle he eſtabliſhes that Certainty upon, he muſt rely upon the Evidence of his Faculties for the Truth of that Principle, which he tells us is this, *That Veracity is a Perfection, and conſequently muſt belong to the Nature of God.* 1ſt. *R.* p. 7. 2d *R.* p. 18. For which Propoſitions we may therefore conclude, he was contented to ſuppoſe the Truth of his Faculties; and he cannot deny Mr. *Lock* the ſame Priviledge, till he can ſhow him ſome way to Knowledge without their help.

In the mean time there can be but two ways of knowing that Veracity is a Perfection, either it is an innate Principle, originally Imprinted on the Mind; (which I ſhall not endeavour to confute, Mr. *Lock* having done it ſufficiently, nor is it needful to my Purpoſe.) Let that be the Remarker's Way of Knowledge if he pleaſes,) ſince he muſt no leſs rely upon the Truth of his Faculties, in that way than any

any other, (it being impoſſible for God himſelf to make any Impreſſion on us, without giving us a Faculty whereby to receive it.) But let us ſee whether it is diſcoverable in the other way, which muſt be Mr. *Lock*'s of *Senſation and Reflection*. I ſuppoſe the Remarker does not doubt, that in this way we can diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſhood, *i. e.* know that things are as they are, appear, as they appear, and that doing a thing, differs from not doing it, that an Apple, for Example is not a Horſe, that Pain, is not Pleaſure, and that performing our Promiſe, is not breaking it; or that repreſenting things as they are, or as they appear to us, and performing our Promiſe, *i. e.* Veracity, is more agreeable to our Nature, and Beneficial to Mankind, than the contrary; which how far *to us* the Rule of Good and Evil, I have before ſhewn, and ſhall only add here, that if in Mr. *Lock*'s Way we can know, that what is Beneficial to Mankind, is better than what is deſtructive to it; that Happineſs is better than Miſery, that Power and Knowledge is better than Impotence and Ignorance; if we may truſt our Faculties in diſcerning Truths, as ſenſible to us as our own Exiſtence; it cannot be doubted, that in his Way we can be aſſur'd that Veracity is a Perfection, till ſome other Reaſon of Falſhood can be imagin'd, than Ignorance, Impotence, or willing Evil for

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its own ſake, which cannot be conceiv'd poſſible to chuſe or prefer Evil, as Evil, being no leſs a Contradiction than to judge that to be beſt, which we know to be Worſt.

And the Remarker could not have been at a loſs how to deduce this, and all the other Moral Attributes of God, from Mr. *Lock*'s Principles, if he had carefully conſidered his Diſcourſe of our Idea of God, where he ſhews that it is *made up of the ſimple Ideas we have received from Senſation and Reflection, by putting together all the Qualities and Powers which we experiment in our ſelves, and find it better to have, than to be without, and enlarging every one of them with our Idea of Infinity*; to which place I refer the Remarker, and if he can by *Reflection*, find Veracity, Juſtice, and Goodneſs, among the things that *it is better to have than to be without*, I hope (with what I have ſaid) it will help him to deduce thoſe Attributes of God from Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; which will ſatisfy him that they give us a ſure Foundation for *Natural and Revealed Religion*; by which we have a full aſſurance of a future State. The Remarkers Third Head of Enquiries, which we are next to Conſider. B. 2. c. 23. ſ. 33, 34.

That the Immortality of the Soul is only highly probable by the light of Nature, none can deny who believes that Apoſtle by whom we are told, that Life and Immortality is brought to light by Jeſus Chriſt through the Goſpel, Why then is it objected againſt Mr. *Lock's* Principles, that they give us no certainty of the Immortality of the Soul without Revelation? By what other way can we be certain of any thing that is only highly probable by the Light of Nature? Which is all that can be prov'd by any Principles, and ſo far Mr. *Locks'* will go, as I doubt not to make appear. But farther I ſhall ſhew, that there is

nothing in his Principles, which at all weakens the main Proofs of a Future State, ſo that if they are thought to amount to Demonſtration, they have no leſs Force and Evidence upon his Principles, which will leave no pretence on this account againſt them; as will plainly appear in examining the Remarker's Objections.

1ſt. R. p. 8. *You ſuppoſe* (ſays he) *that the Soul may be ſometimes abſolutely without Thoughts, of one kind or other; and alſo, that God may, if he pleaſes* (*for any thing we know by the Light of Nature*) *give or have giv'n, to ſome Syſtems of Matter a Power to conceive and think. Upon theſe two Suppoſitions, I could not make out any certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, and am apt to think it cannot be done.*

As to the firſt of theſe Objections, I confeſs I do not ſee of what Conſequence it is at all to the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul; do they depend upon the contrary Supoſition, that the Soul *always thinks*? If they do, proofs upon a Suppoſition have a very unſure foundation; but let it be granted, that it is ever ſo clearly prov'd that thinking is neceſſary to the Souls Exiſtence, that can no more prove that it ſhall always Exiſt, than it proves that it has always Exiſted; it being as poſſible for that Omnipotence which from nothing gave the Soul a *Being*, to deprive it of that *Being* in the midſt of its moſt vigorous Reflections, as in an utter Suſpenſion of all Thought. If then this Propoſition, *That the Soul always thinks*, does not prove that it is Immortal, the contrary Supoſition takes not away any proof of it, for it is no leſs eaſy to conceive that a *Being* which has the Power of Thinking with ſome intervals of Ceſſation from Thought, that has Exiſted here for ſome time in a Capacity of Happineſs or Miſery, may be continued in, or reſtored to the ſame State, in a future Life, than that a *Being* which always thinks, may be continued

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in the ſame State, but to do the Remarker all the Juſtice, and give him all the Satisfaction I can, I ſhall examine the Subſtance of what he has Objected againſt Mr. *Lock*'s Aſſertion, without entring farther into the Diſpute than may ſerve to ſhew whether it is of any Conſequence for, or againſt the Immortality of the Soul.

Mr. *Lock* ſays, *Men do not think in ſound Sleep*; and his Reaſon is, becauſe they are not *Conſcious* of it, and 'tis a Contradiction to ſay a Man thinks, but is not *Conſcious* of it; thinking conſiſting in that very thing of our being Conſcious of it. Upon which Suppoſition, the Remarker *cannot make out any certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul.*

I ſuppoſe Mr. *Lock* did not deſign it a Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, but let us ſee whether it weakens any Proof of it, which the Remarker ſhould have ſhewn, but inſtead of that propoſes Difficulties, which that Suppoſition involves him in, and begins with this Notable one, *I wonder how you can obſerve that your Soul ſometimes does not think, for when you do obſerve it, you think. If a Man could think, and not think, at the ſame time, he might be able to make this Obſervation.* This revers'd, may be an Argument of ſome Force indeed, but to conclude that my Soul does not always think, 'tis ſufficient to know that there has ſome time paſt in which I was not Conſcious that I thought; unleſs we will allow that the *Soul* may think, when the *Man* does not, which is plainly to make them two *Perſons*, as Mr. *Lock* has ſhewn * *P.* 44, and 45. in which the Remarker ſays he does *not underſtand what that diſcourſe about the Idenity, or non Idenity of the ſame Man, ſleeping and waking, and about* Caſtor *and* Polux, *aims at, and tends to.* A Diſcourſe about the *non-Idenity of the ſame Man*, would, I confeſs, be very hard to underſtand; but I find no ſuch in that place, or any other of Mr. *Lock*'s Eſſay; he does not trifle at that rate, as to talk of the

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* 1ſt. R. *p.* 12.

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*ſame Man*'s not being the *ſame Man*. He ſay indeed, that *if the* Soul *can whilſt the Body is ſleeping, have its thinking and enjoyments apart, which* the Man *is not at all Conſcious of, his* Soul *when he ſleeps, and the* Man conſiſting of Body and Soul, *when he is waking, are two* Perſons. And he farther illuſtrates the ſame thing in his Diſcourſe of *Caſtor* and *Polux*, which if it be thought abſurd to aſſert, 'tis not hard to find what that Diſcourſe aims at, *v. g.* to ſhew that ſuch an abſurdity will follow from this ſuppoſition, That the Soul thinks when the Man is not Conſcious of it. But whatever that Diſcourſe aims at, of what Conſequence can it be to the Immortality of theSoul,ſuppoſing it *does not* always think?That the Remarker ſays nothing of. But it will not be improper here to take notice of an Inference he draws from it in his ſecond Remarks; That Mr. *Lock* does not think the Soul a *Permanent Subſtance* diſtinct from the Body. *This* (ſays he) *ſeems to be the Suppoſition you go upon, when you queſtion whether a Man waking and ſleeping* without *Thoughts be the ſame* Man. *If there be ſtill the ſame Soul, the ſame permanent Subſtance, I ſee no room for that Queſtion, or Doubt, which you make.* Here the Queſtion is again turn'd, not only from the ſame *Perſon* to the ſame *Man*, but to ſleeping *without* Thoughts, from ſleeping *with* Thoughts, that he is *not conſcious of*, which are very different Caſes as to this Queſtion, tho' much the ſame indeed, as to the thing it ſelf, but that the Remarker won't allow. But perhaps he takes the *Soul*, *Man* and *Perſon*, to ſignifie the ſame thing, and ſo they may to him; every Man has the Liberty to make his own Words ſtand for what Idea he pleaſes; but when he argues againſt the Opinion of another, he muſt conſider in what Senſe thoſe Terms are us'd by that other, and in that Senſe

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oppoſe him, otherwiſe he fights with his own Notions, and not his whom he ſeems to diſpute with. And 'tis impoſſible to read Mr. *Lock*'s Eſſay with the leaſt Attention, and not know that he does not uſe thoſe three Terms in one and the ſame Signification; which if the Remarker had conſider'd, he cou'd not have ſo much miſtaken Mr. *Lock*, or found ſuch Difficulties in his Diſcourſe. If Mr. *Lock* had underſtood by the *Soul*, *Man* and *Perſon* the ſame thing, he wou'd never have made ſuch a Queſtion, whether the *Soul* thinking apart, what the *Man* is not at all conſcious of, were not a *diſtinct Perſon*, from the *Man*; which wou'd be juſt the ſame thing as to ask, whether the Soul thinking apart, what the Soul is not conſcious of, be not a diſtinct Soul from the Soul: But underſtanding by *Perſon* as he does *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and by *Man* the *Soul and Body united*, he may queſtion whether the *ſame Soul*, the *ſame permanent Subſtance*, thinking *apart from the Body*, in ſound Sleep, what the waking *Man* is not conſcious of, whether that *incommunicable Conſciouſneſs* does not make the *Soul*, and the *Man* conſiſting of Body and Soul, two diſtinct Perſons; *Perſonal Identity*, conſiſting in the *ſame Conſciouſneſs* and not in the ſame *Subſtance*, for whatever Subſtance there is, without *Conſciouſneſs* there is no *Perſon*; *Conſciouſneſs* therefore and not *Subſtance*, making a *Perſon*, the ſame Conſciouſneſs muſt make the ſame Perſon, whether in the ſame, or in different Subſtances; and no farther than the ſame Conſciouſneſs extends, can there be the ſame Perſon, but whereever there is *two diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſſes*, there is two diſtinct *Perſons*, tho' in the ſame Subſtance.

