

*This I am sure of, that the Distinction, suppose of Gratitude and Ingratitude, Fidelity and Infidelity, Justice and Injustice, and such others, is as sudden without any Ratiocination, and as sensible and peircing, as the Difference I feel from the Scent of a Rose and Asa-foetida. One would think here, he were doubting whether upon Mr. Lock's principles we can distinguish Gratitude from Ingratitude, Fidelity from Infidelity, &c. that is; know that breaking a Trust, is not keeping a Trust, &c. which (as all other Moral Virtues, as Mr. Lock has shewn) are a* Fsp 9.  
14.  
*Collection of simple Ideas, received from Sensation and Reflection; But since he allow'd above, that we can from Observation and Reason, infer such a Distinction to be useful to Society, and by consequence, that we can by them perceive such a Distinction, we will guess his meaning here, to be, that the perception of the Morality and Immorality of these things is as sudden, &c. as the difference he feels from the scent of a Rose, and Asa-foetida; tho' I do not know what it is, to perceive the Morality and Immorality of these things without any Ratiocination; Justice and Injustice, I think, depend upon the Rights of Men, whether Natural, or establish'd by particular Societies, and therefore to know what they are, 'tis necessary to know what Right is, which sure requires some Reflection; but to know that Injustice is Evil, without any Reflection, seems to me, no more than to know that the term In-*