

stice, stands for something that we don't know, which is Evil; unless it will be said that we may know it to be a detaining any one's Right, without knowing what Right is, which will be a very insignificant Knowledge: But if the Remarker means that as soon as he knows what it is to have a Right to a Thing, he perceives, that to detain from a Man what he has such a Right to, is Evil, without any farther Reflection, I understand him, but see not how it can be objected against the force of Mr. *Lock's* principles, being only a perception of the disagreement of these two Ideas, of one Man's having a Right to a Thing, and another's having a Right to take it away: But this only by the way.

Let us now Consider that for which this sudden preception without Ratiocination is brought as a Proof, *viz.* That the Grounds of the Distinction of Moral Good and Evil, is in the Nature of the Things themselves, abstract from the good of Society; which is that he cannot make out from Mr. *Lock's* Principles. By which Distinction in the Nature of Things, if he means that without respect to Men, or to Society, tho' Mankind had never been, or never been design'd, Justice, Gratitude, Fidelity, &c. had been Good, and their contraries Evil; I Confess my self incapable of having a Notion of these Vertues abstract from any Subject, to conceive. For Example, that