But farther, not only Mr. *Lock*'s Queſtion may be made, ſuppoſing the Soul a *diſtinct permanent Suſtance*, but he cou'd not make it upon

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any other Suppoſition with the leaſt Senſe, to his purpoſe, which is to confute this Opinion, that the *Soul* thinks, in ſound Sleep, when the *Man* is not conſcious of it; now what manner of Argument I pray wou'd this make?

If the Soul thinks when the Man is not conſcious of it, the *Soul* and the *Man* are two *Perſons*.

But the Soul not being a permanent Subſtance, *may* make two Perſons, *Ergo*, The Soul *cannot* think when the Man does not, becauſe that makes them two Perſons, the Sum of which is, the Soul *cannot* think apart, becauſe it *can*.

But if this Aſſertion, that the Soul and the Man are two Perſons, implies, that it is not a permanent Subſtance, let thoſe look to it who ſay, that the *Soul* thinks when the *Man* is not conſcious of it, ſince 'tis only a Conſequenc of that Suppoſition, but can no way concern Mr. *Lock*, who denies that Suppoſition. But the Remarker is to be excus'd for making an inference ſo inconſiſtent with the deſign of that Diſcourſe, ſince he confeſſes he does not underſtand what it tends to, and perhaps only ventur'd at a ſhrew'd gueſs to provoke a clearer Account. And indeed, the beſt Conſtruction I can make of the Remarker's writing againſt Mr. *Lock's* Eſſay, is, that he underſtands very little of it, ſo groundleſs are the Difficulties he makes, and his Conſequences ſo wrong. This I am ſure, no Man that means well, if he underſtands any thing of what Mr. *Lock* ſays upon this Subject, *that Men think not always*, can from thence infer, that he does not think the Soul a permanent Subſtance, for it is plain, all the Difficulties he finds in ſuppoſing the Soul does always think, ariſe only from its being in a ſleeping, and waking Man, the ſame permanent Subſtance. Why elſe does he find it *ſo very hard to be conceiv'd, that the Soul in a ſleeping Man, ſhou'd this moment be buſie a thinking, and*

*Eſſ. p.* 45.

*the*

*the next moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts?* Why, does he think it ſtrange, *if the Soul has Ideas of its own, that it deriv'd not from Senſation or reflection, that it ſhou'd never in its private thinking, retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new Diſcoveries?* Or why does he call it an *Abſurdity*, to make the *Soul* and the *Man* two *Perſons?* There is nothing ſtrange or abſurd in all this, if the Soul in a ſleeping and *waking* Man be not the ſame permanent Subſtance. P. 47. P. 46.

I hope what has been ſaid, is ſufficient to help the Remarker's underſtanding in that Diſcourſe of Mr. *Lock*'s which ſo much puzled him; and then I am certain he cannot apprehend it of any conſequence to the Immortality of the Soul, ſuppoſing *it does not think, when the Man is not Conſcious of it.* I now proceed to his ſecond Difficulty:

*I do not underſtand* (ſays he) *how the Soul if ſhe be at any time utterly without Thoughts, what it is that produces the firſt Thought again, at the end of that unthinking Interval* And what then? Muſt we therefore conclude it cannot be done? If that be a good Argument, we muſt deny the moſt common and viſible Operations in Nature. Do you underſtand *how* your Soul thinks at all? *How* it paſſes from one Thought to another? *How* it preſerves its Treaſure of Ideas, to produce them at pleaſure on Occaſions? And recollects thoſe it had not in a long time Reflected on? *How* it moves your Body, or is affected by it? Theſe are Operations which I ſuppoſe you are not ſo Sceptical as to doubt of, nor yet pretend to underſtand how they are done: And ſince we are certain that the Soul is affected with all the conſiderable Changes of the Body, that it is Sick, and in Pain, and unable to perform its Functions, ac- 1 R. R. p. 9.

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cording as the Body is disorder'd, since we so sensibly perceive it to become Drowsy when the Body is so; so many degrees abated of its Action; even to very near not thinking at all, from that intenseness and vigour of Thought it had, and recovers when the Body is refresh-ed with Sleep; whatever is the Cause of these Effects, whether some immediate Connexion be-tween them, or an Arbitrary Law of their U-nion, where is the difficulty to conceive that the same Cause which lulls it almost, shou'd lay it quite to rest and awaken it again with the Body?

2. R. p. 17. But *upon this Supposition* (says the Remarker) *that all our Thoughts perish in sound Sleep, we seem to have a new Soul every Morning.* That's a pretty Conceit indeed, but how does this seem? Thus, as he explains himself; *If a Body cease to move, and come to perfect Rest, the motion it had cannot be restored, but a new* Motion *may be produc'd. If all Cogitation be extinct, all our I-deas are extinct, so far as they are Cogitations, and seated in the Soul: So we must have them new impress, we are, as it were, new Born, and begin the World again.* The force of which Argu-ment lies thus, *Cogitation* in the Soul answer-ing to *Motion* in Body, as the same Moti-on cannot be restor'd, but a new *Motion* may be produced; so the same *Cogitations* cannot be restor'd, but new *Cogitations* must be produc'd. *Ergo*, we seem to have a new *Soul* every Morn-ing. This may be a good Consequence, when the Remarker has proved that every *new Mo-tion* makes, or seems to make a *new Body*: In the mean time, all I can infer from this Par-allel, is, That my Thoughts to Day, are not the same numerical Thoughts I had Yesterday, which, I believe, no body supposes they are, tho' they did not suspect they had a *new Soul* with every *new Thought*.

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But if the Remarker thinks, that if all our thoughts ceaſe in ſound Sleep, all our Ideas are extinct, and muſt be new impreſt; I deſire him to conſider, when a Sleeping or Waking Man thinks, what becomes of all thoſe Ideas which he does not actually perceive in his own mind, for the mind is capapable of taking notice but of very few at once: Muſt not all the reſt by this Argument be extinct? And ſo we muſt have them new impreſt; and are, as it were, New Born when ever we have any Ideas which we have not always actually perceiv'd, *i. e.* every time we paſs from one thought to another. This is a ſure Conſequence, if when all our thoughts ceaſe, all our Ideas muſt be new impreſt, unleſs a Man cou'd actually perceive all the Ideas he ever had at once; for his having only one thought in his mind, can no more keep any other there, or excite any other that it has no connexion with, than if he had no thought at all: I am thinking for Example, in my Sleep, of a Horſe; his Beauty, Strength, and Uſefulneſs: Does this thought preſerve in my mind, the Idea of a Church, of Happineſs or Miſery? Or can it help me to any of them, when I have occaſion for them? If not, then theſe Ideas muſt be new impreſt when I awake; but if they remain in the Soul when I was only thinking of a Horſe, whereever they are beſtow'd, it may be preſum'd, there is room for that one Idea more without thruſting

out another to give it place; and when that one is among them, I see no more reason why they must be all new impress, than that the others must have been new impress when I only thought of that one; unless it be suppos'd, that the Soul has always, just one Idea mor than there is place for in the repository of its Ideas; and if that happen to crou'd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for Air.

*Ibid.* But here the Remarker interposes, *If you say the Ideas remain in the Soul, and need only a new Excitation; why then, say I, may not Infants have* Innate Ideas *(which you so much oppose) that want only Objects and Occasions to excite and actuate them, with a fit Disposition of the Brain?* By what hath been said, it will appear, That this Argument gains no force from Mr. *Lock*'s Opinion, That *the Soul does not always think*; since if the Soul does always think, it can perceive but very few Ideas at once; so that the same Consequence will follow from a Man's having only one thought, as from his having no thought at all; whether all his other Ideas must be new impress, or remain in the Soul, and need only a new Excitation: This Objection therefore wou'd have been as much to the purpose in any other place, The Remarker might have ask'd, If when a Man thinks only upon one Object, there remain Ideas in the Soul, which he does not perceive to be there; Why may not Infants have *In-*

*nate*

*nate Ideas*, that want only Occaſions to Excite them? This then, having no particular Relation to the Queſtion in diſpute, requires no Anſwer here; but that the Remarker may not think he has entangled Mr. *Lock* with his own Principles; I deſire him to conſider if theſe are Parallel Caſes: How comes it, That when Objects or Occaſions, Excite theſe Ideas in Children, they do not perceive that they were in their minds before; but conſider them as things New, and till then abſolutely unknown to them? But when Ideas are Excited in a Man, which he has before receiv'd by Senſation or Reflection, he conſiders them as things he is acquainted with, and clearly perceives they have been in his mind before. Why does not every thing appear equally New to a Man, which he has, or has not known before, as every Idea does, the firſt time it is Excited in him? But ſince, it is certain, That the mind does perceive when any Ideas are Excited in it, that were there before; and that every Idea appears new to it the firſt time it is Excited; this can be no Argument, that becauſe the Soul is capable of retaining the Ideas it has receiv'd by Senſation or Reflection; that it can Record them for its Uſe, and Recollect them at Pleaſure; therefore, it may have Innate Ideas, tho' it never perceives that it had them, not even when they are Excited in it; for this makes the Caſes ſo far from being the ſame, that

it is one of the greateſt Arguments againſt *Innate Ideas*, that the mind does always perceive, when the Ideas which are Excited in it, were there before: Beſides, how can it be conceiv'd, that *Innate Ideas* ſhou'd need any Objects to Excite them; and that the mind ſhould never Excite any of them in it ſelf without thoſe Objects; as it often does Excite in it ſelf, the Ideas it receiv'd by Senſation, or Reflection, without the preſence of thoſe Objects by which it firſt receiv'd them; Why then are are ſuch Objects neceſſary to Excite *Innate Ideas*, ſince the mind has a Power of Exciting Ideas in it ſelf, without the preſence of any Object? When the Remarker has ſhewn the reaſon of this conſiderable difference, and prov'd that it does not hinder them from being parallel caſes, then we may conclude againſt Mr. *Lock*, That ſince the Soul can retain the Ideas it has receiv'd, and excite them at pleaſure, tho' it do not always perceive them, therefore it may have Ideas which it never did perceive, nor can Excite in it ſelf, nor when they are Excited, perceive that it ever had them before; and then he can have nothing to ſay for himſelf, but muſt let us enjoy our *unperceivable Ideas*, and be as much the better, and wiſer for them, as we can.

