

ly establish'd, if it is, and always must be true, supposing those things to which it relates, to exist.

2 R. p. 22. But here the Remarker's Question will be made, Upon what Grounds must it be so? If *Good* and *Evil*, *Vertue* and *Vice*, are not such in their own Nature, they must be so from the Arbitrary Will of God, and all Things are indifferent, till he declare This, or That, to be Sin, according to his Pleasure: That is, he might if he had so pleas'd, have made *Vertue*, *Vice*, and *Vice*, *Vertue*: To which, I answer, That God having made Man such a Creature as he is, it is as impossible that *Good* and *Evil* should change their respects to him, as that *Pleasure* can be *Pain*, and *Pain Pleasure*, which no one in his Senses will Affirm, and yet, I think, no Body has suppos'd them to be real Existences, independent of any Subject; And if the Relation which Moral Good and Evil has to Natural Good and Evil, were sufficiently observed, there would be as little dispute about the Nature and Reality of *Vertue* and *Vice*: Those who think they are only Notions in the Mind, would be convinced they are as Real as Natural, Good and Evil; all *Moral Good* consisting in Doing, Willing, or Chusing, for one's self or others, what ever is a *Natural Good*; and all *Moral Evil*, in Doing, Willing, or Chusing whatever is a *Natural Evil*, to one's self or others. This, I doubt not,