But ſtill the Soul may be ſometimes without any thought, and yet (for any thing we have heard) not endanger its Immortality. Let us conſider the Remarkers next difficulty. *Beſides*

*Besides* (says he) *I am utterly at a loss how to frame any Idea of a* Dead Soul, *or of a Spirit without Life or Thoughts.* How a Dead Soul comes in here, I don't know, Can there be no Life, where there is no Thought? I confess that I have hitherto thought that Insects and Plants have Life, tho' I did not suppose that they do always think. He goes on: *What is the Soul when she does not think? She must be actually something if she exist: She must then have some Properties, whereby she is distinguished from nothing, and from matter.* And again, in the Second Remark, *You say the Soul has no Extension, nor at certain fits any Cogitation: What can the Soul be then but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd for the exercise of it; and ceasing to act when the Body is indispos'd?* To which I answer, That it is true, we have no Idea of the Soul but by her Operations; but that is no more a Reason to conclude that she is nothing when she does not operate, than when she does, since we are equally ignorant what the Soul is, when we do think, as when we do not. I ask what is the Soul when she does think? Is she a real permanent substance? What then are her peculiar properties, whereby she is distinguish'd from other substances? If it be said the power of thinking, I ask whether she has any other Properties to distinguish her from Nothing, and from Matter? If not, Then Nothing, or Matter, may have the Power of thinking. This is plain,

1st.R. p.9. 2d.R.p.16.

P. 14.

plain, If the Soul has no Eſſential Properties diſtinct from Matter, whereby ſhe alone is capable of the Power of thinking, there can be no reaſon why Matter may not have that Power. If it be ſaid ſhe has other Eſſential Properties, without which ſhe cou'd not have the power of thinking, when the Remarker has found out what thoſe Properties are, he will then know what the Soul is, when ſhe does not think; for whatever that Subſtance is, that has the power of thinking, there is no reaſon to doubt that it remains the ſame, when it ceaſes from that action, any more than there is to doubt that a Body in motion, and at reſt, is the ſame Subſtance; for we have no clearer Idea of the Subſtance of Body, than we have of the Subſtance of Spirit, as Mr. *Lock* has ſhewn; which Excellent Diſcourſe alone one wou'd have thought ſufficient to prevent the leaſt inſinuation, that he does not think the Soul a real permanent Subſtance.

Eſſay B. 2. C. 23.

There is much more reaſon to conclude, that thoſe do not think the Soul a real permanent Subſtance, who make this Queſtion, If the Soul has no Extenſion, nor at certain fits any Cogitation, what can the Soul be then, but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd, *&c.* For from what other Reaſon can they make it? If the Soul be really ſomething elſe than a certain Power acting in the Body, what can hinder it from being the ſame thing when it does not act?

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but if it muſt be nothing when it is not in action, *What then can the Soul be, but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd for the exerciſe of it, and ceaſing to* Be *when the Body is indiſpos'd? But* (to retort the Remarker's words) *whether that be a Superiour Divine Power diſtinct from Matter, as a* vis movens, *or a Power faſtned I know not how to the Body, or upon ſuch and ſuch Syſtems of Matter; whether I ſay of theſe two Suppoſitions better agrees with this Doctrine, I cannot certainly tell; but either of them deſtroys the Immortality of the Soul, upon the Diſſolution of the Body.* I leave the Reader to judge which is moſt concern'd in this conſequence, Mr. *Lock*, who ſays that it is not neceſſary to the Exiſtence of the Soul that it ſhou'd be always in action; which wou'd be abſurd to ſay, if it be not a *diſtinct permanent Subſtance*; or the Remarker, who thinks the Soul cannot Exiſt, when it is not in action; which there is no ground to think, if it be a *real permanent Subſtance.*

The Vanity of Men ſeems to be the great Reaſon why they have ſo readily ſuppos'd, without any proof, that the Soul does always think; for having no Idea of it, but by its operations, we are unwilling to perceive our own ignorance, and loath to part with the only Idea we have of that dear thing which we call ſelf; on this Account the Remarker ſeems offended with Mr. *Lock*. *Why* (ſays he) *do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible* [2] R. p. 16.

State

*State of the Soul, whereof neither you, nor others, can have any conception?* And why is this complain'd of, but that Men are willing to believe they know more than they do? Or how elſe cou'd they think a State of *thinking, without being conſcious of it*, more intelligible than a State of not thinking at all? Or how cou'd they conclude thinking, which is the action of the Soul, neceſſary to the Exiſtence of the Soul it ſelf, if they did not make our Knowlege the meaſure of things, and our not having an Idea of a thing, ſufficient to exclude it from Being? I proceed now to the Remarker's laſt difficulty.

1 R. p. 9. *Then after all* (ſays he) *what ſecurity can we have upon this Suppoſition that we ſhall not fall into this Sleep at Death, and ſo continue without Life or Thought?* What I have ſaid in the beginning of my Diſcourſe upon this Head, might ſerve for an Anſwer to this Objection; but the Remarker by repeating it, *Page* 12. ſeeming to lay a great weight on it, I ſhall conſider it more particularly.

And Firſt (as I obſerv'd before) If our Security of a Future State depends upon this, *that the Soul always thinks*, it has a very unſure Foundation, for there is no pretence of a proof that the Soul does always think; and there are great probabilities that it does not think in ſound Sleep, (as Mr. *Lock* has ſhewn.) But if the proofs of a Future State, do not depend upon the Souls always thinking, the contrary Suppoſition

position cannot leſſen our ſecurity of it; and that they do not depend upon it, I think needs not be prov'd, no body that I know of did ever offer this Propoſition, *That the Soul does always think*, as a proof of its Immortality; and the Reaſons we have to expect a Future State, are of ſuch a Nature, that they can receive no force from it, nor loſe any by the contrary Suppoſition: The Remarker on another Occaſion, tells Mr. *Lock*, the grounds of our expectation of *Future Puniſhments and Rewards* are, that *there is a preſage of them from Natural Conſcience*; and that *they are deducible from the Nature of God, if we allow him Moral Attributes.* Now it is evident that neither of theſe two grounds can loſe any of their force upon this Suppoſition, That the Soul does not think in ſound Sleep, and will not they ſecure us that we ſhall not continue in this Sleep after Death? If not, why does the Remarker mention them as Proofs of a Future State? But if they do prove it, why does he ſay he *cou'd make out no certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, upon this Suppoſition, that it is ſometimes without thoughts?* Since thoſe Proofs he mentions remain in their full force, notwithſtanding this Suppoſition. Thus having ſhewn, that all the Conſequences the Remarker draws from Mr. *Lock*'s Suppoſition are without grounds, I may with aſſurance conclude, that it is of no conſequence to the Immortality of the Soul, nor does at all weaken any proof of it.

3 R. p. 13.

I cannot here forbear taking notice, how little Service they do to Religion, who eſtabliſh the main Principles of it upon ſuch an uncertain foundation, as the Nature of a thing, of which we are ſo very ignorant, as we certainly are, of *What the Soul is.* Her Operations we have clear Ideas of, and therefore from our capacity of diſcerning and chuſing Good or Evil; and from the Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of God, which we may certainly know to belong to his Nature; we have very good Arguments, and great probabilities of a Future State of Puniſhments, and Rewards; ſuch as no conſidering Man can deny, and within every ones Underſtanding. But when the Soul's Immortality is ſaid to depend upon ſuch Suppoſitions as this, *That the Soul always thinks*, or that it is *Immaterial*, what can the conſequence be, but to make Men think they have very little aſſurance of a Future Life, when they find themſelves ſo much in the dark as to thoſe Principles upon which it is eſtabliſh'd, that the greateſt Proofs of them are drawn from our ignorance? As that we cannot *conceive how* Matter ſhould be capable of ſuch and ſuch Powers as we perceive in the Soul; or (as the Remarker objects) *what* the Soul is, when ſhe is without thoughts.

But cou'd the Immateriality of the Soul be prov'd to be as certain, as it is highly probable, it can never be of good conſequence, and may be dangerous, to make

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that the main proof of its Immortality; for this is an Argument of no uſe to the Generality of Mankind, who want either leiſure, or capacity, for ſuch nice Speculations; and if they are convinc'd on other grounds that the Soul is Immortal, it is no great matter whether they think it Immaterial, or no: But if they are perſwaded that it cannot be Immortal, if it is not Immaterial, 'tis eaſie to ſee of how ill conſequence that muſt be, if the Proofs of the Souls Immateriality ſhou'd not happen to convince them; as it often falls out by the different caſt of Mens Heads, that the ſame Arguments that are very ſtrong and perſwaſive to one Man, have no force at all with another, eſpecially in Abſtract Reflections. Thoſe therefore who are Zealous for Truth, ſhou'd endeavour to eſtabliſh it upon the plaineſt, and cleareſt Principles, and ſuch as are moſt adapted to common apprehenſions. This is not the only inſtance in which I have obſerv'd, that Truth does not ſuffer leſs from thoſe who would maintain it upon falſe or uncertain grounds, than from thoſe who openly oppoſe it. I have known ſeveral who have been carefully enough Inſtructed in their Duty, who yet for want of being taught at firſt, or applying themſelves to conſider the true grounds of it, have been eaſily argu'd out of their good Notions, tho' ſome of them Perſons of no mean Capacity; for if the Foundation fail, the beſt Supeſtructure will fall, tho'

ſtrong and immoveable, when eſtabliſh'd upon its proper grounds: And this does not only happen when the Foundation is in it ſelf weak or uncertain, but when Truths are taught upon Principles, which tho' true, and ſolid in themſelves, are not the ground or reaſon of thoſe Truths; which ſome have done out of a good Deſign of rendring the Truths they teach the more Sacred; but every thing ſtands firmeſt on its own Foundation; and I believe, if it were rightly conſider'd, it wou'd appear, that the reaſons of all Moral Truths, are plain and clear, and within the reach of the loweſt apprehenſions. Theſe things which I have only hinted at, are of great conſequence to be throughly conſider'd by all who have the Inſtruction of others under their Care, that they may not think they ſufficiently acquit themſelves of their Duty by inculcating good Maxims, when their Negligence, or *Miſtaken Zeal* in teaching the Grounds of them, may at leaſt give too great advantage to thoſe who make it their buſineſs to corrupt the *Principles*, as well as the *Practice* of their Companions, which are but too many in this Libertine Age.

This being a Matter of ſo Univerſal Concern, I hope I ſhall be excus'd if I have led the Reader a little out of the way for it. We now return to the Remarker, who after he has repeated his laſt Difficulty, *i. e. If the Soul be ſometimes without thoughts, why may ſhe not be ſo, thoughtleſs,*

*and*

*and ſenſeleſs, after Death?* He adds, *'Tis ſome comfort indeed that we ſhall at length return to Life at the Reſurrection: But I know not* how *you explain* that; *nor how far you allow us to be the ſame* Men, *and the ſame* Perſons *then that we are now.* This is a great comfort indeed, and I ſuppoſe the Remarker here deſign'd to make Mr. *Lock* amends for all the faults he has imputed to his Principles, by owning that they afford us this comfort; but I cannot gueſs what *That* is which he knows not *how* Mr. *Lock* explains: Mr. *Lock* never attempted that I know of, to explain *How* we ſhall return to Life, which *That* ſeems to refer to, nor how far we ſhall then be the ſame *Men*; and he needed not have told him that he knows not how he explains a thing, which he has not explain'd at all: But Mr. *Lock* has very clearly explain'd how far he allows us to be the ſame *Perſons*, *Conſciouſneſs* according to him, *as far as it is extended, makes the ſame Perſon*, in which he ſays *is founded all the Right, and Juſtice, of Reward, and Puniſhment, Happineſs, and Miſery*; *and thus* he ſays, *we may without any difficulty conceive at the Reſurrection, the ſame* Perſon, *tho' in a Body not exactly in make or Parts the ſame he had here, the ſame* Conſciouſneſs *going along with the Soul that inhabits it*; which may be ſufficient to ſatisfie the Remarker how St. *Peter at the Reſurrection will be the ſame*; and how Mr. *Lock* conceives the Reſurre-

*Eſſ. B. 2. C. 27.*

*Ibid. S. 15.*

Vid. 2 R. *p.* 15.

Reſurrection, as far as is reveal'd of it, and to all its ends and purpoſes, which is our *Happineſs, or Miſery*; further than this he does not pretend, nor are we concern'd to know; and I think in a Matter which can only be known by Revelation, no Man ought to determine, or enquire farther than the Holy Spirit has thought fit to reveal. Mr. *Lock* knows too well the Vanity and Preſumption of ſuch an Attempt, to offer at it. *'Tis enough* (ſays he) *that every one ſhall appear before the Judgment Seat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what ſort of Body he ſhall appear, or of what Particles made up, the Scripture having ſaid nothing, but that it ſhall be a Spiritual Body rais'd in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.* The Remarker muſt be contented *to walk in the dark* as to theſe things, tho' he ſays he does not love it, ſince there is no way to have farther Light in them than the Scripture has given; and if he thinks Mr. *Lock*'s Doctrine of the Soul obſcure, becauſe he does not pretend to be certain by his Natural Faculties, of things which they cannot certainly diſcover, (a way to Knowledge which ſome are very fond of,) I believe Mr. *Lock* will be content not to be underſtood by him, rather than write what he does not underſtand himſelf, to appear intelligible to others.

*Reply to the Biſhop of Worceſter, p. 182.*

*2 R. p. 15.*

The Remarker next proceeds to the Second Suppoſition, which he thinks weakens

*1 R. p. 13.*

weakens the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, *viz. That God may give, or have given, for any thing we know, to ſome Syſtems of Matter, a Power to perceive, and think*; and here one wou'd expect he ſhou'd have ſhewn how this Suppoſition weakens the Proofs of the Soul's Immortality; but all his Objections are againſt the probability of the Suppoſition, and to ſhew the difficulties of conceiving how Matter ſhou'd have ſuch a Power; which he enlarges upon in his 3*d* Remark, and has ſeveral Pages to that purpoſe, for what reaſon I know not, ſince Mr. *Lock* allows it to be highly probable that the Soul is Immaterial, but where he is ſpeaking of Demonſtration, only ſays that 'tis not *impoſſible, for any thing we know*, that God may give, or have given, to ſome Syſtems of Matter, diſpos'd as he ſees fit, a Power to perceive and think. But my Deſign being only to vindicate Mr. *Lock*'s Principles from the dangerous Conſequences imputed to them by the Remarker, I ſhall not enter into that Diſpute; and I think Mr. *Lock* has ſaid enough in his laſt Additions, to ſilence the Triumph of ſuch ſort of Arguments, drawn from *the unconceiveableneſs of ſomething in one Hypotheſis*, which cannot be a proof of the contrary Opinion, in which there are things altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from our comprehenſion. All the Demonſtration we can have from ſuch difficulties, is of the weakneſs and ſcantineſs of our Knowledge,

which

which ſhould not make us forward in determining poſitively on either ſide, much leſs to eſtabliſh the Immortality of the Soul on ſo uncertain a foundation, which is a Conſideration I have before inſiſted on, and I cannot but think Mr. *Lock* has done much more Service to Religion in that Diſcourſe, *B.* 3. *C.* 4. where after he had ſaid that he *ſees no contradiction in it, that Omnipotency ſhould give to certain Syſtems of Matter, a Power to perceive and think, tho' it be moſt highly probable that the Soul is Immaterial*; he adds, that *if our Faculties cannot arrive to Demonſtrative certainty about it, we need not think it ſtrange, all the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough ſecur'd, without Philoſophical Proofs of the Souls Immateriality; ſince it is evident that he who made us at firſt begin to ſubſiſt here, ſenſible, intelligent Beings, and for ſeveral years continu'd us in ſuch a State, can and will reſtore us to the like State in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has deſign'd to Men, according to their doings in this Life; and therefore 'tis not of ſuch mighty neceſſity to determine one way or t'other, as ſome over-zealous for or againſt the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the world believe.* Theſe are Mr. *Lock*'s words, and I appeal to all unbiaſs'd Men, whether he does not better ſecure the belief of a Future State, by eſtabliſhing it on ſuch grounds as give an equal aſſurance of it whether the Soul is Immaterial, or no;

Vid. *The Fourth Edition.*

than

than thoſe who take pains to perſwade Men that a Future State is leſs certain, if the Soul is not Immaterial.

But beſides the uncertainty and danger of this Argument which I have before taken notice of, The uſeleſsneſs of it to the generality of Mankind, ſufficiently ſhews, that it cannot be the foundation of the belief of a Future State; That it is not ſo to the Eaſtern Pagans at this day, we have the Evidence of a * Judicious Author, both from the information of the Miſſionaries who have been longeſt among them, and his own Converſation with them, who tells us that they believe the *Immortality* of the Soul, but have no notion of its *Immateriality*; and that they only ſuppoſe it of a *Matter* ſubtil enough to eſcape being ſeen or handled. And that many of the Old Philoſophers who expected a Future State, had no thoughts of the Souls being *Immaterial*, any one muſt obſerve, who has read them with attention. And I believe, if well examin'd, it will appear that thoſe among them who had a Notion of the Soul's being Immaterial, did not believe its Immortality upon that Foundation, but only ſought an explication how the Soul by its own Nature might be capable of that Immortality, which they found great Reaſon to hope for, on other Grounds much more firm and perſwaſive.

* Loubere *du Royaume de* Siam.

But what is yet more conſiderable, were this proof of the Souls Immortality, as certain and as univerſally receiv'd as any ſelf-evident Propoſition, it wou'd not at all ſerve to the chief end of our aſſurance of the Souls Immortality, *viz.* The expectation of Rewards and Puniſhments in a Future State according to our doings in this Life; without which 'tis no matter whether we think the Soul Immortal or no; and this we cou'd never have by the moſt attentive conſideration, and the cleareſt knowledge of what kind of ſubſtance the Soul is; It muſt be eſtabliſh'd on far different Grounds, ſuch as the conſideration of our ſelves as Rational and Free creatures, of which we have an Intuitive, Infallible perception; and of an Omnipotent Being, from whom we are, and on whom we depend, of which we have a Demonſtrative knowledge within every ones underſtanding to whom it is propos'd; and if the Conſequences drawn from them are not ſufficient to aſſure Men of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, as the cleareſt proofs of the Souls Immortality can ſignifie nothing without them, ſo neither can they add any force to them, and therefore are of no uſe to the Great Ends of Morality and Religion: For ſuppoſe to convince an intelligent Heathen, who thought the Soul Material, and doubted of a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, Arguments were us'd to prove the Soul in its own Nature undiſſol-

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vable, and that therefore it must remain after Death; he might then reasonably enquire in what State it remains, how he may be sure that it is in a State of Rewards and Punishments, and that it does not return to the Universal Soul of which it may be an Effluence; or inform the next parcel of Matter it finds fitted for it, as some Philosophers have thought. This it is plain must be still in doubt to him, notwithstanding those Proofs of the Soul's Immortality; and Arguments of another nature must be us'd to satisfie him in this Point, whatever may be most proper to work on his Understanding. Suppose those I have before hinted at; That 'tis reasonable to think that the *Wise and Just* Author of our Being having made us capable of *Happiness* and *Misery*, and given us Faculties of discerning and chusing *Good or Evil*, design'd we should be accountable for our Actions, and *Happy*, or *Miserable*, according as they are conformable, or not, to that Law which he has establish'd in our very Natures, that his Will might be certainly known to us; and since it is visibly not so, in the ordinary course of his Providence, but all things happen alike to the Righteous, and the Wicked, in this World, 'tis most consonant to Reason to think this is only a State of Probation, and that the dispensation of Rewards and Punishments, is reserv'd for a Future Life; there being no other way to reconcile the partial distribution of things here, to that

order which we know is agreeable to the Divine Will, by the conformity it has to our Reaſon, which is a Ray of his own Wiſdom. We will ſuppoſe the Heathen convinc'd by theſe Arguments, or others to the ſame purpoſe, that he owns it is highly reaſonable to conclude there muſt be a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; but he does not ſo well digeſt the Soul's being Immaterial, he has no notion of a Subſtance without any Extenſion. Suppoſe then the *Remarker* ſhould tell him, as he does Mr. *Lock*, If the Soul is not *Immaterial*, there can be no certain proof that it is Immortal. And I deſire him to take this Dilemma for the Heathen's Anſwer: Either the Arguments by which I have been convinc'd that there will be Puniſhments and Rewards in a Future State are Proofs of it, or they are not; if not, then tho' the Soul ſhould be Immortal, I have no aſſurance that it will be in a ſtate of Rewards or Puniſhments; and if they are Proofs of a Future State, then a Future State is equally certain, tho' the Soul be not Immaterial, ſince that does not make it leſs conſonant to the Juſtice and Wiſdom of God, nor leſs within his Power. I believe the *Remarker* will find he has no way to ſolve this Dilemma, but muſt either give up the certainty of Rewards and Puniſhments, or the neceſſity of thinking the Soul is Immaterial, to prove a Future State; and I defie him to eſtabliſh the Belief of Rewards

and

and Punishments in a Future State, on any Arguments that will not be equally conclusive, whether the Soul is Immaterial or not.

This then is evident, that Mr. *Lock*'s Supposition that God may have given (for any thing we know) to some Systems of Matter, a Power to perceive, and think; does not at all weaken any proof of the Soul's Immortality, that can be of use to the Great Ends of Religion, for which alone we are concern'd to know that the Soul is Immortal. And perhaps the insignificancy, as to those Ends, of our knowing what kind of substance the Soul is, may be the reason we are left so much in the dark about it. Our Wise Maker has proportion'd our Faculties only to our Necessities, and has made his Will known to us by a Light of Nature clear enough to render any one inexcusable who does not follow it; tho' the full assurance of an Eternal Retribution, is only given us by *Jesus Christ, who has brought Life, and Immortality, to Light, through the Gospel*, which I have already shewn that Mr *Lock*'s Principles give us a sure foundation for, both of Natural, and Reveal'd Religion: So that I think no more remains to clear the Remarker's difficulties, his doubts of *Natural Conscience*, (which is the chief Subject of his 3*d* Remark) being easily resolv'd from what has been already said. But the *Remarker* being a little unlucky at drawing Inferences from Mr. *Lock*'s Principles,

ciples, I will give him ſome help in his enquiry what *Natural Conſcience* is, according to them.

R. p. 5. But firſt, I muſt take notice of a Cavil he begins with at Mr. *Lock*'s defining Conſcience to be nothing elſe but *our own Opinion of our own Actions*, without expreſſing what ſort of Actions are the Subjects of it. Now any one who reads that part of his *Eſſay*, will find that Diſcour-
. 1. C. 3. ſing of *Innate Practical Principles*, he all along mentions only ſuch Actions as are to be refer'd to Moral Rules, and that he had no reaſon to apprehend being miſunderſtood, or that it could be ſuppos'd he included any other ſort of Actions, no other being at all to the purpoſe in that Qteſtion.

Before I proceed to ſpeak of what I think the true Notion of Natural Conſcience, of what Authority, and of what Uſe it is; it will be fit to conſider what the *Remarker* ſays he underſtands by it, which he next proceeds to tell us, but defines it more particularly in another place
. p. 7. thus: *A Natural Sagacity to diſtinguiſh Moral Good, and Evil; or a different perception and ſenſe of them, with a different affection of the Mind ariſing from it; and this ſo immediate as to prevent and anticipate all External Laws, and all Ratiocination.* This he ſays he takes to be *the Foundation of Natural Religion, without which he does not know how it can ſubſiſt*; tho' he approves of Mr. *Lock*'s Account of

Natural

Natural Religion ſo far as it goes. *You place Natural Religion* (ſays he) *I think in the belief of the Being of a God, and of Obedience due to him. This is good ſo far as it goes, and is well ſupported. But the Queſtion is, what Laws thoſe are that we ought to obey, or how we can know them without Revelation, unleſs you take in Natural Conſcience for a diſtinction of Good and Evil, or another Idea of God than what you have given us.* Having already anticipated this Doubt, by ſhewing how the Moral Attributes of God are deducible from Mr. *Lock*'s Principles, and how we know what his Will is, by the conformity or repugnancy of things to our Reaſon, and with reſpect to Humane Nature, of which he is the Author, I need not give a particular Anſwer to this Queſtion: But ſince the *Remarker* lays ſo great a ſtreſs upon his *Principle of Natural Conſcience in that Senſe and Notion* which he has given of it, that he *takes it to be the Foundation of Natural Religion*, and thinks *the diſtinction of Good, and Evil, is manifeſted, and ſupported by it*; let us farther conſider it. P. 5. P. 4, & 5.

It would be too tedious to repeat all that the *Remarker* ſays on this Subject, from the beginning of his Third Letter to the 16*th* Page; I need only hint at ſome Obſervations, by which it will appear, that he has not ſetled in his own Mind a determinate Idea of his *Principle of Natural Conſcience*, but argues for it ſometimes in one Senſe, and ſometimes in another; that

Mr. *Lock*

Mr. *Lock* is not at all concern'd in the greateſt part of his Argument; and by which the weakneſs of the whole will be obvious to every Reader.

P. 8. After his Definition, he gives us a notable illuſtration of his Principle in the Soul of diſtinguiſhing *morally Good and Evil*, without Ratiocination, by the Power we have of diſtinguiſhing *ſenſible qualities* without Reflection, or Ratiocination. He might every whit as well have told us, that ſince we have a Power of diſtinguiſhing *Moral Relations*, without making uſe of our Eye-ſight, we may diſtinguiſh Red, and Yellow, without Eyes; they being no more the proper and only inlets of our Ideas of Colours, than reflection is of moral diſtinctions; which the Remarker ſays we may have without Reflection, ſince we can diſtinguiſh Colours, and other ſenſible qualities without Reflection. But if this were ſo, Mr. *Lock* may very well ſay what the Remarker believes he will not, That then Children would be

*Ibid.* able to diſtinguiſh Moral Good and Evil, for they very clearly diſtinguiſh all the Objects of Senſation that come in their way; and this Principle cou'd never be *improved*, or *corrupted*, as no one can be perſwaded that any Senſation he has is more or leſs agreeable, or that a diſagreeable Senſation is an agreeable one; which if we cou'd, it is evident that our Senſes wou'd not be ſufficient to their End, to give us notice of what is convenient,

nient, or inconvenient to the Body. And it is reaſonable to think if there were ſuch an inward ſenſation deſign'd, as the Remarker ſays, to direct us as to what is good or hurtful to the Soul, it wou'd operate as conſtantly as thoſe others do; no Man cou'd prefer Vice to Vertue, any more than he can Pain to Pleaſure; otherwiſe it wou'd not anſwer the end it was deſign'd for.

Another thing to be obſerv'd is, that moſt of the Remarkers Arguments were anticipated by Mr. *Lock*, tho' he takes no notice of the Anſwer to them, as to the ſame purpoſe we were now upon, Mr. *Lock* having own'd *that there are natural Tendances imprinted on the minds of Men, and that from the firſt inſtances of ſenſe, and Perception, there are ſome things grateful, and others ungrateful to them*; the Remarker takes occaſion from thence, to deſire he *will grant ſuch a-like impreſſion on the Soul, with reference to moral Good and Evil, as a Rule or direction to our actions*; tho' Mr. *Lock* there ſays, that thoſe impreſſions he ſpeaks of, are ſo far from confirming the like, with relation to moral Good and Evil, *that this is an argument againſt them*, ſince if their were any ſuch impreſſions, *we could not but perceive them conſtantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do thoſe others on the will and appetite, the deſire of Happineſs, and averſion for Miſery, continuing (as Innate Practical principles ought) to influence all our actions without ceaſing, and are in all Perſons, and all Ages,*

P. 9.

*Eſſ.* B. 1. C. 3. S. 3.

*ſteady and Univerſal.* But this the Remarker takes no notice of. In another place he argues that exorbitant practices againſt Natural Conſcience, are no proof that there is no ſuch Principle; which Mr. *Lock* grants, nor does he contend againſt a *Natural* Rule. But the generally allow'd breach of a Rule any where, he ſays, is a proof that it is not INNATE, which he had given inſtances of in ſeveral Nations. This objection not being eaſily anſwered, the Remarker chuſes rather to oppoſe an Argument which Mr. *Lock* does not uſe, but on the contray owns that it is none. But any one who conſiders what Mr. *Lock* objects, will eaſily ſee to how little purpoſe the Remarker takes ſo much pains to ſhew that the ſame Arguments which he brings againſt *Innate Principles*, may be us'd to prove that the Law of Chriſtianity, is not known among Chriſtians; for beſides the great difference of an *Innate Law*, which Men muſt always carry about with them, from any other that they may avoid reflecting on, or miſunderſtand; the caſe of Chriſtians acting againſt a known Law, cannot be the ſame with that which Mr. *Lock* repreſents, unleſs the Remarker can ſhew any Chriſtians, *who conſtantly, without the leaſt remorſe, or ſhame, offend againſt that Law which they believe; and that all the by-ſtanders, even Law-makers, and Governers, ſilently connive at it, nay affirm that it is their Duty to do ſo:* For this is the Caſe of thoſe Nations which Mr. *Lock* mentions.

3d R. *p.* 11.

*Eſſ.* B. 1. *c.* 3.

3d R *p.* 14.

ons. But the Remarker has a ſhrew'd objection againſt this Argument; They are *Barbarous People*, he ſays, and he excepts againſt them for witneſſes, as *Perſonæ Infames*. I find, if Mr. *Lock* wou'd convince him that there are no *Innate Principles*, he muſt ſhew him ſome polite Nation where the People have diligently, and rightly imploy'd their Faculties, and yet are ignorant of the Law of Nature; this might be requir'd, if Mr. *Lock* deny'd a Law of Nature, knowable by our Natural Faculties; but to prove what he affirms, that this Law is not knowable to Men, but by their making a right uſe of their Faculties, 'tis ſufficient to ſhew that there are Men, who are abſolutly ignorant of the cleareſt Principles of that Law. No, ſays the Remarker, they are Barbarous ignorant People; and therefore, are no good Witneſſes, that there are no Innate Principles. But are they not Men I pray? What is it then that makes them more Barbarous, or Ignorant than others, but their not having made a right uſe of their Natural Faculties? this is Mr. *Lock*'s argument, that their are no Innate Principles, ſince ſome Nations, for want of making a right uſe of their Faculties, are ſo *Barbarous, or Ignorant*, as to have no Notion of the cleareſt of thoſe Principles which are eſteem'd Innate. To which the Remarker's objection, That they are a Barbarous People, not fit to be admitted for witneſſes, is indeed very extraordinary. If he pleaſes to conſider P. 10.

what he means by *Barbarous*, and what is the cauſe that theſe People are ſo; I believe he will better ſee the force of Mr. *Lock*'s Argument, and allow them to be very good Witneſſes in this caſe, tho' perhaps he might with reaſon except againſt them at the Bar: All he is deſir'd to take upon their Credit is, that Men do not know their Duty without making a right uſe of their Natural Faculties; and that therefore there are no *Innate Principles*, or *none to any purpoſe*, ſince they do not operate till Men by Reflection diſcover that Law which is to be the Rule of their actions. To prove this Mr. *Lock* mentions ſome vitious practiſes approv'd in ſeveral Nations; which the Remarker calls *raking up their durt and filth, to through in the Face of Humane Nature.* It ſhews Men, indeed that they ſhou'd not idly, or raſhly, take up with the firſt Notions they meet with, but employ their Faculties in the Beſt manner they can, which God has giv'n them to attain the knowledge of their Duty, which they can only be ignorant of by their own fault. But what *indignity* this can be thought *upon Mankind*, or what *piece of Ingratitude to our Maker*, I believe no body but the Remarker can apprehend.

*ibid.*

*P.* 11. He next proceeds to mention ſome Vertuous Actions of Heathen States, contrary to their intereſt, and yet done with general applauſe, as a proof of Natural Conſcience. They are indeed proofs of a

*Law*

*Law of Nature*, which Mr. *Lock* is no leſs an advocate for than he, tho' he denys *Innate Principles*, which leads me to a very material obſervation, which is, that throughout this whole Diſcourſe, the Remarker uſes indifferently, as Terms of the ſame ſignification, *Law of Nature*, *Natural Conſcience*, *Innate Principles*, *Innate Powers*, *and Natural Princples*, which all ſignifie very different things; and of which Mr. *Lock* has only denied *Innate Principles*; which conſider'd it will appear that he is very little concern'd in the greateſt part of this diſpute. But I ſhall only inſtance two or three places particularly, as where he argues, that *Univerſal conſent is not neceſſary to declare a* Principle *to be* Natural; *for the ſenſe of Muſick, of Beauty, of Order, and Proportion, are Natural to Mankind, tho' ſome Men are not at all affected with them. Ev'n the* Power *of Reaſon, (ſays he) ſeveral Paſſions, &c. appear ſooner in ſome than others; and if you allow theſe* Principles *to be* Natural, *and Born with us, I know not why you ſhou'd make ſuch ado about the word* Innate. *If you allow none at all, not theſe laſt mention'd, nor ſo much as* willing, or nilling *this, or that, the controverſie will be chang'd; and I deſire to know what Idea you can form of a Soul without any* Powers, *or any* Action. Now here it is plain, that by Natural *Principles* is only meant *Powers* or *Faculties* of the Soul, which is a very different ſenſe from that in which Mr. *Lock* denies any *Principles* to be *Innate*, tho' he does not deny them to be *Natural*;

*Vide. p. 5. 9. 12.*

*Natural*; But in this ſenſe of them he will make no a-do about the word *Innate*; if the Queſtion be whether there are Innate *Powers* or *Faculties* in the Soul, the controverſie will not be *chang'd*, for there will be no controverſie at all; Mr. *Lock* only contends againſt thoſe who ſay there are Principles of Metaphiſical or Moral Truths Originally imprinted on the mind; by which, if they only mean that there is an *Innate* Power or Capacity in the Soul of knowing thoſe Truths, they mean nothing different from Mr. *Lock*, who denies *Innate Principles*; for he does not deny that there is a Power in the Soul of perceiving, and aſſenting to thoſe Truths, or of diſtinguiſhing Good and Evil; tho' he is not ſo ready at it as the Remarker, without employing his Faculties about it, or without Ratiocination: So there is no occaſion for him to *form an Idea of the Soul without any Powers*, nor for that ſuppoſition which with a ſeeming charitable wiſh, the Remarker wou'd ſo groundleſly faſten on
P. 13. Mr. *Lock*.

The next place I ſhall mention, where *Innate* Principles, and *Natural* Principles, are us'd in the ſame ſenſe, and both only for *Powers* or *Faculties* of the Soul, is Page the Fifteenth, where he pretends to anſwer a *Dillemma* which Mr. *Lock* propoſes concerning *Innate Principles*. But any one who takes the pains to conſider what he there ſays, will find that he uſes thoſe Terms in a quite different ſenſe from that

which

which Mr. *Lock* underſtands by *Innate Principles*; and that therefore Mr. *Lock* is not at all concern'd in that Argument: Neither is it any thing to the Remarkers purpoſe of eſtabliſhing *Natural Conſcience* in his own ſenſe and notion of it, if we may take it from his Definition, *Page* 7. but, indeed, his uncertain uſe of theſe, and thoſe other Terms I have mention'd, makes it very difficult to know what he means by his *Principle of Natural Conſcience*; for thoſe *Principles* which he here affirms to be *Innate*, are Powers of the Soul, the *Exerciſe* of which, he ſays, is *Conditional, and depends upon the diſpoſition of the Body*, Culture, *and other* Circumſtances; which as they are very different from thoſe *Principles* which Mr. *Lock* denies to be *Innate*; ſo are they alſo from the Remarkers *Principle of diſtinguiſhing in Moral Caſes without* Ratiocination, *ſufficient for a general direction of our Lives, and the foundation of Natural Religion.* For how can it be ſufficient for thoſe Ends, if it depend upon contingent *Circumſtances?* Or how can the Exerciſe of a Power of diſtinguiſhing things *without Ratiocination*, depend upon any *Culture*, or be hindred by *contrary Principles*, as, he ſays, this Power may? For by *Culture* here muſt be meant a *Right Inſtruction, or Right* Reflection; and by *contrary Principles*, falſe Maxims, or Opinions, (tho' in the ſame place he uſes that Term in a quite different ſenſe, for *Powers* of the Soul) which are all acts of *Ratiocination*;

P. 16.

P. 5, 8, 9.

P. 16.

and

and therefore to ſay that the *Exerciſe* of this Power depends upon them, is the ſame thing as to ſay, that the Power of diſtinguiſhing things *without Ratiocination*, depends upon *Ratiocination*. Which, if the Remarker underſtands, I believe he will hardly make it intelligible to any body elſe.

From all theſe Obſervations compar'd, and rightly apply'd, it will plainly appear that Mr. *Lock* is very little concern'd
*Ibid.* in this Diſcourſe, which, the Remarker ſays, is in defence of Natural Conſcience, againſt whom I know not, the moſt part of it being Arguments for things which Mr. *Lock* no leſs affirms than he, tho' he appear to oppoſe him, by uſing Mr. *Lock*'s Words in a different ſenſe from that which he underſtands them in; and thoſe Arguments by which the Remarker really does oppoſe him, being anticipated, and fully Anſwer'd in Mr. *Lock*'s Eſſay.

And from the inconſiſtency of his Definition of *Natural Conſcience*, with his illuſtrations of it in ſeveral places, and his looſe and undetermin'd uſe of thoſe Terms which are of greateſt conſequence in this Diſcourſe, I muſt take leave to conclude, that he has not fix'd in his own Mind a clear Idea of that Principle which he contends for; tho' he thinks he has given
*P.* 8. *Rules, and Marks*, by which it may ſufficiently appear to others what he means by it; and therefore by thoſe *Marks* I will endeavour a little to clear his own

Notion

Notion to him; and for his ſatisfaction to eſtabliſh what I think Natural Conſcience is, according to Mr. *Lock*'s Principles, and in the true Notion of it; tho' Mr. *Lock* is without reaſon brought into this Diſpute, as is evident from the Remarker's own words; *I do not remember* (ſays he) *that in this ſenſe you have once nam'd Natural Conſcience in your Book*: Why then I pray are ſo many Arguments us'd, as if he had writ a whole Book againſt it? By what Rule is a Man concluded to deny every thing that he has not affirm'd? But the Remarker is not the firſt who has thought this good Logick, and fair dealing againſt Mr. *Lock*; whatever he writes next, if it ſhou'd be of *Gravitation*, or the *Motions of the Planets*, I think he wou'd do well to put the Articles of his Religion at the end of it, for fear he ſhou'd be accus'd of having none, if his Book ſhou'd not happen to name any. 3 R. p. 5.

But as to *Natural Conſcience*, I deſire the Remarker to examine whether that *Principle* he ſpeaks of, or (as I had rather expreſs it here, as leſs Equivocal) that *Power* of diſtinguiſhing in Moral things *without Ratiocination*, be not a conſequent of a *previous* Ratiocination, or Inſtruction; by which, having got ſome clear or *confus'd* Ideas of Good and Evil, a different affection of the Mind conſtantly ariſes from them, and this ſo immediate, as that it may be truly ſaid to be *without* Ratiocination; from which, the miſtake

may come, that it prevents, or is *before any Raticionation*, tho' it is really an effect of it, only operating without taking notice of its cauſe; as in other Caſes, the likings or averſions of the Mind, to things, or Perſons, may be obſerv'd to do, which having been at firſt produc'd by ſome outward Cauſe, ſome Good, or Evil, we have found, or heard, or apprehended of thoſe Things, or Perſons, the ſame affection conſtantly exerts it ſelf at their preſence, without any reflection on the Cauſe, or perhaps the leaſt ſenſe that it ever had a known Cauſe.

And this ſudden affection in Moral Caſes, is indeed of excellent uſe, when it is once *ſet on work by an enlightned Judgment*, to keep up the diſtinction of Good and Evil, to incite, or to be a check upon Mens Actions, in the heat of a Temptation, when they have neither time nor power to reaſon the Caſe, or to reflect upon the Inſtructions have been given them; and *thus* may be truly call'd *the Support of Natural Religion*; or as the Apoſtle ſays, *a witneſs accuſing or excuſing thoſe who have no other Law but that of Nature*; but muſt not therefore be taken for the Law it ſelf, or as the Remarker calls it, the *Foundation of Natural Religion*, but rather *Natural Religion for the Foundation of it*; and then it may with ſafety be rely'd on. Therefore Philoſophers, and Divines, having moſtly writ for ſuch as have had in ſome meaſure a knowledge of their

their Duty, do with good reaſon give great Authority to this Witneſs, and frequently ſend Men to conſult their Conſciences, as if it were the Original Rule, and an Infallible Director; for it is not eaſily perverted, or ſilenc'd, when once rightly ſet on work; and has a great influence on Mens Actions, nothing being more inſupportable, than to ſtand condemn'd in our own Judgments; or more delightful, than the approbation of our own Minds; and therefore this Monitor may prevail, when our Paſſions have miſled or ſilenc'd Reaſon; or the hopes of eſcaping Future Puniſhments made us for a while ſecure.

But Powerful and Faithful as this Witneſs is, ſince it may by falſe Opinions, or vicious Habits, take a wrong Biaſs, (which the greateſt Aſſertors of its Authority confeſs,) and is always ſet on work by the firſt Perſwaſions which happen to take poſſeſſion of Mens thoughts, ſince it does not direct their Opinions, but is influenc'd by them; this not only ſhews that it is not deſign'd for the Original Rule, and firſt Director of our Actions, or *the Foundation of Natural Religion*, but that it is of dangerous Conſequence to lay the whole weight of Morality upon Conſcience alone, independent of the occaſions from which it has taken the firſt bent. For no doubt there are too many who by an unhappy early Education, perſue with the ſame bent of Con-

ſcience, or without the leaſt remorſe, what others (who have been better taught) abhor. Now in this Caſe, to bid theſe Men appeal to their Conſciences, as an Innate Guide, that will infallibly direct them in their Duty, can only ſerve to confirm them in their prejudices, and to make them go on ſecurely in their Vicious Habits, without farther Examination, when they find themſelves acquitted by that inward ſenſe, which they are taught to Revere as the impreſſion of God himſelf. That this may be the Caſe of many is not deny'd by the Remarker;

3 R. p. 10. *We do not conceive* (ſays he) *Natural Conſcience ſuch a Light as may not be dimn'd,*

P. 15. *or it may be* extinguiſh'd *in ſome People,* and in another place *appeal with ſincerity to your Conſcience; if that be obſcur'd,* perverted, *or ſear'd, we cannot help it. Theſe*

P. 16. *Principles of Conſcience are Seeds that may* Die, *or may Thrive,* &c. *they may be weak in ſome, and* ineffectual *in others, by contrary Principles, or other Impediments.* This being granted, it is evident that thoſe People in whom theſe Principles happen to be *extinguiſh'd,* or *perverted,* will in vain appeal with ſincerity to their Conſciences; there is no way to ſet them right but by rectifying their Judgments; they are to be warn'd not to truſt to ſo dangerous a ſecurity, and to be convinc'd of their Errors, and their obligations, on Rational Grounds.

I appeal

I appeal to the Remarker, whether this is not the only way of dealing with a Man who has been Educated from his Infancy in falſe Principles, confirm'd by vicious Habits, and the approbation of all his Companions, whether ſuch a Man may not by Reflection and Reaſon be corrected, and convinc'd of the Natural Obligations which the Creator has laid on him, as a Rational, Sociable, and Dependent Creature? This I doubt not the Remarker will allow, his Zeal for an *Innate Light* will not tranſport him ſo far as to put out the *Light of Reaſon*, that it may ſhine alone, and leave Men irrecoverably in the dark, in whom this Light of Conſcience happens to be *Extinguiſh'd*: Tho' he ſays *he does not ſee by what Ratiocination we can collect what the Will of God is, unleſs we take in Natural Conſcience for a diſtinction of Good and Evil.* I hope on farther conſideration, and what I have before ſaid on that Subject, he will not deny the conſiſtency of our Duty to Reaſon, and the Evidence of it to all who diligently ſet themſelves to know it; That wou'd indeed be *an indignity to Mankind, and a great ingratitude to our Maker*: But all who perceive the reaſonableneſs of what is required of us, the neceſſity of it for the preſervation or perfection of our Nature; all who read the will of God in his *Wiſdom*, muſt acknowledge that he has not been thus wanting unto Men, but that all the Precepts of Natural Religion may be clearly

3d P. 5.

clearly known by the Light of Reaſon, to any one who ſets himſelf to ſearch. This being what I believe the Remarker will not think fit to deny, I take for granted, and deſire him to conſider, whether a Man, in whom the Dictates of Conſcience (ſuppoſing them Innate) have been early obſcur'd, or perverted, being brought to a knowledge of his Duty by Reaſon, or Reflection, whether I ſay this Man has not a ſure foundation for Natural Religion, without taking in his Principle of Conſcience for a diſtinction of Good and Evil? This he muſt grant, unleſs he will ſay that *General, obſcure and indiſtinct notices* (for ſo
P. 7. he deſcribes his Innate Principles) are a better foundation for Natural Religion, than clear and diſtinct Knowledge; which if it be too abſurd to aſſert, the Remarker muſt own, notwithſtanding his Zeal for *Innate Principles*, that thoſe who deny them may have a ſure foundation for Natural Religion, as long as the Precepts of it are conſiſtent with, or Evident to the Light of Reaſon.

And farther I ſuppoſe the Remarker will very readily allow, that when a Man is thus brought by Reaſon to a true Senſe of his Duty, his Conſcience, tho' before perverted, will then be ſet right, and thenceforward Condemn or Acquit him, according as he obeys or not that Law which his Underſtanding has aſſented to, and this *without Ratiocination*, by an immediate affection of the Mind: But let

him

him consider whether this be the effect of an Original impression on the Mind, anticipating all Reflection, or Ratiocination; or whether it does not plainly prove, that Conscience is nothing else but a Judgment which we make of our Actions, with reference to some Law, which we are perswaded ought to be the Rule of them. This I believe will, upon an unprejudic'd Examination, be found to be the true Notion of Natural Conscience, and the Best with regard to Religion (as Truth always is a surer support for it than the most Pious mistaken Notions) for this account cautions Men not to trust to a Peace of Conscience which may proceed from false Opinions; and leaves all its Authority in those who have had occasions of being rightly inform'd of their Duty.

Thus I have done with each particular Head of the Remarkers Enquiries, and I hope have said enough to convince him, that Mr. *Lock*'s Principles of Humane understanding, give a sufficient security against such a System as he apprehends, *a Manichæan God, a Mortal Soul, an Arbitrary Law of Good and Evil*, and any dangerous Inferences from Mr. *Lock*'s Notion of *Cogitant Matter*, viz. *That God* may, *for any thing we know, give the Power of Cogitation to some Systems of Matter*. For I have shewn that the Proofs of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, are equally conclusive without a Demonstrative certainty of the Souls *Immateriality*. And as to that other

2. R. *p.* 11.
3. R. *p.* 16.

other Difficulty with which the firſt Remarks conclude, concerning the Nature of God and his *Immateriality*, upon this conceſſion, That Matter may be capable of Perception and Thought, Mr. *Lock* has ſo well confuted the *Materialiſts* on that Point, ſo ſtrongly prov'd, that Cogitation cannot be the Power of Matter, or that the Supreme Cogitant Being cannot be Material, that I cannot immagine to what end the Remarker brings in thoſe Arguments againſt the Immateriality of God, if he means as well to Religion, and Mr. *Lock*, as he wou'd be thought to do.

Eſſay B. 4. C. 10.

But whatever he there meant, it ſeems he has repented upon farther thoughts, or better ſeen the force of Mr. *Lock*'s proofs that God is Immaterial; which he there fears will riſe no higher than Probability, tho' he heartily wiſhes they may; but in his Third Letter, his judgment is brought over to his hearty wiſh, and he confeſſes that Mr. *Lock very well refutes the Materialiſt, who wou'd have but one ſingle ſubſtance in the World, namely Matter*. And to ſhew his ſincerity and good will the more, he owns this where one wou'd leaſt expect it, when he is giving the worſt inſinuations he can of Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; But the manner of his doing it is an extraordinary mark of the kind intentions, and reſpect to Mr. *Lock*, which he profeſſes, and which no body can doubt of, who obſerves how ingeniouſly he endeavours to faſten the *Principles*

P. 23.

*of*

*of Deiſm* on Mr. *Lock*, by ſhewing that ſome of his Notions are not inconſiſteut with them ; and that ſome of the Queſtions which he diſcuſſes may be rais'd upon their Principles, tho' none of them do neceſſarily depend upon thoſe Principles ; and a great part of his Eſſay is directly contrary to that which the Remarker ſays he cannot but think is the Miſtery aim'd at all along, but conceal'd from us, *viz. That the Soul of Man is not a diſtinct permanent ſubſtance.* Let the impartial, judge whether this be to *argue fairly* ; or whether it does no look like a *deſire to make uſe of Names* to no very fair purpoſe. But that I may not be ſuſpected to have miſrepreſented the Remarkers way of imputing the Deiſts Principles to Mr. *Lock*, I will, as briefly as poſſible, run over the particulars which he compares to them. Vide 2 R. p. 12.

*The grand Principle of Deiſm* ( ſays he ) *is this, There's one Infinite, Univerſal Spirit that actuates Matter always, without the Operation of particular Spirits ; And if the Soul of Man be nothing but an influx from another Principle, not a diſtinct permanent Subſtance, whoſoever goes upon this Principle, I do not wonder if he cannot allow Innate Ideas, or Practical Principles in the Soul ; for there is no permanent Soul to imprint them upon.* 3 R. p. 23 ( *Anſw.* ) But may not one who does think the Soul a permanent Subſtance, doubt that it has any Ideas but what it received from Senſation and Reflection; becauſe he is not conſcious of any but what he can

trace to those Originals? And the Power or Faculties of receiving Ideas, no less require a permanent Substance to Exist in, than Ideas themselves. *Moreover* (says the Remarker) *upon that Hypothesis the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal.* And what is that, I pray, to Mr. *Lock?* Has he any where told us that the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal? Does he not frequently profess a stedfast belief that the Soul is Immortal? Has he not zealously contested that our ignorance of what kind of Substance the Soul is, does not at all weaken the assurances of its Immortality? Why then is this, That *the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal*, brought in as an opinion of Mr. *Lock's*, but at any rate to make that Position, *That the Soul is not a distinct Substance*, be suppos'd a Principle of his?

Essay, B. 4.

*Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's 2d Letter.*

*Furthermore* (says the Remarker) *in consequence of this Principle of Deism, and the Mortality of the Soul, great difficulties must needs arise to them about the Resurrection, How it can be the same* Man, *or the same* Person, *that rises again, when both the Body and the Soul are new; and this wou'd bring on nice disputes about the Notions of Identity, and Diversity, which accordingly we find discussed at large in the Essay, for their satisfaction, I suppose, that go upon those Principles.* It may be so, But the Remarker must give me leave to *suppose* too, that those Notions are not discuss'd for their satisfaction *alone*, who go upon those Principles;

ciples; and the reaſon why I take the liberty to ſuppoſe ſo, is, becauſe Mr. *Lock* determines the Ideas of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, upon ſeveral very different Principles; and becauſe thoſe who do think the Soul a diſtinct permanent Subſtance, may have ſome *difficulties about the Reſurrection, and about the Notions of Identity and Diverſity*; for *Identity of Subſtance* will not determine it in all caſes, as *Perſonal Identity*, and *Human Identity*, to thoſe who take the *Body* into their Idea of *Man*; and for their ſatisfaction who place *Humane Identity* in the ſame *Immaterial Spirit*, united to ſuch and ſuch Particles of Matter, in ſuch a Shape and Form, Mr. *Lock* ſhews how we *may eaſily conceive the ſame Perſon at the Reſurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in make or parts the ſame he had here.* But ſuppoſing with the Remarker, that Diſcourſe was deſign'd for the ſatisfaction of thoſe *who go upon the Principles of Deiſm*, that does not ſure Intitle Mr. *Lock* to their Principles; and indeed theſe are a ſort of Deiſts very well worth ſatisfying, whatever they think of the Soul, ſince they allow the Reſurrection: I ſuppoſe they are of that Party which the Remarker tells us will own both Natural and Reveal'd Religion. And to ſatisfie ſuch Men how conſiſtently with their own Notions, they may conceive the ſame Perſons at the Reſurrection, accountable for their Actions in this Life, is worthy of a good Man's pains, tho' he differs from them in their opinions *Poſtſcript.*

opinions of the Soul; and much more ſerviceable to Religion, than thoſe can be (what ever zeal they pretend for it) who will not allow that the Reſurrection, or a Future State, can be eſtabliſh'd upon any Hypotheſis but their own; for no doubt, if Men are convinc'd of a Future State, 'tis of no conſequence upon what grounds they are ſo, their miſtakes about the Subſtance of the Soul, will not endanger their Morals, or their Salvation; And if Mr. *Lock*'s Diſcourſe of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, was deſign'd to reſolve the difficulties that may ariſe about the Reſurrection, that can only ſhew his concern to ſecure that Eſſential point upon every Man's Principles, ſince he determines the Ideas of Identity and Diverſity upon ſeveral contrary ſuppoſitions; and therefore there can be no reaſon to conclude any one of them to be his opinion, more than another, unleſs he has declar'd in favour of one, which he has done two or three times in that Chapter for this, *That the Soul is one Individual, Immaterial Subſtance*, the direct contrary to that which the Remarker wou'd have thought to be his opinion.

Vide, p. 13. S. 25.

We come now to the next and laſt diſpute which the Remarker mentions as ariſing from that Principle, *That the Soul is not a Subſtance diſtinct from God and Matter. From this Poſition* (he ſays) *a Queſtion ſprings up concerning the Powers of Matter, or whether Matter be not capable of Cogitation?* I ſhould rather think this Queſtion

R. p. 14.

pre-

preceded that Position; it seems more Rational, and Natural, in the ignorance Men are of *what the Soul is*, first to enquire whether that Power of Cogitation which they perceive in themselves may not be communicated to Matter; and if they find no contradiction in it, (and upon that think fit to determine of the nature of a thing, which they cannot certainly know) thence to conclude, that the Soul is not a Substance distinct from Matter. But howsoever that be, it cannot be concluded, that those who make this Question go upon a Supposition *That the Soul is not a distinct permanant Substance*, which is the Principle the Remarker wou'd have suppos'd to be Mr. *Lock*'s; The Question, as Mr. *Lock* makes it, is not *whether our Cogitations are the operations of God, or of Matter*; but whether God has given the Power of Cogitation to a *Material*, or an *Immaterial Substance*, and which way soever this Question is resolved, the Soul must equally be suppos'd *a distinct permanent Substance*; for a *Material Substance* is not less a *Substance* than an *Immaterial*.

But the fallacy by which that supposition, *That the Soul is not a distinct permanent Substance*, is imputed to Mr. *Lock*, upon his doubting whether the Soul may not be Material, lies in this, that supposing the Soul not to be a Substance distinct from *Matter*, is taken for the same thing, as supposing it not to be distinct from *the Body*, which are very different suppositions;

tions; and upon this fallacy it is concluded, that those who think the Soul may be *Material*, cannot suppose it to exist after the dissolution of the Body. But that one who thinks God may have given *Perception* and *Thought*, to some Systems of Matter dispos'd as he sees fit, may suppose this System *distinct from the Body*; and to continue in the same State of *Cogitation* when the *Body* is dissolved, we have for an Instance (not to mention many others) a no less eminent Philosopher than *Cicero*, who in all his enquiries about the Substance of the Soul, went not beyond that Matter of which the Heavens are made, *Aristotle*'s *Quinta Essentia*; tho' he finds reasons to think it may be *Immortal* and survive *the Body*; and plainly distinguishes it from *Body*, taken for the sensible, organical parts of a Man, tho' there is nothing of Immateriality in all his considerations about the substance of the Soul.

This then is evident, that none of these Discourses in the Essay which the Remarker mentions, as *agreeing with the notion of one Universal Mind operating according to different Systems of Matter, without any particular thinking Beings distinct from the Universal*; None of them, I say, do necessarily depend upon, or terminate in that Supposition; and some of them do necessarily suppose the contrary: For if the Soul is not suppos'd a particular Substance, distinct from the Universal Spirit, to what purpose are any Questions Made or Resolv'd about

about the Reſurrection? There is no ground for ſuch an expectation, who can take account, or be accountable for actions done here, if they are all the operations of one Univerſal Spirit? And who but the Remarker cou'd find any conſiſtency in that Suppoſition, with a Diſcourſe to ſatisfie Men how they may conceive the ſame Perſons at the Reſurrection, and juſtly ſubject to Rewards and Puniſhments, whatever ſubſtance the Soul is, or of whatever Particles the Body is made up? No ſort of Deiſts, or Sect of Men, that I know of, did ever reconcile theſe two opinions.

Thoſe Sects which the Remarker ſays were noted for holding only one Univerſal Mind, conſiſtently with themſelves denied the Reſurrection; and to ſuch Men Mr. *Lock*'s Diſcourſe about *Identity* and *Diverſity*, cou'd give no ſatisfaction in that Point, nor cou'd it be made upon their Principles. But I leave the Reader to judge what ground there is from any of the Particulars mention'd, for the Remarker to impute that opinion to Mr. *Lock*, and to *think that the Miſtery aim'd at all along* in an Eſſay, where upon every occaſion he ſpeaks of the Soul as a real diſtinct ſubſtance, in too many places to be inſtanced; and of Man as a free Agent, ſubject to an Eternal Retribution, according to his doings in this Life; and that ſo frequently, and ſo expreſly, that 'tis impoſſible to declare his ſentiments upon that grand Point

13. *P.* 22.


*Ibid.*

(for

(for the Remarkers Eaſe as he deſires) more plainly than he has done; which, indeed, is ſo effectual a way of *concealing a Myſtery* ſo oppoſite to thoſe Notions, that I believe no body will ſuſpect it to be Mr. *Lock*'s *aim*, but the Remarker: And he, I hope, upon further reflection, will find *an eaſier Key to decipher this Philoſophy*, and be as forward to own his miſtakes of Mr. *Lock*'s Principles, and wrong inferences from them, as he was to publiſh Remarks ſo injurious to him, upon *uncertain Concluſions, and groundleſs Suppoſitions.*

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*The End.*



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